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ABSTRACT
2011 was a seminal year in the history of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Popularly
referred to as the Arab Spring, the region has experienced a wave of revolutions and instability. It
can be classified in three broad categories within 2011: Uprisings that have resulted in the
overthrow of standing regimes, uprisings that have failed to overthrow standing regimes, and states
that have not experienced popular revolts. In the first category Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and Tunisia
have all experienced uprisings resulting in the respective departure of Muamar Gaddafi, Hosni
Mubarak, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali. In contrast Syria and Bahrain have
experienced uprisings that have not resulted into the toppling of their regimes thus far. Finally,
countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran have experienced none of the instability observed in 2011
within the same time period.
In tracking the evolution of selectorates, I identified the rise of actors within the newly
developing coalitions whose Islamist preferences are unaccounted for in the standard Selectorate
Model. As later explained in detail, Selectorate Theory is driven by the public-private goods
argument. The theory states that a leader’s political survival is based on the mix of private payoffs
he can provide to his selectorate and public goods provided to the general population. The once
secular despots are either gone or are on the way out as evident by the removal of Hosni Mubarak,
Zine Abidine Ben-Ali, Saddam Hussein, Muamar Gaddafi, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the currently
embattled Bashar Al- Assad. They are being replaced or have already been removed by governments
that are led by Islamic Parties. Therefore, newly elected or appointed leaders must take into account
the role of religion in their calculus for political survival in a way that they did not before. This begs
the question: what about the regimes in my case studies that have not been toppled such as Saudi
Arabia, Iran, and Bahrain? Although these are highly autocratic governments, the leaders of such
governments have a legitimacy that is derived from implicit approval of their Islamist allies. This

strengthens the argument that religion must be accounted for beyond the standard Selectorate
Model rationale for political survival in MENA. In such context I provide a revised Selectorate Model
explanation that accounts for the role of religion.
I conclude that the standard Selectorate Theory is insufficient for MENA because it is does not
account for the role of religion. By testing the coalitional distribution and evolution of selectorates, I
developed a revised Selectorate Model that includes the role of religion along with the standard
private payoffs – public goods argument. The role of religion is expressed by the presence of
religious stakeholders in the agent based model such as clerics, shura councils or Islamic parties
present in all selectorates in MENA. I tracked the selectorates through a series of predictions made
throughout the course of 2011 using the Senturion agent based model. It serves as a powerful
alternative to standard historical analysis and wisdom. I provide an explanation of why certain
regimes fell while others remained relatively stable and why some governments experiencing similar
instability remain using agent based modeling (ABM) in application to Selectorate Theory.
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I.

Introduction and Overview
2011 was a seminal year in the history of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Popularly

referred to as the Arab Spring, the region has experienced a wave of revolutions and instability. It can be
classified in three broad categories within 2011: Uprisings that have resulted in the overthrow of
standing regimes, uprisings that have failed to overthrow standing regimes, and states that have not
experienced popular revolts. In the first category Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and Tunisia have all experienced
uprisings resulting in the respective departure of Muamar Gaddafi, Hosni Mubarak, Ali Abdullah Saleh,
and Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali. In contrast Syria and Bahrain have experienced uprisings that have not
resulted into the toppling of their regimes thus far. Finally, countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran have
experienced none of the instability observed in 2011 within the same time period.
In tracking the evolution of selectorates, I identified the rise of actors within the newly developing
coalitions whose Islamist preferences are unaccounted for in the standard Selectorate Model. As later
explained in detail, Selectorate Theory is driven by the public-private goods argument. The theory states
that a leader’s political survival is based on the mix of private payoffs he can provide to his selectorate
and public goods provided to the general population (Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 2003). The proportion
of private versus public goods determines the type of government the leader will have. However, with
the rise of Islamist Parties, leaders in MENA must take into account preferences that are not driven only
by financial benefits, but also social and religious preferences. The once secular despots are either gone
or are on the way out as evident by the removal of Hosni Mubarak, Zine Abidine Ben-Ali, Saddam
Hussein, Muamar Gaddafi, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the currently embattled Bashar Al- Assad. They are
being replaced or have already been removed by governments that are led by Islamic Parties. Therefore,
newly elected or appointed leaders must take into account the role of religion in their calculus for
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political survival in a way that they did not before. This begs the question: what about the regimes in
my case studies that have not been toppled such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Bahrain? Although these are
highly autocratic governments, the leaders of such governments have a legitimacy that is derived from
implicit approval of their Islamist allies. This strengthens the argument that religion must be accounted
for beyond the standard Selectorate Model rationale for political survival in MENA. In such context I
provide a revised Selectorate Model explanation that accounts for the role of religion.
This dissertation evaluates the Selectorate Model in application to the Middle East. I conclude that
the standard Selectorate Theory is insufficient for MENA because it is does not account for the role of
religion. By testing the coalitional distribution and evolution of selectorates, I developed a revised
Selectorate Model that includes the role of religion along with the standard private payoffs – public
goods argument. The role of religion is expressed by the presence of religious stakeholders in the agent
based model such as clerics, shura councils or Islamic parties present in all selectorates in MENA. I
tracked the selectorates through a series of predictions made throughout the course of 2011 using the
Senturion agent based model. It serves as a powerful alternative to standard historical analysis and
wisdom. I provide an explanation of why certain regimes fell while others remained relatively stable and
why some governments experiencing similar instability remain using agent based modeling (ABM) in
application to Selectorate Theory. The predictions are organized as case studies tracking the rebellions
or lack thereof and the political dynamics of several states in the Middle East and North Africa. The
states included in the dissertation consist of Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Libya.
This is an empirical test of Selectorate Theory using agent based modeling in predicting the
outcome of events taking place in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The predicted outcomes
serve as a tool for examining the Selectorate Model by identifying the evolution of coalitions. A test in
predicting real-world events taking place serves as a strong validation of my revised selectorate model
as well as the agent based model itself. Indeed not all the predictions have been accurate; however, the
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majority of predictions have proven to be valid with moderate to detailed specificity. The ultimate
explanatory power of a model is how well the prediction matches reality. This dissertation is an attempt
at not just predicting the future as an end in itself. Instead we test the validity of the predictions for the
purpose of finding generalizable explanations on why regimes fall while others faced with similar
centripetal forces remain in the context of the selectorates.
In an age of continued political punditry much of the policy making world is bombarded by subject
matter experts who provide a valuable illustration of the historical and present environment. However,
such experts are unable to provide reliable predictions on future political outcomes. Although not a
perfect model or a silver bullet by any means, the Senturion agent based model harnesses the
knowledge of subject matter experts using computing technology to make predictions that are much
more accurate than the seat of the pants analysis which mainly relies on intuitive historical trends. This
particular agent based model uses game theory logic such as expected utility. It encapsulates over half a
century’s work in economics, political psychology, and computing technology.
The common mode of decision-making by policymakers is to first receive detailed analysis and
narratives about any particular dilemma. For example, the on-set of the Arab Spring, similar to any other
particular crises, set into motion a flood of analysis to policy-makers consisting of detailed descriptions
of the various factors leading up to the wave of instability facing the region.1 Analyses ranged anywhere
from cultural and historical perspectives of the uprisings to conceptual explanations common among
political scientists and historians.2 Explanations such as economic disparities, dissatisfaction among the
masses, and social injustices causing such dissatisfaction serve as such examples. These cases are at best
the culmination of wisdom that can account for events only after they have occurred. Unfortunately the
current policy world more often than not succumbs to analyses that are rarely more than journalism
1

Defense Whiz to Pentagon: Your Predictions are Destined to Fail
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/danzig-military-predictions/
2

Ibid.
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sprinkled with opinions that are shot from the hip. Indeed, objective journalism and reporting of the
news provide the necessary foundation for analyses. However, journalism coupled with unfounded
analysis serves merely as an opinion or editorial commentary grounded in ideological advocacy of beliefs
that are difficult to prove or disprove.
The extreme opposite approach to the journalistic narrative is the excessively esoteric research
written by academics for academics. As advances in computing technology improve, so too do the
quantitative methods in analyzing complex policy dilemmas or puzzles. As political scientists we often
focus more on the methodology and theoretical constructs of a problem rather than solving the puzzle
in a manner that can be actionable for policymakers. In short we often end up having a conversation
with ourselves rather than providing decision makers alternatives to the status quo ante. The answer
lays somewhere in-between describing the crises and making scientific conclusions using proven
methodologies (Feder 1995).
The concept of game theory based ABMs have an elegant practicality. It posits that stakeholders,
domestic and international policymakers, are self-interested rational individuals who seek to maximize
the benefits to each decision they make after weighing the costs and risks associated with any action.
The application of expected utility with ABMs calculates the anticipated costs and benefits of any
particular decision in order to predict the actions of stakeholders in regard to any particular issue. But
before making any calculation, analysts must identify who the stakeholders are, how influential they are,
what their position is on any an issue, and the level of importance they place on the issue. In fact, most
rational policymakers already think in this fashion intuitively. Assume a person enters a negotiation
table. He or she will naturally want to know some fundamental questions. Who are the people at the
negotiating table? How powerful are they in regard to achieving their goal? How important do they hold
the issue being negotiated? Which groups or organizations do they belong do? Any particular negotiator
or policymaker will wonder how others may react based his or her action. Therefore, a rational
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negotiator will then take a position on an issue based on his or her perception of how others will react.
In spite of the fact that strategic negotiators already think and act based on these questions, the human
mind has limitations on tracking how everyone will react based on all the interactions of different moves
by the various stakeholders.

II.

Problem Statement:

The wave of uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has posed a high level of
uncertainty for global policymakers, regional leaders, and the various populations affected by this
instability. In this dissertation I will evaluate whether Selectorate Theory is an adequate explanation for
the events unfolding in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since 2011. I will test and evaluate this
by applying agent based modeling in order to capture the coalition distributions and the evolution of the
various selectorates. I will argue that the role of religion should be accounted for in the scope of
Selectorate Theory due to the rise of Islamic parties in the MENA by democratic means. The Selectorate
Model states that government types are determined by two primary elements: the size of the
selectorate, meaning the group of actors who have a say in policy outcomes, and the winning coalition
necessary in keeping the leadership in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003). The theory is driven by an
incentive argument indicating that a leader’s survival is based on a mix of private payoffs and public
services (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). In application to MENA I propose an expanded
Selectorate Model that will include not only pressure by the population for governments to shift away
from maximizing private benefits for supporters to maximizing the public good of the expanding
selectorate, but will do so by concurrently considering financial gains with religious preferences. I will
evaluate whether adding the role of religion in Selectorate Theory provides a clearer picture of the
evolution of the Arab Spring, particularly with the rise of Islamic parties by democratic means.
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I will use agent based modeling to empirically test the validity of Selectorate Theory (Abdollahian,
Kugler, Feng, 2000). In my dissertation I will conduct an empirical test of Selectorate Thoery using the
Senturion agent based model in an attempt to determine the validity and accuracy of the crises facing
the Middle East and North Africa in terms of coalitional distributions. Indeed, under longer time
horizons Selectorate Theory has shown to be accurate. My agent based analysis on the Arab Spring and
Iran indicates that in the transition period following a revolution the size of the selectorate and winning
coalition is not a determining factor on the extent of democratization. More simply, the preferences of
the stakeholders, many of them Islamist, within the selectorate determine the form of government
during the transition period. In fact there are also historical instances where the respective size of the
selectorate and coalition increased but the society became even more authoritarian, i.e. Iran 1979. The
countries I have made predictions on are consisting of Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, Iran, and Saudi
Arabia.
The Middle East and North Africa has experienced a wave of revolutions and uprisings. The
predicted states in the region can be classified in three broad categories:
1. Countries with uprisings that have resulted in the overthrow of standing regimes: This category
includes Egypt and Libya. They have experienced uprisings resulting in the respective departure of Hosni
Mubarak and Muamar Gaddafi.
2. Countries with revolts that have failed to overthrow standing regimes: Syria and Bahrain serve as such
examples.
3. Countries that have not experienced popular revolts: Saudi Arabia and Iran have had none of the
internal instability observed in the first two categories.
Motivated by the Selectorate Model, this paper outlines the series of predictions made
throughout the course of 2011 on the Arab Spring and Iran by applying agent based modeling. Having
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proven to be accurate, my analysis documents the evolution of events taking place in the selected
countries.
Hypotheses:
H1: The further away the winning coalition is from the median stakeholder, the greater the conditions
for a political crisis or uprising. (Black 1958)
The median stakeholders were weighted based on each particular stakeholder’s level of
influence. For example, in the case of Syria, Bashar Al Assad has the greatest influence. Therefore, he
garners the greatest weight. We captured the domestic median preferences on the issue of governance
and compared it to the current or deposed leader’s position. We also compared the domestic median
with the global median. The global median account for all the stakeholders, domestically and
internationally while the domestic median only captures the actors within the country being analyzed.
H2: Political survival of leaders in MENA is determined by religious preferences in conjunction with
the public-private goods argument posited by the Selectorate Model
Prior to analyzing the results we can observe that almost all the remaining governments in
MENA have a religious party within their polity. The most stable governments have either developed a
coalition with the religious stakeholders or are a non-secular government in entirety. The governments
which have been toppled during the Arab Spring were secular and are being replaced with less secular
leaders. Based on these observations we posit that political survival is linked to religious preferences, a
dimension that is not accounted for in the standard Selectorate Model.
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III. Literature Review
The Selectorate Perspective
The work by Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow (2003) on Selectorate Theory
posits that within every populace of a given state there is a subgroup of actors who have influence on
policy outcomes. Within this selectorate there is a winning coalition consisting of the subset of
stakeholders who select the leadership and aid him or her to maintain power. Figure 1 illustrates that
the size of the selectorate and the size of the winning coalition in proportion to the overall population
determine the type of government a state will have. For example, a monarchy has a small selectorate
comprised of the nobility within which a winning coalition comprised of members of the ruling family
select and support a king as the leader. On the opposite side of the spectrum, a democracy consists of a
large selectorate made up of all citizens who can vote and require a relatively large winning coalition,
summarily a majority of those who cast their vote for the winning leadership. As the size of the
selectorate increases, the extent of authoritarianism decreases (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995).
There are two circumstances that result into the leader being deposed: a constructive vote of
no confidence or simple deposition (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, et. al., 2003). In the cast of no
confidence, the challenger must draw enough support away from the incumbent in order for the
incumbent to lose backing from his winning coalition within the selectorate. If no particular leader
maintains support of a winning coalition, the incumbent remains the leader by default. In the case of
the Arab Spring, one such example is the lingering rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen. In April of 2011
Saleh agreed to step down within 30 days and after surpassing the initial time period was befallen with a
failed assassination attempt that seriously injured him. In spite of the major loss of confidence by the
majority of the tribes within Yemen represented as members of the winning coalition, Saleh continues
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to remain in Yemen due to the absence of an alternative ruler who can gain dominant support from his
previous coalition.
In the case of simple deposition, the challenger has to merely gain an adequate number of
supporters from the incumbent’s coalition. If the challenger gains more members of the coalition than
the incumbent, the ruling leader is then removed as the challenger takes his place. In the case of the
Arab Spring, the removal of Muamar Gaddafi of Libya served as a prime example illustrating how former
members of his coalition defected to the Libyan Transitional Council. As evident by my case study
analysis of Libya, the scales tipped in favor of the Libyan Transitional Council when Shokri Ghanem of the
Libyan Oil Corporation defected in support of the opposition.
The number of people comprising the winning coalition also has an impact on an incumbent’s
prospects for political survival (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, Morrow 2006). According to
Selectorate Theory if either the size of selectorate grows or the winning coalition shrinks, defecting
becomes riskier (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). It is this risk of exclusion from the winning
coalition that drives loyalty for the current leader, a major advantage for whoever holds the status quo.
It is for this reason in which political systems with small winning coalitions and large selectorates tend to
be most stable. In such a case, the members of the winning coalition can easily be substituted out with a
large pool of candidates from the large selectorate. Because of the ease of substitution, members within
the winning coalition are driven by a norm of loyalty where each member within the coalition attempts
to out due others in proving loyalty to the leader. In the case of the Arab Spring, such a system is
exhibited by Syria’s political system. In such a case the Assad regime has maintained control of Syria by
developing a small winning coalition with a large selectorate consisting of the Baath Party. My agent
based model indicates that Assad has a system where many of the actors within his coalition tend to me
more adamantly in support of the status quo than Assad himself. In effect, the analysis indicates that
Assad’s followers are extremely loyal and they depend on him for survival which according to
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Selectorate Theory is driven by the dynamic that they can easily be replaced by a vast array of
candidates with the Baath Party. This is one of the reasons why the Assad Regime has continued to
survive in spite of an international campaign opposing his rule with what is mounting into a civil war.
Choosing a political leader according to Selectorate Theory is driven by one primary factor: the
need for the leader to provide payoffs to the winning coalition in order to be selected and survive over
time (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). The mix of private and public goods leaders choose for the
purpose of maintaining power depends on the size of the selectorate. In a dictatorship, the leader can
survive by partitioning most of the state’s resources through private payoffs while devoting less of the
resources to be delivered as public goods. The small selectorate and winning coalition allows the leader
to buy off support without the need to gain public approval. Therefore, so long as the leader satisfies his
or her coalition, he or she maintains power. Because the vast majority of the dictator’s populous are
outside of the selectorate, he or she can limit public services while maintaining hefty private payoffs to
his winning coalition. Dictators can disregard and disenfranchise the vast majority outside the innercircle since they have little or no say on the choice of ruling authority.

Figure 1: Visual Conceptualization of Selectorate Model
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Selectorate Theory logic results into several core predictions on the behavior of political leaders
based on the size of the selectorate (S) and the winning coalition (W). In the first prediction, the larger
the ratio of W/S reduces the leader’s proclivity to stealing from the public coffers. As the size of the
winning coalition grows, leaders are more prone to commit revenues to public goods that benefit
broader society instead of private stakeholders. (Bueno de Mesquita, et. al (2003). Based on this logic,
the we reach the second prediction: The welfare of the members of the winning coalition decrease with
the rise of W ; however, there is a threshold where the coalition’s welfare eventually increases after a
turning point based on factors such as stability and extent of democratization. The winning coalition’s
welfare initially decreases because public wealth is being redistributed where if it would otherwise be
concentrated in the hands of the elite. The third core prediction is that total expenditures increases as
the size of W increases. The logic behind this is simple as well: A proportionally large winning coalition
requires more private payoffs and as a result increases expenditures. The fourth prediction is that tax
rates decrease as W increases and S decreases (Bueno de Mesquita, et al, 2003). This is so because the
larger winning coalition results into greater private benefits, two of which are black market transactions
and less return back to the public good, taxation being a direct tool for redistribution.
Selectorate Theory posits that political survival for leaders and institutions is determined by
their ability to provide resources through based on a mix of public goods and private payoffs. Examples
of public goods consist of primarily services such as education, healthcare, public roads and
transportation, police and public safety, and potable water. Private payoffs can exist in the form of
direct bribes or more sophisticated methods such as tax breaks, contract preferences, or generally any
form of benefit that is exclusively reserved for the winning coalition in an unfair and illegitimate manner.

The Role of Islam in Politics
The political elements of Islam, similar to Christianity and Judaism, are derived from the
religion’s holy book known as the Quran. In addition to the Quran, political practices are also derived
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from the sayings and living record of the Prophet Muhammad referred to as the Sunna. Political
leadership is legitimized in Islam if one is accepted as a descendent of Muhammad. In Sunni Islam a
successor of the Muhammad is referred to as a Caliph while in the Shia religion he is called an Imamate.
The duty of the religious leader in Islamic is to follow and impose Islamic law, also synonymous with
Sharia Law. For several centuries, the descendent argument was the source of political legitimacy in the
Islamic world until the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan’s loss of authority over Mecca to the Saud family in
1925. Following World War I, the Middle East and North Africa experienced a series of attempts to catch
up with the West, most notably Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s secularization and modernization of the postOttoman Turkey. Similar trends toward secularism continued with Pahlavi Era Iran, Gamal Abdel
Nasser’s Egypt and the rise of pan-Arabism.
However, in 1979 the secular government of the Pahlavi regime ended with an Islamic
revolution and fast-forward to 2011, the Arab Spring has resulted in the ousting of the once aspiring
secular despots seeking regional and global influence. One argument is that the primary motive for a
return to Islamization is the resistance to colonialism and control of the Islamic world by outsiders (Roy,
2004). Another common argument is historian Bernard Lewis’ argument that Islamic world’s failure to
modernize is rooted in the absence of widespread reform movements experience by Christianity and
Judaism (Lewis, 1995, 1997). In historical comparison, Lewis contends that Christianity’s experience with
the reformation and renaissance served as a precursor to the French and American revolutions. This in
turn was part of a gradual separation of church and state. However, Islam has not experienced such a
separation. As a result, the role of politics and governance remains a fundamental element of the state
in the Muslim world. In short, Lewis contends that Islam, democracy and modernity are difficult to
reconcile.
A differing view point is Nasr’s contention that the rise of the middle class in Muslim countries is
reconcilable with modernity and Islam (Nasr, 2009). What Nasr observes in such cases is middle class
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that is highly religious but still motivated by economic incentive. A prime example he sites is the case of
Turkey, a growing economy coupled with the rise of Islamic parties. In spite of the rise of a business
minded middle class throughout various Islamic countries, Nasr also argues that the rift within Islam
between the Shiite and the still dominant Sunnis will be a major source for instability and conflict in the
21st century (Nasr, 2006). In short, Nasr expresses the dominant argument within the field of political
Islam – that religion and democracy are reconcilable as evident by Muslim majority countries such as
Maldives, Malaysia, and Turkey. In spite of the historical examples expressing the possibility of a
democratic Islamic world, the consensus remains that the religious differences within Islam make peace
unstable. The Arab Spring test the validity of both these notions.

Tracking and Forecasting Selectorates and Winning Coalitions
With the application of agent based modeling, I captured the elements of the selectorate and
the winning coalition along with other domestic and international stakeholders playing a role in the
outcome of events in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). My data illustrates those countries
following the deposition of the ruler move toward a projected path closer to Democracy. In the case of
Egypt, Libya, and Yemen the selectorate and the winning coalition initiate a transition phase toward a
less autocratic government; however, the extent of democratization varies significantly. The selectorate
size and winning coalition size increase because of the emergence of more stakeholders engaging in
policy outcomes. However, standard Selectorate Theory is driven by a single dimension: the lessening of
private payoffs versus public goods as the size of the selectorate and the winning coalition increases.
The Selectorate Model proves useful on the private-public goods dimensions but the religious dimension
of countries with Muslim majorities is appropriate in capturing the preferences of the winning coalition
or the larger selectorate.
Throughout the course of 2011 I forecasted and validated the evolution of events taking place in
the Arab Spring and Iran by applying the Senturion Agent Based Model. The validated forecasts indicate
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that once an uprising has begun, the form of government will be determined by the winning coalition or
the position closest to the median stakeholder. The scales we use incorporate authoritarian-democratic
choice. By incorporating into agent based modeling this dimension we harness the power of computer
simulations in predicting what decision makers should expect based on their present positions on
governance. Senturion generates a picture of the current and projected political landscape by utilizing
agent based modeling with game theory logic such as expected utility (Abdollahian and Kugler et al
2000). Previous publications have tested and documented the validity of such models (Feder 1995,
Abdollahian and Kugler et al 2000). The first round is merely a feedback of the model inputs. It then
animates the political landscape as described by the issue continuum into a dynamic simulation of how
political interests will likely evolve into the future. Each round is considered an evolution or change in
negotiated outcomes between the various groups and stakeholders. The round or negotiation phase
comes to an end when the cost of negotiating exceeds any benefit gained by continuing the negotiation.
The position with the most weighted influence results into the winning outcome, notwithstanding the
threat of veto-players. The perceptual model allows researchers and policymakers to determine which
deals are feasible based on the formation of coalitions in support of any particular policy position.
Understanding the intricacies of the Middle East and North Africa because of our specialization in the
region improved our ability to better interpret simulated outcomes.

Agent Based Models
The origins of agent based models (ABM) ability to predict future outcomes are rooted in Bernoulli’s
(1738) definition of expected satisfaction, referred to initially as moral expectations. With the rise of
economics as a science in the 20th century rational behavior models such as the expected utility theory
began taking shape as a vessel for predicting behavior. The Von Neuman Morgenstern (VNM) Utility
Theorem (1947) established the platform for future debate over development of expected utility logic.
Now referred to as VNM rationality, the theorem posits four axioms: (1) Completeness of preferences,
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(2) Transitivity of such preferences, (3) Continuity of preference between a probability of 0 to 1, and (4)
the holding of preferences independently from the possibility of another outcome. In applying the
expected utility model we loosen theoretical rigidities associated with full rationality and substitute it
with bounded rationality. Individuals have a bounded rationality because they are not capable of looking
into an unbounded time horizon, but rather see only a move ahead of their current choice. (Bueno de
Mesquita 1997).
Agent Based Modeling with the application of game theory and expected utility took shape in the
application of international politics with the publication of the War Trap (Bueno de Mesquita 1981). The
War Trap applied Black’s (1958) median voter theorem along with the Bank’s monotonicity principle to
predict dispute outcomes between states resulting in competition, confrontation, cooperation or
negotiation. In the “War Trap Revisited”, Bueno de Mesquita extended the predictive capability of his
expected utility model by a risk function in accounting for stakeholders preferential risk behavior (risk
neutral, risk averse, or risk taking). 3 Although Bueno de Mesquita identified the range of expected
behavior between dyads, Lalman (1988) extended the precision of the predicted dispute outcomes by
calculating the direction and intensity as vectors. Bennett and Stam (2000) conducted a cross validation
of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman’s international interactions game by including all possible dyads in
the international system from 1816 to 1984 instead of just analyzing European dyads. Although the
relationship was less clear among all interstate dyads their universal test provided a critical validation
that the model can be applied across different regions.
Figure 2 depicts the effects of perceptions on the escalation of conflict. If both players perceive a
positive expected utility from challenging or fighting, then the outcome will be conflict, as depicted by
the first quadrant. In opposite fashion, if both player perceive a negative expected utility by challenging
eachother, then neither will fight. The perceived losses from both side is depicted by quadrant four,
3

Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky (1979) "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk",
Econometrica, XLVII (1979), 263-291.
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making it a condition for deterrence. Quandrants 2b and 2a depict the condition for under which one of
the challengers will resist while seeking better terms through fighting. Quadrants 3b and 3a will depict
the situation where one side, perceiving it cannot gain from fighting, will yield or acquiesce to the
challenger instead of fighting.
Figure 2: Expected Utility: The Effects of Perceptions on the Escalation of Conflict

4

The practicality of agent based modeling in world politics developed further with the likes of
numerous publications such as Negotiating Peace in Kosovo (Efird, Abdollahian, et al). Such practical
applications incorporated dyadic relations with augmentation of coalitions to better predict political
outcomes and evolutions prior to the outcome at the onset of a crisis or conflict situation. In both
theoretical and empirical terms, it is determined that the application of game theoretic ABMs is not as
effective in predicting the onset of a crisis as it is in predicting its outcome once the beginning step has
been initiated (Bueno de Mesquita, 1985; Lalman, 1990, Abdollahian, et. al., 2000).

4

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “The War Trap Revisited,” The American Political Science Review, Volume 79, Issue 1
(Mar., 1985), 156-177
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Assumptions:
•

Decision makers are trying to maximize their expected utility with regard to both policy and

personal security satisfaction.
•

Each player’s actions are informed by what that player expects to see happen in the next round of

play and by what happened in the round immediately preceding.
•

Players are operating with “bounded rationality”. Players calculate the perceptions of other players’

expected utility on an issue with a given level of uncertainty.
•

In the game, each player knows three factors:
The potential influence of each actor on each issue examined.
The current stated policy position of each actor on each issue examined.
The salience each actor associates with those issues.



The model assumes that the costs of bargaining rises at an increasing rate as the simulation continues
through successive rounds.



As the number of rounds increase, the costs of negotiating will reach a point where it does not make any
more sense to continue



The predicted final policy outcome is equal to the position of the median voter in the last round of
simulation if there are no veto players (Black 1958)



If there are veto players, then the predicted outcome is the policy, if any, that those actors agree to in
the final round.



When the costs of bargaining exceed a given threshold then the bargaining will end without agreement.



Issues are single-dimensional with single peaked preferences



Issues are monotonic, meaning decision-makers expected gains from a dispute increase, so too does the
decision maker’s willingness to use force in pursuit of such gains (Banks 1990)
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Empirical Validation:
As stated in the introduction, this dissertation is an empirical application of agent based
modeling coupled with the use of computing technology in validating the predictive capabilities of the
model. But more importantly is powerful tool showing the evolution of coalitions through the lens of a
Selectorate Theory explanation. The ABM is applied and tested using the Senturion software.
The seminal publication indicating the empirical validity of agent based models is Feder’s
declassified publication tracking the accuracy of predictions of ABM using Policon and Factions software
platforms compared to the predictions made by CIA analysts.5 Policon is a first generation ABM
software incorporating the use of computers for analyst at the CIA seeking to make political predictions.
It was used by the CIA from 1982 through 1986.6 Factions was developed internally as a platform similar
to Policon by the Directorate of Science and Technology’s Office of Research and Development.7 The
declassified publication provides comparative empirical results testing predictions on issues concerning
stability in over 30 countries. Feder’s declassified publication cited that Policon and traditional methods
were both found to be accurate about 90% of the time. However, Policon and Factions were more
detailed in their predictions, managing to hit the bull’s-eye twice as often. This dissertation serves a
similar purpose to Feder’s publication as an attempt to further validate the application of ABMs as a
powerful alternative to traditional methods of analyses, particularly for the unclassified world of
policymakers and stakeholders.

Connecting Selectorate Theory and Agent Based Modeling
Agent Based Modeling in application with game theory and expected utility cannot predict the
onset of a conflict or crisis. However, once the crisis has been initiated it can predict whether the regime
will remain or fall by identifying the winning coalition and the distance with the median stakeholder
5

Stanley A. Feder, “Factions and Policon: New Ways to Analyze Politics,” Studies in Intelligence vol. 31, no.1 (Spring
1987), pp. 41-57. Originally Classified “Secret” and “Noform.”
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
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(Black 1958). By this logic, if the leader can maintain a coalition that is dominant or close to the median
stakeholder, he will survive. If his coalition begins to disintegrate, he is expected to eventually fall. The
leading authority can also interchangeably be called the veto-player. The further the veto-player’s
influence is degraded, the more likely he will to cease his influence to veto or prevent his own downfall.
An expected utility explanation for why regimes fall is simple: After the onset of an uprising, once the
net utility of success in overthrowing the regime surpasses the net utility of failing to overthrow it, the
regime will fall (Abdollahian, Efird 2000). This simple agent based model in application to expected
utility and game theory allows us to predict the outcome of an uprising or crisis. In this dissertation, I
incorporate the work by Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow (2003, 2010) on Selectorate
Theory in further answering the question of why regimes either survive or transition. Having identified
religious actors and their formation of coalitions, I will propose that the role of religion must be
accounted beyond the standard Selectorate Model if we are to under the true logic of political survival
in the Middle East and North Africa.
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IV. Method and Organization
This dissertation is less focused on the method and theoretical construct of the agent based
applications and is more concentrated on the empirically practical application of the model in predicting
political outcomes of the Arab Spring and Iran. I have made a series of predictions over the course of
the year tracking the evolution of events taking place in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The
sample set of countries consist of Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.
In this dissertation I will predict, analyze, and evaluate the validity of the ABM while also
evaluating the public-private goods argument of Selectorate Theory. This is conducted by obtaining the
inputs, running the inputs through Senturion computer simulation, interpreting the outputs, and
tracking the validity of the forecasts by comparing the predictions with the actual outcomes using open
source news sources (i.e. Reuters, Associated Press, BBC). The analysis will be conducted through six
steps (Efird, Abdollahian, et al 2000):
1. Frame the Issue: Asking the correct question is arguably the most pertinent step to getting the best
predictive answer to any problem.
a. Identify the issue: The issue must be monotonic.
b. Develop a continuum by defining the range of possible outcome pertaining to the issue.
2. Input the data: The data on stakeholders are obtained by either interviewing subject matter experts
obtaining information through open source media reports combined with academic knowledge.
a. Identify the individual stakeholders and the groups they belong to.
b. Identify the level of group influence. Define their level of individual influence, individual salience in
regards to the issue, and their individual position on the issue continuum.
Policy Position: This is the stakeholders’ preferred or stated position based on the defined range of
positions on the issue continuum.
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Power: The most powerful group and individual within the group are indexed at 100. Each stakeholder is
attributed a value relative to the most powerful stakeholder. For example, two stakeholders with
influence score of 45 and 55 combining their power will be equal to the most powerful player at a score
of 100.
Salience: This captures how important the issue is to each stakeholder. It is a measurement of the
stakeholder’s willingness to achieve his or her stated policy position. This is measured on a scale of 0 to
100 as follows:
90 - 100: This is the most important issue. The stakeholder will drop anything he or she is doing at any
moment to address the particular issue.
70 - 80: This is important to the stakeholder. It is one of the most important issues, but not a life or
death level.
50 – 60: This is one of several important issues. Other issues are certainly more important.
30 – 40: The stakeholder cares about this issue, but it is not that important compared to all the issues he
or she has to deal with.
10 – 20: This is a minor issue for the stakeholder and he or she rarely pays attention to it.
0– 10: The stakeholder does not care about the issue.
3. Run the data and Receive Simulated Output: By incorporating agent based modeling with expected
utility and game theory logic described in the literature review along with the stakeholder’s risk
propensity, the computer simulation predicts what the decision makers should expect if their stated
positions are sincere in present time. Senturion generates a picture of the current political landscape.
The first round is merely a feedback of the model inputs. It then animates the political landscape as
described by the issue continuum into a dynamic simulation of how political interests will likely evolve
into the future.
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Each round is considered an evolution or change in negotiated outcomes between the various groups
and stakeholders. The round or negotiation comes to an end when the cost of negotiating exceeds any
benefit gained by continuing the negotiation.
4. Interpreting the Outputs: The position with the most weighted influence results into the winning
outcome, notwithstanding the threat of veto-players. The perceptual model allows the policymaker to
determine which deals are feasible based on the formation of coalitions in support of any particular
policy position. Understanding the intricacies of the Middle East and North Africa because of my
specialization in the region improved my ability to better interpret simulated outcomes.
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V.

The Case of Egypt
On February 6th of 2012, Egypt’s democratic Parliament gathered, only three weeks after the

newly elected legislature held its first inaugural session. When given a chance to speak one of the
members from its Islamist bloc began praying out-loud in the middle of the session. The speaker of the
new Parliament, Mohammed Saad al-Katani of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party,
immediately ordered the member’s microphone be cut-off and shouted, “this is a house of debate, not a
Mosque. If you want to pray, go to a mosque but remember that I am just as much of a Muslim as you
are.”8 This incident is just one example of the political turmoil taking place in Egypt’s newly elected
legislature, a fierce debate between the secular platform of the Freedom and Justice Party as the
majority and the minority Islamist bloc. In spite of the threat of extremists within the democratically
elected legislature, this instance confirms the notion that Egypt’s government is led by secular rules in
which all religious and non-religious parties are governed by.
Almost exactly one year ago on February 7th 2011 I correctly forecasted that if Hosni Mubarak
departs Egypt, the prospects for a democratic transition would be likely.9 My simulation indicated that if
Mubarak departed early, a coalition leaning toward a Liberal Democracy would emerge with the various
political parties advocating for a multiparty system versus the military and intelligence apparatus
advocating for a one party system. The combined trade-off between military rule in the interim and the
emergence of an election process indicated a trend toward democratic transition. In November of 2011 I
updated the initial forecast, further strengthening the initial claim that Egypt will have Democratic

8

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iI-u8_8hwj4&feature=youtu.be
This is footage from an outburst in the Egyptian Parliament between an Islamist member and the speaker on
February 7 2012.
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reforms by allowing for election of national leaders. I noted that the military would undermine some of
the democratic processes as a tradeoff for maintaining order and stability in the transition phase.
Democracies are created from negotiations resulting in pacts. The prospect of Democracy in
Egypt relies on the political parties’ ability to maintain their pacts by keeping their commitments. The
initial solidarity between the political parties served as an indication that they will remain civil until they
have some guaranteed form of governance that secures their positions in Egypt’s new government. In
February of 2011, I along with Dr. Ashraf Singer correctly predicted that the Egyptian military’s role as
the interim custodian in the transition period is appearing less like Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1979 and
similar to the Turkish Coup D’état of 1980 (Bagherpour and Singer, 2011). Fast-forward to almost one
year later. My updated forecast in November of 2011 as illustrated by Figure 4 shows the bifurcation
between Egypt’s military and the elected legislature. This is bifurcation indicates the emergence of a
shadow government represented by a military acting independently from a future elected legislature.
Although parties such as the Islamist Al Nour party have aspirations, the center-of-gravity in the Egypt’s
revolution was rooted in a populist demand for reforms. This had less to do with religious ideology and
more to do with high unemployment and economic inequality. In comparison, the Turkish coup in 1980
was far more violent compared to Egypt’s current revolution. However, the conditions and outcomes
are astonishingly alike. In September of 1980 the Turkish military deposed the civilian government and
abolished the Parliament along with a suspension of the Constitution. These are the same actions taken
by the Egypt’s military in the interregna. But the transition from a Turkish military regime in 1980 to a
newly formed Democracy began three years after the coup with a one party election in 1983, whereas
Egypt’s security forces are claiming a much shorter hand-over of power. By analyzing the playbook from
Turkey we can conclude that Egypt too must undergo its series of evolutionary transitions from current
military rule to repetitive fair elections in which only then we can label the end-state as Democratic.
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The initial and updated simulations depicted in Figures 3 and 4 suggest that the various
undeveloped political groups in Egypt form a united but unstable coalition for sake of solidarity
following the early days of Mubarak’s departure. As the political parties began taking form for the
election season, their positions on democratic governance became less consolidated. In spite of the
analysis indicating Egypt’s engagement in democratic transition, my ABM application illustrates the
emergence of stakeholders and groups pushing for a less secular Egypt. This corresponds with my
hypothesis positing that the role of religious preferences plays just as much of a part in political survival
of leaders as does the role of private payoffs and public services. As Egypt becomes more democratic, it
is becoming less secular than the previous Mubarak regime. If Egypt continues its democratization
process, the country will continue to be less secular while at the same time shifting toward a greater
desire for public goods and services for the population.
Figure 3: Projected Forecast on the Prospect for Democracy in Egypt on February 7th 2011
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Figure 4: Projected Forecast Update of Egypt’s Prospects for Democracy in Egypt on 15 November
2011
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My analysis illustrates in Figure 5 and 6 that the median stakeholder in Egypt is positioned in the
range between a multi-party and single-party system. This is a far distance from Mubarak’s authoritarian
government previous to the uprising. The gap between the median stakeholder and Hosni Mubarak
during the uprising depicts the dissatisfaction between the status quo and a shifting influence calling for
Mubarak’s departure. The move toward democracy is evident by the emergence of multiple parties
and recent elections concluding with the Freedom and Justice Party winning the majority of seats in the
Parliament and a minority Islamist bloc gaining one-third of the seats.10 Although it is difficult to predict
if Democracy will last for the long-term, the forecast based on the median stakeholder provides early
evidence that Egypt is engaging in a democratic transition. In spite of religious elements within the
Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, the platform set forth by the majority of the elected

10

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/final-results-confirms-islamists-winners-in-egyptselections/2012/01/21/gIQAXpwbGQ_story.html
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polity have thus far been secular, particularly the need for improved public services and economic
opportunity.
My revised Selectorate Model requiring the role of religion to be accounted for, holds as a valid
explanation for democratic transition in Egypt. This is so because the platforms for reform continue to
be driven by the need for public services as a solution for an economically deprived population.
However, as the level of democracy increases, the role of religion in politics has also increased more
significantly than the preceding non-democratic government under Mubarak. Extended private
benefits for the ruling military class in addition to many newly elected leaders are surely present in an
imperfect democratic process, but nonetheless, the recognition of Islamic principles remain a significant
concern. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate that the median stakeholder position moved closer to a multi-party
democracy while during the same period the influence of Islamic parties such as the ultraconservative
Nour Party strengthened.
Figure 5: Projected Median Position for Egypt’s Governance following Mubarak Departure on Feb 7
2011
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Figure 6: Projected Median Position on Egypt’s Governance on November 15th 2011

There were a total of 16 predictions made during the course of 2011 on Egypt. The first analysis on
February 7th 2011 consisted of 6 overall predictions. Of these six predictions, five of them occurred while
one of them was a counterfactual scenario based prediction. Of the five predictions all of them were
accurate. From these pertinent predictions 40% of them were detailed, 40% were moderately specific,
and 20% were general. The validity of the remaining 10 predictions has been undetermined at the time
of this dissertation given the results and effects of the proposed elections were too early to be
determined. This transition led by the military’s role as custodian of the Egypt is period of discontinuity.
In this regard time will judge tell the validity of predicting the future form of government in Egypt. Fully
detailed forecasts on Egypt can be found in the appendix.

29

30

31

VI. The Case of Libya
Throughout the course of 2011 I correctly forecasted the evolution of the uprising against
Muamar Gaddafi.11 To summarize the forecasts, I predicted that Gaddafi would fight to the end against a
highly factionalized opposition that could only prevail with a NATO intervention. I also accurately
simulated the evolution of the conflict’s phases described as an initial stalemate, a transition phase
where the opposition gained the upper hand, the endgame for Gaddafi and a post-Gaddafi democratic
transition. In the issue of governance, on October 20th 2011 I forecasted that Libya will transition to a
hybrid between a tribal system and multiparty democratic system. The national government is expected
to have a selection process based on predetermined representation by tribal affiliation. In accordance
with the Selectorate Model the country will be less authoritarian because of the emergence of a larger
selectorate represented by the various tribes and emerging political parties.
In terms of religion, we are observing the rise of Islamic Parties in Libya. Two of the leading
parties in Libya, the National Gathering for Freedom, Justice and Development (FJD) and Party of Reform
and Development (PRD), have publicly stated their support for Sharia Law. While stating their religious
platform these parties also continue to push for free-market nationalist agendas.12 One of the other
leading political parties is Al Haq. Although there is a strong Islamic strain running through its agenda as
well, Al Haq has prioritized its platform as a promise to deliver public goods and services through oil
revenue. Al Haq’s campaign platform promises to the Libyan people free electricity, free education, free
healthcare, cheaper food prices, free land to build on, a free car ever 11 years, free phone and internet,
a free house, and social security payments for the unemployed.13 Although these may be inflated
promises, the point is clear: there is an emergence of a movement that is driven by a desire for public
services intertwined with Islamic principles.
11

For further details on the forecast go to www.sentiagroup.com
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/03/us-libya-parties-idUSTRE8120ZX20120203
13
http://www.youtube.com/user/AlhaqpartyLibya
12

32

My revised explanation for Selectorate Theory posits that religious identification will be a key
determinant for political survival. In such case the standard Selectorate Model explanation will not be
sufficient in determining the behavior of the leadership based on the private-public goods argument. In
opposite fashion, the priority for the emerging leaders is projected as to an economic reform agenda.
Figures 10 and 11 depict the projected median of the selectorate nearing the threshold for a multi-party
democracy.
Based on this simulation depicted in Figures 7, 8 and 9, I predicted that Libya will attempt a
democratic transition that will be highly unstable. This transition will be expressed through an election
process. However, it will fall short because of the intertwining of tribal and religious politics with
elections. This is projected to hinder the long-term stability of any democratic movement. For example,
the fairly large Gaddafia tribe is expected to resist the new order based on its previous commitment to
Muamar Gaddafi and the privileges that came with it. This does not mean they can stop the transition
process completely, but they can certainly hinder it. The emergence of more than thirty parties
competing in the Libya’s anticipated elections in 2012 provides yet another signal that democratic
preferences remain unclear, while tribal or religious preferences appear more viable.
Thus far I have described Islamic democracies in which Selectorate Theory sufficiently describes
the public-private goods motive for political survival. To recap, such examples are Turkey, Malaysia,
Maldives and what is projected to be Egypt. I have also described Islamist states that are not democratic
but have semi-democratic tendencies, Iran serving as the prime case. The projected form of government
in Libya serves as a unique case where the government is anticipated to have a multi-party democratic
election process while religion remains a priority just as much of a push for public services. An example
that is similar is the case of Lebanon. Lebanon’s government is described as a confessionalist
parliamentary system where the election of the legislature must be proportional to the religious
demographics of the country. To guarantee that the various religions be represented in the government,
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by law the President must be Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of the
Parliament a Shiite Muslim. This serves as a unique example of a democratic country on the upper
bound, a predicament where the country’s public-private goods motive does not hold as the primary
driver for political survival. I posit that upper bound semi-democratic societies such as Lebanon and to
lesser democratic extent with Libya remain unstable because of the religious or tribal differences driving
political survival instead of private payoffs or public goods. By having democratic elections under the
proposed Sharia Law, Libya will either emerge into a theocratic state led by an autocrat or highly
unstable government driven by tribal and religious competition.
Figure 7: Projected Forecast on the Prospect for Democracy in Libya on March 24th 2011
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Figure 8: Projected Forecast on Prospect for Democracy on Post Gaddafi Libya on September 5th 2011
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Figure 9: Projected Median Stakeholder Position on March 24 2011 While Gaddafi Remain

Figure 10: Projected Post-Gaddafi Median Stakeholder Position on November 15th 2011

There were a total of 14 prediction made on Libya throughout the course of 2011. Four of the
predictions are too early to validate. These are predictions on the future governance of Libya. In regard
to the predictions I was able to track and validate, nine out ten were accurate ranging from highly
detailed to moderate specificity. Based on the median stakeholder simulations on Figures 10 and 11 we
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can see that Libya is engaging in a transition phase where the size of the selectorate is expanding,
making it less authoritarian in the interregna. However, we can also observe the trend where Libya is
also becoming less secular. This was readily apparent when the Libyan Transitional Council announced in
October of 2011 that Sharia Law will become the main source of legislation in Libya.14 Following any
popular revolt, the size of the selectorate will increase in the interim period. This is so because majority
of the disenfranchised seek to be included into the decision making process to gain access to benefit
once kept from them (Goldstone, 1995). In the case of Libya, we can see this trend with the emergence
of dozens of political parties and inflated promises to the general population. However, my predictions
indicate a trend in Libya where the selectorate size will stabilize to a point where it will remain larger
than the previous Gaddafi regime but will not meet a stable threshold for a lasting democracy. The
interaction between religion and democratization is clearly apparent with the implementation of Sharia
Law. This is an indication that the public-private goods argument described in the standard Selectorate
Model needs to account for the role of religion in order to accurately describe the calculus for political
survival within Libya. Fully detailed forecasts on Libya can be found in the appendix.

14

“Sharia law to be main source of Leigslation in Libya” by Kim Gamel, Associated Press and Christian Science
Monitor, October 25 2011. http://ww.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2011/1025/Sharia-law-to-bemain-source-of-legislation-in-Libya
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VII. The Case of Saudi Arabia
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is by definition a dictatorship. On October 27th 2011 I forecasted
that Saudi Arabia’s government structure is stable and not prone to change in the short to medium time
horizon. I concluded that the status quo governance structure in Saudi Arabia will remain unchanged
with little or no reform. Even if the single ruler structure under the House of Saud is weakened by 50%,
there will be little or no change to the power structure according to my ABM simulation in Figure 13. A
challenge to Saudi rule will marginally strengthen the coalition in support of the royal family. This will
occur when Turkey moves closer in support of the status quo if they view a weakening of the royal
family’s power. The United States along with the great powers will not change their position even with a
dramatic waning of influence unless the Saudi Royal family nears inevitable collapse. The projected
forecast in Figure 12 depicts a system where the selectorate and the winning coalition are situated
firmly in support of a single ruler under the House of Saud. There is no credible challenge to the Saudi
rule. The youth, the female population, and Shiite minorities are the primary groups preferring
democratic reforms; however, they remain disenfranchised and irrelevant to the stability of the ruling
authority. Figure 14 shows that the median stakeholder position does not change, suggesting a stable
undemocratic Saudi Arabia that is not prone to reform. A challenge to the leadership in Saudi Arabia
will not pose a threat to the governance structure of the country. Any challenge will most likely derive
from an internal power struggle within the Saudi royal family. Therefore, a change in personality which
can occur from the death of King Abdullah who is very old will not necessitate change in governance..
This simulation further indicates the stability of the Saudi regime.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the least democratic and most religious country in the Islamic
world. They use their massive oil wealth to provide private payoffs to their ruling family members and
tribal leaders in the form of disproportionate allowances. They also provide large government subsidies
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to Saudi citizens in the form of land, allowances, and other material goods. After observing the toppling
of the Mubarak regime in Egypt, the Saudi King Abdullah reacted by increased benefits for his citizens by
providing additional funds for housing, studying abroad and social security.15
In spite of such use of private payoffs and public goods in Saudi Arabia as described by
Selectorate Theory, the agent based simulation illustrates that a major part of the selectorate in Saudi
Arabia is the highly conservative Shura Council. Without support from the Islamic Shura, the Saudi Royal
family would lose all legitimacy based on their proclaimed role as protectors of the religious shrine in
Mecca. Therefore, the Saudi royal family relies implicitly on their support in order to survive. The Shura
Council dictates a strict interpretation of Islamic Law known as Wahhabism, named after the Muslim
theologian Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab. This makes Sharia law paramount to any economic
initiative. The case of Saudi Arabia shows that the King Abdullah’s calculus for political survival is based
on the acquiescence of the Islamic clergy, a dimension that has little to do with public-private benefits
and more to do with religious ideology. Figures 14 and 15 depict simulations showing the direction of
the median stakeholder in Saudi Arabia. The distance between the median and the winning coalition is
miniscule. They are both situated above the threshold for a 1 ruler system and I observe no change in
positions. In short, Saudi Arabia is stable in the short to medium term time horizon so long as they
continue to receive revenue from their oil profits along with implicit support on their rule from the
Muslim Ulama.

15

“Saudi king offers benefits as he returns from treatment.” by BBC staff. BCC News. 23 February 2011.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12550326
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Figure 11: Projected Form of Government in Saudi Arabia Forecasted on October 27th 2011
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Figure 12: Projected Form of Government with 50% Loss of Power by Saudi Royal Family

Figure 13: Median Stakeholder Position on Saudi Governance forecasted in October 2011

Figure 14: Median Stakeholder Position on Saudi Governance forecasted in December 2011
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There were 3 major predictions made on the issue of governance and stability in Saudi Arabia.
One of these predictions is a counter-factual scenario that has not occurred. In the two predictions that
could be tested, both turned out to be accurate with moderately specificity. In summary there is no
prospect for democratic reform in Saudi Arabia. The highly authoritarian and religious government is
expected to remain in power. The fully detailed forecast can be found in the appendix. The inclusion of
religion into the Selectorate Model indicates that Saudi Arabia is both highly authoritarian and
religious. The Saudi royal family’s cohesion between private payoffs and Islamic legitimacy by the Ulama
has created stability for them in the short to medium time horizon. This supports the argument for
revising the Selectorate Model to accounting role of religion as a fundamental element in the political
survival of leaders in MENA. A fully detailed forecast can be found in the appendix.
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VIII. The Case of Iran
There is more conflict taking place within the Iranian regime than anytime following the death
the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1988. This does not necessarily mean the Islamic Republic of Iran is going to
collapse or that the country’s leaders will follow the fate of Mubarak and Ben Ali in the short-term. The
tension observed in Iran can be distinguished in two forms: conflict between the government and the
disenfranchised citizenry and conflict within the government. In the first case, the various opposition
groups such as the student movement or minority factions whether violent or peaceful are perceived by
the Iranian government primarily as nuisances rather than existential threats. The latter, tension within
the government, is primarily a conflict over resources or power and not a debate over fundamental
changes necessary for improving the lives of the citizenry. In short, there is no indication that Iran will
make reforms that move it closer to a liberal democracy. Much of the fight over power and distribution
of wealth within the state apparatus is driven by the question of succession following the death of
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. It is reported that the Supreme Leader is ill with his death is in the
near horizon. This certainly plays a part in the calculations of all the senior stakeholders in Iran’s
government. Thus there is competition taking place between the various power brokers in order to
secure their future in Iran upon the death of Khamenei.
However, there continues to be international pressure mounting regarding Iran’s nuclear program
and their adversarial positions toward the United States and Israel. The analysis indicates that Iran will
experience substantive change in governance only with the passing of the Supreme Leader. When
Khamenei passes, Iran will develop a new ruling structure consisting of a hybrid between the Supreme
Leader structure and the 3 Leader Structure. This will result in substantive change in the distribution of
power, but will not result into a Democratic Iran.
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The current question however remains: Why did Iran not experience an uprising in 2011 while many
of its regional neighbors such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain did? As predicted the debate
within Iran has been primarily over distribution of resources within the power apparatus. Khamenei has
maintained a coalition that has gained support following the rise and fall of President Ahmadinejad. So
long as he continues to maintain this coalition through rewarding his followers while coercing the
opposition, Khamenei will keep his grip on power. In 2011 we saw no development of new coalitions
powerful enough to oppose Khamenei or make substantive calls for reform.
In October of 2011 Khamenei expressed the option of eliminating the office of the President in Iran, a
clear signal of continuing the inward consolidation of power.16 Furthermore, there are few signs of a
splintering within the military or collapse within the hardline conservatives leading the Parliament. In
conclusion, the idea that Iran will experience domestic reform toward democracy remains dim, justice
from within a distant notion.
In regard to Selectorate Theory, figures 16 and 17 illustrate that the selectorate is situated in the
range between the status quo and a harsh military autocracy. The domestic opposition groups are
projected to remain marginalized and the same applies to the exiled groups. Iran maintains a relatively
large selectorate, but is still an authoritarian state. It serves as an example of a stable authoritarian
regime because the winning coalition is small and can pull from a large selectorate. As a result of this
arrangement, members within Khamenei’s winning circle are substitutable because of the large pool of
candidates waiting to replace them. This drives a norm for loyalty as the actors within the large
selectorate jockey for access to the leader by acts displaying their commitment (Bueno de Mesquita and
Smith 2010).
The public-private payoffs argument once again is not sufficient in describing the Khamenei’s
calculus for political survival. Therefore, as we have explained in the other cases described earlier, we
16
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must include the role of religion into the equation. The Supreme Leader’s power is derived from
religious legitimacy under the Islamic Constitution granting him divine authority. Under such authority
he can practice dictatorial power. His logic for political survival is just as much based on religious
legitimacy under an Islamic law as is the private benefits he provides to his inner circle.. The country is
less authoritarian than Saudi Arabia because of the large selectorate, but the role of religion plays just as
much of part in the long-term political survival of its leadership.
Despite Supreme Leader Khamenei’s overwhelming influence by consolidation of a strong
winning coalition, the simulation tracking the median stakeholder reveals that the international actors
place a tremendous amount of pressure on the status quo structure. The distance between Khamenei
and the median position indicates the growing dissatisfaction between the status quo and those seeking
to change it. The updated projection in June of 2011 shows a median that is situated right above a
single party preference. The increasing distance between Khamenei and the median stakeholder are the
result of international stakeholder pressure. This has little to do with the domestic or the marginalized
exile groups. Nonetheless the system appears stable compared to Arab Spring countries that are
undergoing revolutions.
Figure 15: Iran Regime Type Forecast on March 13th 2011
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Figure 16: Updated Iran Forecast on June 27th 2011
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Figure 17: Median Stakeholder Position for Iran Forecasted in March 2011

Figure 18: Median Stakeholder Position for Iran Forecasted in June 2011

There were seven major predictions made on the future governance of Iran. All of these
predictions were accurate. Of these predictions, five were moderately specific while two were general.
As predicted in the forecasts the winning coalition to be the status quo structure under Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khamenei. Although there has been fallout between President Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah
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Khamenei with prospects of a tumultuous season in anticipation of the Parliamentary elections in 2012,
there is little indication of change in the governance structure within the Islamic Republic of Iran while
the Supreme Leader lives. While continuing to rally his supporters inward he continues undermining the
institutions that would otherwise be used as the regime’s power base. In October of 2011 Khamenei
expressed the option of eliminating the office of the President in Iran, a clear signal of continuing the
inward consolidation of power.17 Furthermore, there are few signs of a splintering of the military or
collapse within the hardliner conservatives leading the Parliament. In conclusion, the idea that Iran will
experience domestic reform toward democracy remains dim, justice from within a distant notion. The
Selectorate and the winning coalition remain stable so long as Khamenei lives. Having provided a
scenario for his passing in my forecast conducted in March of 2011, I predict that there will be a change
in governance following the death of Ayatollah Khamenei. The new governance structure is expected to
be a hybrid system situated between the current supreme leader system and a three leader system with
more influence weighed from the clerics and military apparatus. Nonetheless, even with the death of
Khamenei Iran is not expected to remain authoritarian with the role of religion playing the dominant
role in the legitimacy of the regime. Fully detailed forecasts on Iran can be found in the appendix.
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IX. The Case of Syria
The evolution of events in Syria for 2011 covering the short to medium time horizon indicates
that Bashar Al Assad has managed to survive because of his ability to maintain his domestic coalition in
addition to regional and international support by players such as China, Russia, and Iran. Assad’s relative
influence began to wane as former supporters, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, turned against him in support
for the opposition. But he was able to maintain his autocratic rule throughout the course of 2011
because the distribution of power was in favor of the alliances he had built domestically and
internationally. In such case Assad has crafted a system in Syria where his winning coalition members
rely on him as an indispensable element to their own survival. The regime has been able to withstand
remarkable pressure from the international community along with a defecting military due to the
structure of the selectorate in Syria. The regime has a single party structure made up the Ba’ath Party. In
such an instance Assad has a large of pool of candidates from within his Ba’ath Party. This large
selectorate allows him to pull substitutes as potential replacement for members of his inner circle if
necessary. Assad’s ability to easily substitute members of his winning coalition drives a norm of loyalty
(Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). Such a dynamic creates a system where members compete to
show their loyalty in fear of being ousted from the inner circle. For this reason, Assad’s government
withstood a tremendous amount pressure where other regimes faced with similar circumstances may
have folded much sooner.
Assad’s ability to resist and maintain power is apparent by the continued killing of thousands of
Syrian citizens. But coalitions continue to shift against him. Following months of a brutal onslaught by
the Assad regime, the international community expressed the situation in Syria as a human rights crisis.
Many who were once Assad’s allies have turned against him. Turkey for example has recognized the
Syrian opposition as a legitimate alternative to Assad and has gone as far as providing sanctuary to the
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opposition leaders now situated in Ankara. Although much of the international community has turned
against him in support of aiding the Syrian opposition, Bashar Al Assad still has support from Iran,
Russia, and China.
The international coalition opposing him is stronger compared to Assad’s alliance; however,
China and Russia continue to act as guardians of the regime at the United Nations while Iran’s presence
as a regional power makes Turkey and Saudi Arabia reluctant to acting more aggressively vis-à-vis
military action. Although not as powerful, Iran and Russia in particular have positioned themselves in
such a manner so as to prevent action from being taken against Syria. In short, they are acting as veto
players. In November of 2011 my forecast update for Syria anticipated the escalation of conflict from a
brutal suppression to a civil war. In spite of the degradation of Assad’s power, he still remains resilient
and is not expected to depart Syria unless there is a foreign intervention.
Assad’s Syria has many similarities reflecting Hussein-era Iraq. As an Alawite, Assad is a minority
ruling a country that has Sunni majority much in the same fashion that Saddam Hussein ruled a Shiite
majority Iraq as a Sunni minority. Syria is a country that is highly authoritarian and does not include
religion in major organs of government. The public-private payoffs argument holds true under the Assad
regime as the primary motive for his survival, a typical example of an autocrat who has provides few
benefits to the disenfranchised while providing major concessions to his winning coalition. However,
without the role of religious leaders within his winning, Syria has become highly unstable.
My initial forecast in May of 2011 indicated that Assad will react to the protests in Syria by
providing additional concessions to his inner circle with the intent of making his coalition more stable in
the wake of widespread opposition. Similar to many autocrats in MENA, he has used the threat of
Islamic extremism as an argument for his secular rule. Bashar al Assad’s marginalization of the Muslim
Brotherhood and the violent suppression by his father Hafez reveals the significance they place on such
a threat.
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My forecasts depicted in Figures 20 and 21 indicate that as the opposition begins to form a
coalition advocating a democratic alternative, the role of religion comes into play. Although there are
secular elements within the Syrian National Transitional Council, a major force driving the opposition is
the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).18 In similar trend to Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood is already promising
Islamic Sharia as a major source for future legislation if elected to power with the prospect of a postAssad Syria.19 If this becomes the case, a revised Selectorate Model that accounts for the role of religion
should be considered. If Syria begins a democratic transition, the role of religion is expected play into
the calculus of political leaders just as much if not more than the role of private-public goods. This is
evident by projected role of Islamic stakeholders in the opposition movement such as the Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood.
Figures 22 and 23 depict the projected median stakeholders using the Senturion agent based
model. In the first projection from May of 2011, we can see that the distance between the median
stakeholder and Bashar Al Assad is miniscule, indicating the lack of international and domestic influence
opposing his rule. In November of 2011 the distance between the median stakeholder and Assad remain
miniscule. The Assad regime becomes more isolated internationally but the distance with median only
grows significantly only when accounting for international stakeholders. The median surpasses the
threshold past a single party semi-democratic preference while Assad holds on to power if international
pressure continues to mount. If this gap continues Assad’s rule will be become less tenable.

18
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“A ‘Cosmic wager’ on the Muslim Brotherhood.” by David Ignatius. Washington Post. February 15 2012.
Ibid.

54

Figure 19: Syria Regime Type Forecast on May 15th 2011 (Assad’s initial reactions and suppression of
the uprising)
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Figure 20: Syria Regime Type Forecast on November 9th 2011 *(escalation to civil war and eventual
stalemate)
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Figure 21: Projected Median Stakeholder Position on Syria’s Governance in May 2011

Figure 22: Projected Median Stakeholder on Syria’s Governance in November 2011

Of the 16 major predictions made throughout the course of the Syrian crisis, 3 have no answer
because the short-term outcomes have not been resolved. Of the 13 predictions that could be tested, 10
of them were valid at a 77% accuracy rate. Half of those predictions were detailed while the other half
were moderately specific. This is a rather remarkable achievement given the relative unreliability of
expert data on Syria. The overall predictions on Syria have been remarkably accurate. I have identified
the evolution of the uprising in Syria by several phases. In the first phase I accurately projected a shortterm pacification by Bashar Al-Assad where there was little competition from the resistance. In the
second phase, I projected a consolidation of support from the international community. In the third
phase, I am projecting an escalation to civil war with an inevitable stalemate. At such time,
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notwithstanding an assassination, the Assad regime can only come to an end with direct international
intervention in the form NATO action observed in Libya. Otherwise, the stalemate in Syria is expected to
be prolonged. In regards to Selectorate Theory, Assad was able to maintain rule through private payoffs
to his coalition with very little benefits going to his disenfranchised citizenry. Yet the emergence of the
Muslim Brotherhood and their calls for Sharia Law in a post-Assad Syria is yet another example on why
the role of religion should be incorporated into a revised Selectorate Model for application to MENA.
More detailed forecasts on Syria can be found in the appendix of this dissertation.
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X.

The Case of Bahrain
Bahrain is a small island situated in the Persian Gulf between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and

Islamic Republic of Iran. Throughout history it has served as a strategically significant island providing
port access and a transit point for travel and trade. Although the country is a relatively wealthy country
due to the discovery of oil in 20th century, the Kingdom of Bahrain remains strategically important for
the same historical reasons: an island that provides access to Persian Gulf shipping lanes. For example,
the United States 5th Fleet uses Bahrain as its major port and staging area for Naval operations in the
Persian Gulf. The 2011 uprising against the Al Khalifa Family presented a major dilemma for the United
States and its Arab allies on how to respond to the crisis. Realizing the rising Iranian influence of a Shiite
led majority in Bahrain, the United States and its Arab allies under the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
effectively provided support to the Sunni minority Al Khalifa Royal Family to quell the uprising.
However, this is not an unusual occurrence in the history of Bahrain. The Al Khalifa Family has ruled the
Kingdom of Bahrain for over 200 years because of its willingness to concede to whichever power that
could guarantee its security and stability. They have switched alliances repeatedly ranging from
declaration of loyalty to Nasseredin Shah of Iran from British rule in 1860 all the way to the recent 2011
supplication to Saudi Arabia.
My forecast in November of 2011 concluded that Bahrain’s rule under the Al Khalifa Family is
stable. Having turned to rely on Saudi Arabia and the United States as their security guarantors, the Al
Khalifa Family will continue their hold on power in Bahrain. Shiite led elements such as Al Haq and Al
Wifaq will continue to be marginalized in spite of their initial support from Iran. Gulf Cooperation
Council members (GCC) such as Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, and Saudi Arabia will maintain strong support for
Bahrain’s ruling family in order to counter Iranian led Shiite influence. The opposition element most
likely to continue adamantly working against the Al Khalifa Family will be Shiite led Al Haq. In the final
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evolution of this uprising I expected the Waad Opposition Party, Al Wifaq, and even Iran to reduce their
anti-ruling family activities and inevitably accept Al Khalifa family as the legitimate authority in Bahrain.
This suggests that the Al Khalifa will continue to make a series of deals or concessions that will
strengthen its selectorate and reduce tensions from the opposition. In fact, previous to the forecast
there were already signs of such concessions. In August of 2011 Bahrain’s government provided the
largest salary increase in the country’s history for state employees and retirees.20 In addition, the
Khalifa also created a monthly allowance budget that had not existed before.21
The concessions provided by the Al Khalifa family match the behavior predicted by the privatepayoffs and public goods argument described by the standard Selectorate Model. Figure 24 shows that
in the final evolution of the Bahrain uprising, Waad Opposition and Al Wifaq Shia acquiesce in short to
medium time horizon. Furthermore, the distance between the median stakeholder and Al Khalifa
Family’s support for the status quo rule are very closely aligned and do not indicate any volatility. In
short, Al Khalifa rule in Bahrain is stable and not likely to change anytime soon.
The standard Selectorate Model does not account for religion. Part of the Al Khalifa’s vale of
legitimacy is through the role of religion. The King appoints a Shura Council of forty religious scholars to
advise him on governance. In spite of such attempts for religious legitimacy, the majority of citizens in
Bahrain are Shia although the Al Khalifa are Sunni. The Al Khalifa Family remains under the Saudi
influence and protection because of their Sunni roots, functioning as a defense against Iranian influence
over the Shia population. Bahrain is not as authoritarian as Saudi Arabia but its mix of Sunni Wahabbism
within its polity and limited representation by Shias place it in the upper bound of the curve as well. If
Bahrain were to become more democratic, it is predicted to become less secular. The permitting of
parliamentary elections in 2006 displayed the rise of Shia and Sunni Islamists within the elected polity.
20
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The standard selectorate model would suggest that if Bahrain were a democracy, the primary calculus
for political survival would be a greater proportion of public services given a Democracy’s large
selectorate. However, an Islamist dominated polity would include religious preferences into their
calculus just as much as any economic benefits.
Figure 23: Forecasted Support Al Khalifa Rule on November 11th 2011
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Figure 24: Projected Median Stakeholder Position for Extent of Support for Al Khalifa Rule in Bahrain

There were a total of five baseline predictions on Bahrain. Three out of the five predictions were
accurate. Of these three, one of the predictions was general and two were moderately detailed. The
remaining two predictions are unverified. In such regard, the pacification of the opposition seems to
have worked with the increase in allowances to the general Shia population; however, the outcome is
still unclear and inconclusive for the purpose of verification. The second unverified prediction is due my
lack of access to granular information. In this case, I predicted that Iranian opposition activities will
decrease but for the reasons described above I could verify. Nonetheless the overall prediction on
Bahrain is accurate. The Al Khalifa rule is highly stable with no expected change in governance. The role
of religion remains an indispensible part of the Al Khalifa family’s survival through the appointment of
the Shura Council and limited representation of Shiite and Sunni sects in the Parliament. The prospect
for Democracy in Bahrain is highly unlikely. A more detailed forecast can be found in the appendix.
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XI.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

Beyond the Private Public Goods Argument: The Role of Religion in Shaping
Regimes
The role of religion is not addressed in conjunction with Selectorate Theory’s private and public
goods maximization principle. If we are to better understand the transitions taking place in the Middle
East and North Africa we should address this dimension. In observing the transitions in Egypt and Libya,
I accurately predicted they are becoming less authoritarian while also becoming less secular. In the case
of Egypt, Islamic parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood (now called the Freedom and Justice Party)
and the ultraconservative Al Nour Party gained over 75 percent of the of Parliament through fair
elections.22 The election of these parties gaining the majority of the seats in the newly formed Egyptian
Parliament illustrates the religious dimension that motivates the direction of regime transitions and is
not accounted for in the standard Selectorate Model.
In The Logic of Political Survival (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, et al., 2003) the authors argue that
survival of any leader holding office is determined by the mix of private payoffs to his winning coalition
and public goods to the masses. In the case of the Arab Spring, political survival is also driven by the
direct acquiescence of the religious officials manifested by Islamic parties, an appointed Shura, or Sharia
Law principles. To place in context, the threat of Islamic extremism has been often exaggerated by
autocrats in the region as an argument for maintaining their rule, thereby preventing democratization. A
few examples of this notion are Hussein era Iraq, Gaddafi era Libya and Bashar Al Assad’s Syria. On the
opposite hand, Islamist states imposing Sharia law have underestimated the real threat of Islamic
radicalization within their ranks. The fact that fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were citizens of the
ultra-religious Saudi Arabia is not a coincidence in this regard. This begs the question: is religion and
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Democracy reconcilable in MENA? The role of religion in democratic processes runs a wide spectrum. In
the case of countries with majority Muslim population, it can be divided into several forms in the
context of governance. The first form is defined as democratic countries that recognize Islam as a state
religion (Nasr 2001). Such examples are Malaysia, Maldives, Lebanon, and Turkey. These governments
allow for the inclusion of other religions in the political process. Although not a Muslim state, Israel is
also an example of a democratic state in MENA that has an official state religion (Judaism) as well as
religious parties. Malaysia has a government based on the Westiminster Parliamentary system,
Maldives holds true to a Presidential Republic, Turkey as a Parliamentary Republic, and Lebanon as a
Confessionalist Parliamentary Republic. In spite of the democratic practices, these countries serve as
examples of political systems where the religious preferences determine the political survival of national
leaders.
The second form of political Islam is even less easily incorporated into the selectorate single
dimension of public-private goods. This is defined as an Islamist democracy, a state that holds elections
but is restricted under comprehensive inclusion of Islamic laws into the affairs of the government
(Ghadbian, 2003). Iran is the quintessential example of this evolution where elections while not perfect
do represent a large portion of the selectorate but the primary motivation for change is religious control
rather than the provision of public goods. The historical case of Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1979 displays
the emergence of an Islamist movement resulting into a theocratic government that became less
democratic than the previous secular government it overturned. In the months following the Shah’s
departure, the people of Iran voted through national referendum by an overwhelming majority to
become an Islamic Republic. By equally overwhelming popular support, Ayotollah Khomeini garnered
dictatorial power as the religious and political leader of the country (Nasr 2006). By Selectorate Theory
definitions we cannot distinguish between Iran’s theocratic government and a true democracy. The size
of the selectorate thereby grew rapidly when newly enacted voting rights were extended to the majority
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of Iranian citizens. The country also developed a relatively large winning coalition represented by an
elected president and parliamentarians. Yet Iran became a despotic state and remains so today because
the multi-party system is ultimately subservient to a Supreme Leader that has dictatorial power under a
perceived divine rule from God. Finally, there is the usual Islamic form of governance that has
dominated the region in the past and still remains today. These are purely Islamist authoritarian states
that hold no minimal semblance for democratic elections (Lewis, 1995). Such an example is the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia. This case meets the selectorate definition of a dictatorial state that maintains a small
selectorate and even a smaller winning coalition. The financial resources of this country are distributed
disproportionately as private payoffs to the king’s inner-circle with much less of the resources going to
the public welfare per capita (Beblawi, 1990). But once again, the religious dimension is unaccounted for
because the Saudi King Abdullah must address preferences his Islamic constituency with issues that have
more to do with social or religious needs than economic concerns.

Public-Private Goods and Religion: A New Selectorate Perspective
By tracking the evolution of instability in MENA , I depict the interaction between religion,
private and public goods and Democracy. The proposed Bagherpour – Singer Curve in Figure 25 and
Figure 26 shows that Selectorate Theory holds true to the lower half of the curve because there is either
no role of religion within the governance structure of the state apparatus or is represented by Islamic
political parties that play by the same laws and rules governing secular parties. The horizontal axis of
this curve depicts the spectrum of governance beginning with the left side as dictatorial government all
the way to the right as a liberal democracy with multiple political parties. The vertical axis depicts the
religious spectrum starting at the bottom with no role of religion in governance all the way to the top
with Islamic law or Islamist governance structure. The extent of religiosity or secularism in the

government is expressed by the preference of the stakeholder located at the domestic median
based on qualitative knowledge on the individual or group’s religious views and positions.
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The six studies address the Arab Spring across the 2011 time frame. I forecasted the direction of the
domestic median indicating what type of government will be present in the future or if there is no
change. The extent of religiosity or secularism in the government is expressed by the preference of the
stakeholder located at the domestic median coupled with qualitative knowledge on the individual or
group’s religious views and positions.
Egypt
Situated at the lower bound of the Bagherpour-Singer curve, Egypt’s transition under the
Freedom and Justice Party majority continues to be driven by secular policies summarily defined as a
drive for more public goods along with economic growth. There is no imposition of Sharia Law although
there are religious parties gaining over 70% of the seats in the Parliament. Although religion plays a role,
it is a secondary concern over governance. In the case of Egypt, the domestic median is located at a
“multiparty democracy.” The stakeholder closest to the median is the Muslim Brotherhood. Based on
qualitative assessment coupled with ABM median position, it is clear that Egypt is engaging in a
democratic transition but is becoming less secular based on Islamic preferences, as expressed publicly
by the Muslim Brotherhood.
Libya
My revised explanation for Selectorate Theory as depicted by the Bagherpour-Singer Curve in
Figure 25 and Figure 26 posits that if the priority in Libya becomes religious identification then it will be
in the upper bound of the curve. One of the first actions the Libyan Transitional Council undertook was
the imposition of Sharia Law, placing Libya in the upperbound of the curve. In such case the standard
Selectorate Model explanation will not be sufficient in determining the behavior of the leadership based
on the private-public goods argument because the laws governing all parties are under Islamic Law. In
the case of Libya, the median position is at limited multiparty democracy. The stakeholder closest to the
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median is Omar Hariri, the head of the Libyan Council and an Islamist. This is a clear indication that Libya
is becoming more Democratic but less secular. The imposition of Sharia Law indicates that Libya has
crossed the threshold for an inclusive Democracy, although they have multiple parties running. The
justice system is tilted in preference of Islamist and creates a restricted hierarchy based on the
imposition of Sharia Law.
Saudi Arabia
The revised Selectorate Model as illustrated by the Bagherpour-Singer Curve in Figure 25 and 26
shows that Saudi Arabia is both highly authoritarian and religious. Although the Saudi Government
provides massive amount of private payoffs and public services through petroleum revenues, it’s
legitimacy is based on approval from the Shura council and the Sharia laws that govern the state. For
this reason it is in the upper bound of the curve. In the case of Saudia Arabia, the median position is in
support of the House of Saud Monarchy. The House of Saud governs with strict Sharia Law. Therefore it
is highly religious. Because the median position is located at the House of Saud, the government remains
stable and is not expected to change.
Syria
Syria is situated at the lower bound of the Bagherpour-Singer curve as a country that is highly
authoritarian and does not include the the religious leader in major organs of government. The publicprivate payoffs argument holds true under the Assad regime as the primary motive for his survival, a
typical example of an autocrat who has provides few benefits to the disenfranchised while providing
major concessions to his winning coalition. In the case of of Syria, the median is located at harsh
authoritarianism. The person closest to the median is Bashar Al Assad. He is a secular despot, indicating
that Syria is stable and will remain secular so long as Assad remain in power. Although becoming less
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relevant, Assad is expected to survive in the short to medium term. However, his loss of influence
implies that future leadership should account for religious preferences if seeking to remain stable.
Bahrain
Bahrain is situated in the upper-bound of the Bagherpour-Singer curve illustrated in Figure 25.
Bahrain is not as authoritarian as Saudi Arabia but its mix of Sunni Wahabbism within its polity and
limited representation by Shias place it in the upper bound of the curve as well. In the case of Bahrain,
the median position is in support of the Khalifa famiy and stable. This means Bahrain will continue to be
stable. Bahrain will also continue to be religious government based on the Khalifa’s family partnership
with Bahrain’s Shura Council. Therefore, Bahrain remains on the upper bound of the Bagherpour-Singer
Curve as a non-democratic religious government.
Iran
Iran serves as prime example of a country where the size of the selectorate increased but the
country became more authoritarian because of the imposing of a draconian religious order. It is situated
in the upper bound of the Bagherpour Singer Curve (Figure 25) because of the Constitutional law that
gives ultimate authority to the Supreme Leader as the religious and governing authority over all aspects
of the state. In the case of Iran, the domestic median is located at the status quo government, the
Supreme Leader structure. The stakeholder located at the domestic median is Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Khamenei. This is a clear indication of that the government in Iran is stable under theocratic rule
because of the Supreme leader’s religious preferences.
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Figure 25: Bagherpour – Singer Curve
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Figure 26: Interaction between Religion and Democracy in 2011 MENA Case Studies

I determined that the threshold for where Selectorate Theory is a sufficient explanation for
governance is based on prioritization of preferences (Zagare, 1990). Those governments on the lower
bound hold secular rules of governance as the first priority and consideration for Islamic principles as a
secondary issue. In contrast those countries on the upper bound reciprocally govern with religious rules
or principles as the first priority with secular issues as a secondary concern. Selectorate Theory holds
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true to the lower half of the curve because there is either no role of religion within the governance
structure of the state apparatus or if there are Islamic political parties representing the polity, such
groups play by the same non-religious laws governing secular parties. In short, lower bound countries
are restrained from imposing religious order on the entire society at large. The priority for the
leadership in these cases on the lower-bound of the curve remains a mix of private benefits and public
goods. In the case of Libya, Muamar Gaddafi ruled as a highly secular despot that used private-payoffs
with little regard for public services to his people. Gaddafi era Libya was situated at the lower left of the
curve as a highly authoritarian state that relentlessly marginalized the role of religion. The lower bound
also applies to Mubarak-era Egypt and Bashar Al-Assad’s Syria. The irony of religious suppression in the
name of secularism was that by keeping these religious groups marginalized, these governments
catapulted the radicalization of disenfranchised Muslims in their respective societies by forcing them to
act outside the law. Such religious groups revolted not only to gain access to public goods but to gain
access to religious traditions that paradoxically constrain the secular freedoms of the new selectorate.
Islam explicitly defined itself as a political movement dictating on how societies ought to govern.
Perhaps because there has not been a wide scale secular reform movement with Islam, today there is no
democratically elected state with a majority Muslim population without the presence of Islamic parties
within their polity. The Bagherpour-Singer revised Selectorate Theory holds true in these cases as well.
Turkey, Malaysia, Lebanon and Maldives serve as historical examples. In the case of the Arab Spring, our
analysis indicates that Egypt is projected to become a democracy as evident by the Parliamentary
elections. Although there are radical Islamist elements within the polity, the moderate Freedom and
Justice Party has emerged with majority control over the Parliament, a political party formerly known as
the Muslim Brotherhood. Situated at the lower bound of the Bagherpour-Singer curve, Egypt’s
transition under the Freedom and Justice Party majority continues to be driven by secular policies
summarily defined as a drive for more public goods along with economic growth.
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My case studies covering the Arab Spring and Iran reinforce a simple idea: Political survival is
determined by a leader’s ability to maintain his coalition. To recap, the standard Selectorate Theory
would have us believe that power is maintained or gained merely through the mix of private payoffs to a
leader’s coalition with a portion of public goods given to the rest of the masses depending on the size of
the selectorate. However, the emergence of Islamists within all of the selectorates described in my case
studies proves differently. The once secular regional autocrats are all gone with the exception of Bashar
Al Assad who is on the brink of irrelevance at best and collapse at worst. My ABM forecasts reveal the
once secular states such as Egypt and Libya are becoming less autocratic while at the same becoming
more religious with the rise of Islamist parties by democratic means. Democratic elections in Egypt have
given rise to the Muslim Brotherhood and more extreme Islamists parties gaining a combined 75% of the
seat in the Parliament. In similar fashion, Libya has given rise to numerous Islamist parties that never
existed during Gaddafi’s reign. The Libyan Transitional Council’s first actions upon defeating Gaddafi
were the imposing of Sharia Law, a further indication of Islamization within a once secular government.
The countries that have had uprisings are all being led by Islamist oppositions ranging from the Muslim
Brotherhood in Syria, the Islah Party in Yemen, and the Al Wifaq Party in Bahrain. Those who have
avoided uprisings (Iran and Saudi Arabia) or successfully quelled them (Bahrain) have done so by the
implicit cooperation with their Islamic stakeholders being appeased.
In every single case the point is clear: religious preferences must take into account the calculus
for political survival in MENA. The Bagherpour-Singer Curve (Figure 25) illustrates that as a Muslim
majority society becomes more democratic, the society becomes more religious. Iran serves as prime
example of a country where the size of the selectorate increased but the country became more
authoritarian because of the imposing of a draconian religious order. In the other cases observed in the
Arab Spring, it is too early to determine the medium to long-term time horizon in which we can observe
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a stabilized selectorate. However, my ABM forecasts show a clear increase in the size of the selectorates
with Egypt and Libya making attempts at democratization.
My simulations validate my two hypotheses clearly. In the first hypothesis, the outcome of the
conflict is determined by the position closest to the median stakeholder. But more interesting than this
dynamic is the emergence of Islamists as indispensable elements of the winning coalitions. My forecasts
also indicate that states which have an increasing distance between the status quo leadership and the
median stakeholder become highly unstable and susceptible to eventual collapse. In this situation as
well, we can observe that that the median stakeholder is determined by the weighted influence of
Islamist actors.
In conclusion power is gained and maintained not just from economic benefits but also by
appeasement of the rising religious preferences within the MENA selectorates. The countries that are
least prone to collapse are predicted to be those who have religious elements within their winning
coalitions. Those leaders which have largely ignored the rising religious tides in their countries have
suffered at their own peril. The irony is that addressing the religious preferences of these newly
emerging political powers allows for democratization or at least a less autocratic process to take place in
the transition period. However, having gained access within the selectorate, these Islamist actors
mitigate the democratic processes which brought them to power in the first place.
The threshold for whether a country is in the upper bound of the Bagherpour-Singer curve is the
prioritization between religion and public-private payoffs. The states where the priority for political
survival is religious considerations are on the upper bound of the curve. In these instances, the publicprivate goods argument does not hold because the leadership is driven by ideological preferences that
have less to do with financial gain and more to do with the acquiescence of Islamic principles.
In the case of Iran, the Supreme leader’s authority is mandated by the Islamic clergy. So long as
the Ayatollah Khamenei has support from the clergy, he can continue to garner control. Indeed, the the
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role of private payoffs plays a part in the Khamenei’s grip on power, but it. It is estimated that the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a critical part of the Supreme leader’s winning coalition,
controls more than one-third of the official economy.
Figure 27: Summary Chart

In examining the Arab Spring, political survival goes beyond just the public-private goods mix. In
the summary chart depicted by Figure 27, I concluded that stability is a function of public-private goods,
participation, and religion. Given the sparse data on public expenditures versus private payoffs, I provide
evidence of a disproportionate level of private payoffs by citing the Corruption Perception Index (CPI).
The figure above indicates that the six the case countries in this dissertation are either corrupt or highly
corrupt, an indication of disproportionate private payoffs. In the case of participation, there is no
numeric data comparing participation in terms of voting across all countries. Instead, I made a
qualitative assessment and classified selectorate size as a) expanding with competitive elections, b) no
change (small W/S) c) no with small W/S with non-competitive election.
Although the extent of religiosity varies, all the case studies with the exception of Syria have
some element of religion within their institutions. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain are considered Islamist
governments and are stable compared to the secular governments overthrown during the Arab Spring.
The transitional government in Egypt is less secular than the previous one but the rise of Islamic Parties
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and a push for some Islamization is evident. Libya is on an even greater path toward Islamization based
on the Libyan Council’s decision to impose Sharia Law. All of the stakeholders closest to the median with
the exception of Bashar Al Assad have Islamic preferences for governance, an indication that the
governments will either remain Islamic or transition in the direction if not already. The figure above is
summary of my findings: that political survival (i.e. stability) best achieved in MENA through the right
proportion of private-public goods and an element of religiosity that is expressed either by religious
parties or official partnership with the government at large.
Policy Implications
Achieving stability in MENA is just one element within the broad array of American national
interests for the region. The policy implications for the United States are clear: Regardless of
democratization, to achieve stability, the United States and the international community should
accommodate the religious actors into the political process, so long as they do not collide with their
interests. From a policy standpoint, this dissertation is a study on assessing the feasibility of stabilizing
the Middle East and an evaluation on whether achieving democratic outcomes are achievable. If the
United States seeks to create a world in its own image, it must do so by realizing the costs and reality of
achieving the end-state. The secular despots of the Middle East are now gone and are being replaced by
governments that are more religious than the rulers they overthrew. The one exception is Bashar Al
Assad’s Syria; however, he too is becoming less relevant as Syria descends into civil war.
The standard Selectorate Model suggests that enough bribes and private payoffs coupled with
limited services to the masses can offset dissatisfaction in even the most authoritarian states. However,
my revised Selectorate Model indicates that such a system can pacify but never satisfy authoritarian
societies unless the ideological or religious preferences of the various political groups are addressed.
The case of Iran in the 1979 was a cautionary tale more than thirty years prior to the Arab Spring. Under
the Shah’s reforms and spiking oil prices of the 1970s, Iran experienced a massive increase in wealth and
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quality of life. Yet the Shah’s regime was overthrown because many of the ideological and religious
preferences of groups outside of the political system were not addressed. This resulted into an Islamist
movement that delivered much less in wealth than the previous government it overturned with a
Islamic society that addressed the people’s ideological preferences.
The United States and the international community should encourage the countries in MENA to
include religious actors into the political process regardless of whether the state is democratic or not.
For stability it can turn to Saudi Arabia to see a model that works. The Saudi monarchy includes all the
elements of a stable regime based on the revised Selectorate Model: a large amount of private-payoffs
and public services due to their massive oil wealth, coupled with an integration of the ultra conservative
religious Ulima into the polity. The result of this is a society that is not only stable but reliable so far
international oil interests are concerned. A similar formula should be applied utilizing the three
elements of the revised Selectorate Model. Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Iran all have different
ideological preferences and are in different stages of development. The question should not only
address if democratization is possible but rather if the ideological preference of the society is being
addressed by the extent of religiosity. Only these states become stable for the medium to long term
horizons.
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Appendix
Charts Depicting Selectorate and Revised Selectorate Models
Interaction Between Selectorate Size and Government Types

Interaction Between Public Goods and Government Type (but the role of religion is not included)

Public Goods

Private Payoffs
Liberal
Democracy

Authoritarion
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1. Complete Predictions on Egypt
a. The Egyptian Uprising: The Departure of Hosni Mubarak
Data Collected: February 3rd 2011 Analysis Completed: February 7th 2011
Background: The massive protests in Tunisia followed by the abdication of its ruler Ben Ali in motivated
the people of Egypt to follow in a similar path. In doing so, Tunisia and Egypt share a similar story. Both
countries were making significant headway in initiating reforms that had helped spark economic growth.
But the crash of the global economy resulted in massive unemployment for both countries while high
expectations for an improved standard of living still remained. This served as a major factor in elevating
the level of dissatisfaction amongst the people beyond a level of toleration for corruption, human-rights
abuses, and absence of political rights with the country. Hence we are now observing a massive uprising
amongst the Egyptian people who are making a major demand for change within their country.
Will Mubarak stay? Newly empowered political parties, such as WAFD, Al Ghud and to a lesser degree
the Muslim Brotherhood, will pressure Mubarak to begin a forced, yet measured transition. Regime
change will likely be negotiated due to continued support from the Egyptian Army and intelligence
services for an orderly transition.
What if something happens to Mubarak? If for some unanticipated reason Mubarak departs quickly, a
highly fractionalized polity will rapidly evolve where previous military support for a stable transition
succumbs to popular support represented by El Baradei for faster results. However, the Intelligence
services will remain adamantly opposed to any change and increased political violence is expected.
What type of democratic or autocratic regime change is coming? When & how long? If Mubarak
remains in Egypt during a measured transition, the prospects for a stable democracy remain limited.
There will be an initial jockeying for position leaning toward a liberalized Democracy as most political
interest are capitalizing on the current anti-Mubarak situation, but almost all Egyptian political parties,
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with the exception of Al Ghud, will quickly revert to more autocratic means even more repressive than
the current regime in order to maintain stability.
Is Mubarak helping or hindering democracy? If for some unanticipated reason Mubarak departs Egypt
quickly, current calls for democracy from all the political parties and international groups are likely be
much more successful. Mubarak’s early departure creates a power vacuum under current conditions
that El Baradei and other supporters of reform could effectively capitalize on. Under this scenario,
lasting dramatic democratic reforms are possible and supported by the military and the international
community. Even the intelligence community will slowly support higher levels of democratic reform
under these conditions in order to maintain political stability. In short, a democratic future of Egypt’s
government depends on Hosni Mubarak’s immediate departure. The longer he stays, the lower the
likelihood for lasting democratic reforms.
What will be attitudes towards US interests? Short of major unforeseen violence or political terrorism
attacks, fears of accelerating anti American sentiment are likely to be unfounded. Egyptian bureaucracy,
political institutions as well as the military will not significantly shift current support toward the US,
although some US credibility has already eroded since the uprising.
Overview: I explore the current political events, negotiations and coalition building between various
internal forces in Egypt as well as the external players such as the United States and other countries.
Using expert information collected on Feburary 3rd, 2011 and Senturion analysis performed on February
7th, I offer the following report. In addition to the predicted outcomes of the current positions, I also
suggest other courses of actions indicating alternative futures of what may happen if the internal players
within Egypt and various coalition partners change their positions. I evaluate three issues affecting the
outcome of the Egyptian upheaval.
1. The extent of support for Hosni Mubarak
2. Commitment to Democratic Reform
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3. Disposition towards the United States
Current Stakeholder Dispositions: I conducted SME interviews along with my internal verification of the
various players seeking to advocate their own positions within the Egyptian uprising. In conducting these
interviews I measured the relative power of the various groups, the power of the actors and with
importance they placed on their positions within the issue continuum.
Current Situation: As the second week of protests continue in Egypt Hosni Mubarak has stated that he
will not run for President in the following election which is more than seven months away. Major forces
within Egypt, including the newly emerged Mohamed El-Baradei are siding with popular support for
Mubarak’s immediate departure. The United States has also indicated its loss of confidence for
Mubarak, calling for him to step down sooner than later. In reaction to the Egyptian protesters,
Mubarak has appointed Omar Suleiman (intelligence chief) as Egypt’s first Vice President and Ahmed
Shafiq (Air Force General) as the Prime Minister. In addition to the changes taking place within the
government apparatus, political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the WAFD party and Al Ghud
party are certainly mobilizing to jockey for position as events continue to unfold.
I. Mubarak’s Departure
Issue: Support and disposition toward Hosni Mubarak
Problem: Although disintegration of support for Mubarak within the Arab street in Egypt is evident,
support within the government apparatus and other political forces are less clear.
Issue Continuum: The scale of preferences range from zero as “Total Support for Mubarak” all the way
200 as “Staunch Opposition to Mubarak”. As displayed by the continuum below, 100 is Neutral. For
example, 0 position of would mean a continued preference for Mubarak remaining in power while 200
would represent Mubarak’s immediate departure with no pre-conditions or caveats of any type.
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Scenario: Mubarak’s Prolonged Departure

Outcome: The simulation suggests that if Mubarak prolongs his stay, he will not be deposed from within
the government apparatus. His coalition will not splinter and he will leave Egypt from a combination of
external pressure coupled with pressure from political parties that are not part of the government
apparatus. Therefore, he has the ability to prolong his stay in Egypt if he desires in the foreseeable
months. The simulation indicates the positions supporting and deposing Mubarak will not change
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significantly. The Army, represented by General Tantawi, is the most powerful force thus far because of
its organizational strength and ability to mobilize. The Army is closely allied with Mubarak and will
continue to support him in the coming days, but this will wane over time. The Army’s primary goal will
be assuring a peaceful transition of power while preserving its own interests. Mubarak has strong
support from the PLO, Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel and Saudi Arabia. This support will not
change. The newly appointed Vice President who is also Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman is still an ally
support of peacefully transitioning Mubarak. However, the simulation interestingly displays that Iran will
initially depose Mubarak, but will eventually turn to a position slightly to left of Neutral with limited
support. The Liberal Party, Ayman Nour of the Al Ghud Party, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Mohamed El
Baradei will form a coalition to depose Mubarak indicating that their position will not change. The
United States will remain opposed to Mubarak following the initial upheaval.
Scenario: Mubarak’s Early Departure
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Outcome: The forecast indicates that if Mubarak departs early, the state apparatus will become
splintered between the Army and the intelligence service. Omar Suleiman, the acting VP and head of the
intelligence service will hold a position that is more pro-Mubarak; however, the Army leadership will
defect toward a staunch anti-Mubarak position. Although power will weigh toward an anti-Mubarak
stance, the outcome will be much more conflicting within the government if Mubarak departs early.
Strength: My simulations indicate that the U.S. can leverage Omar Suleiman toward an anti-Mubarak
opposition block. This may reduce conflict within the Egyptian government.
Weakness: The state’s security forces will remain splintered if Mubarak leaves and the U.S. does not
intervene.
Opportunities: The U.S. can leverage Suleiman once Mubarak departs.

Prospects for Democracy
Issue: Disposition toward Democratic Government.
Issue Continuum: The scale begins at 0 defined as “Harsh Autocracy.” This would be defined as a step
back from the current Mobarek regime with a greater concentration of power and repression. The scale
at 25 is the status quo position represented by the Mubarak regime. The mid-point of the scale is
defined as a “One Party Democracy,”a system similar to the political structure in Russia. The next point
is “Democracy Limited,” defined as continuous free elections with the possibility of a two party system

87

and limited procedural reforms. And finally at a 100 I labeled “Democracy Liberal,” a Democracy
resembling any multitude of developed western European systems.

Scenario: Prospect of Democracy under Prolonged Mubarak Departure

Outcome: Although there will be an initial jockeying leaning toward a liberalized Democracy, my
calculations indicate that the final outcome will still be some form of autocracy that does not reach the
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minimum threshold necessary for a democracy or a one party system. In short there will be some easing
of restrictions and reforms resulting into an autocracy leaning toward free elections; however, in the
end the government will still exert repression in order to satisfy coalition needs and tradeoffs between
chaos and order.
Strength: There will initially emerge a democratic movement, but it will be temporary.
Weakness: These forces want to create space through an initial democratic movement to pursue their
own inevitable autocratic or Islamist aspirations. I observe this with various moves toward liberalized
Democracy by the WAFD party, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Al Ghud Party, and Amr Moussa. This will
be followed afterwards by General Tantawi’s move to a Democratic preference. However, in the end
most political parties along with the Army will lean toward an autocratic form of government that will
provide improved but limited reforms compared to the Mubarak regime. One exception in remaining
committed to a Democratic system is the Al Ghud Party.
Opportunities: The United States and allies can use the transitional time for democratic reform to
advocate their positions toward liberalized reforms. Although the reforms that will most likely take place
in Egypt will not reach the threshold for a democratic system, there will be improved reforms closer to
democratic dispositions compared to the status quo ante.
Threats: The initial democratic movement will eventually stabilize under some form of autocracy. This
presents the risk of rising non-secular movements.
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Scenario: Prospect of Democracy with Mubarak’s Early Departure

Outcome: The earlier Mubarak departs, the higher the prospects for a democratic transition that hold.
The simulation indicates that if Mubarak departs soon, there will be a coalition leaning toward a Liberal
Democracy with the various political parties aligned on position and the state apparatus aligned closer
to a one party system but still surprising the threshold for a democratic state.
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Strength: If Mubarak leaves soon, a democratic system that holds will emerge.
Weakness: State security apparatus will remain divided with the political parties on the type of
democracy. This will present secondary and tertiary levels of uncertainty not captured by this forecast.
Opportunity: The U.S. and various political parties can leverage the Army and intelligence services to
move closer to a liberal democracy.
III. Support for the U.S.
Issue: Disposition toward Pro or Anti-American Stance if Mubarak draws out departure from Egypt.
Problem: Egypt is a major power center in the Middle East because of it’s large population and geostrategic location. It has served as the primary ally of the United States within the Arab world for over 30
years. A loss of support will damage American credibility and potentially push other Arab countries in a
similar direction.
Current Situation: The military and intelligence apparatus within Egypt have strong relationships with
the United States and receive $1.3 billion in defense aid annually. Therefore, they have a strong interest
in remaining friendly to the United States. However, the Arab sentiment in the street and organized
political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood hold opposite opinions. They will portray the United
States as an enabler for the Mubarak regime resulting from over 30 years of support. This historic
relationship between Mubarak and the U.S. will hinder a pro-American disposition from holding sway
within the various political parties in Egypt.
Issue Continuum: The scale range from zero labeled as “Staunch Anti-American” to 100 as “Staunch ProAmerican.” A staunch anti-American position would mean that the bedrock of political strength and
ideology is rooted in anti-western and anti-American opinions. A staunch pro-American position is
defined as a willing ally of the United States committed to fully aligned interests on a majority of foreign
policy issues and many domestic issues.
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Outcome: The disposition toward a pro-American agenda will not change after the various political
parties take form. The changes that have taken place in regard to a pro-U.S. policy have already
occurred. The simulation indicates that the current positions will remain the same. The Army will stay
committed toward a Pro-American disposition and this will not change through the various evolutions of
the crisis. However, the Muslim Brotherhood and Egyptian Media will elevate anti-U.S. sentiment, but it
will not be enough to create policy changes that alter American interests in regard to Egypt.
Scenario: Support for U.S. with Prolonged Mubarak Departure
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Strength: The Army and majority of power will remain staunch supporters of the United States
Weakness: There will be an elevated level of Anti-Americanism represented by the Muslim
Brotherhood. This may have secondary and tertiary effects not predicted in this model.
Opportunities: The U.S. can leverage the Army to seek support from the Al-Ghud Party and Mohamed
El-Baradei in return for reform and some form of power sharing.
Threats: The rise in the level of Anti-Americanism expressed by the Egyptian media and the Muslim
Brotherhood can push other political players such as the WAFD party and Al Ghud Party in the same
direction.
Scenario: Support for U.S. if Mubarak Departs Early
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Outcome: Support for the United States or against it will not change significantly based on Mubarak’s
departure.

Strength: Egyptian policy with the U.S. will remain stable so far as the government is concerned.
Weakness: There will still be anti-American sentiment presented by the media. The positions do not
change; but the extent of anti-Americanism among the media and Muslim brotherhood is
underdetermined and not completely captured by this simulation.

Opportunities: My simulation indicates that the Army and intelligence services can leverage the
Muslim Brotherhood toward a more pro-American stance.
b. Egypt Forecast Update

th

th

Date Update: November 7 2011 Analysis Completed: November 15 2011

What will be the future form of government in Egypt? Egypt will develop two parallel
governments: a legitimate legislature comprised of elected officials and paradoxically a shadow
government consisting of military and intelligence apparatus. The shadow government will be less
autocratic than the previous Mubarak regime, meaning there will be more stakeholders sharing power
within the authoritarian structure. However, it will not meet the threshold for even a one party semidemocratic system similar to Russia.
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How will Prime Minister Netanyahu react to the rising anti-Israeli sentiment? Fearing the rise of
more anti-Israeli sentiment, Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel will support the Egyptian military and
intelligence apparatus as a partial assurance or hedge against further dissent. Israel will consistently turn
to the Egyptian military much more so than any of the future elected leaders such as Presidential
candidates Amr Moussa or Mohamed El Baradei.

What will happen if the head of Egypt’s military council, General Tantawi, is removed or
resigns? Egypt’s outcome is not dependent on General Tantawi. If General Tantawi is removed or
resigns as Chairman of the Egypt’s military council, the intelligence apparatus and military will still
remain entrenched in Egypt’s governance. The military apparatus will still remain as the dominant force
governing Egypt. The shadow military regime will still persevere, resulting into only limited or marginal
gains for the democratic movement. Furthermore, Egypt does not become any more or less proAmerican if Tantawi is removed or resigns.

What will be the extent of support of the United States? The military will continue to be proAmerican because its reliance on U.S. foreign aid and military assistance. The Muslim Brotherhood along
with the Freedom and Justice Party will continue their position in the opposite direction by promoting
anti-American sentiment as their political narrative.

What will be the future of Egypt’s economy in regard to economic openness? Egypt’s economy
is driven primarily by tourism; however, it also has a substantial portion of its GDP comprised of
agriculture and transport sectors. Egypt will have a semi-open economy that is regulated and controlled
by the government. The economy will consist of a series of public-private partnerships ensuring the
government its share of profits.

Overview: We explore the current process of coalition building and negotiations between actors within
Egypt and the international community. Data was collected on November 7th 2011 and analysis was
completed on November 15th 2011.
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Current Stakeholder Dispositions: We have incorporated SME incite from academics within the
United States and input from journalists reporting on the current crisis. In conducting these interviews
we measured the relative power of the various groups, the power of the actors, their positions on the
issue and the importance they placed on such issues within the continuum.

Issue Continuum on Power Structure and Governance: This continuum ranges from “0” as a harsh
autocracy to “100” defined as a Liberal Democracy. At “25” we defined the government as autocratic.
Under this structure there are more stakeholders sharing power compared to a harsh autocracy or
dictatorship; however, selection of leaders are not democratic through any public election process. At
“50” we defined the government as a “one-party system,” similar to Russia’s elected one-party system.
At “75” the government is defined as at least a two party system, yet does not meet the threshold for a
liberal democracy.

Issue Continuum on the Extent of Support for the United States: The continuum ranges from “0”
as staunch anti-American policies and rhetoric similar to Iran’s policies. At “50” the extent of support for
the U.S. is neutral and at “100” the extent of support is strongly pro-American.

Issue Continuum on the Degree of Economic Openness: This issue continuum ranges from “0” as a
controlled closed economy to “100” as a completely open economy. At “25” the economy is defined as
closed to business opportunities, meaning it is still highly controlled with only limited opportunities for
those within the government. At “50” the economy is defined as regulated but somewhat open under
strict official and unofficial structures. At “75” the we defined an open economy that is regulated by the
government.
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Basecase: Future Form of Government

Outcome: Egypt will develop two parallel governments: a legitimate legislature comprised of elected
officials and paradoxically a shadow government consisting of military and intelligence apparatus. The
shadow government will be less autocratic than the previous Mubarak regime, meaning there will be
more stakeholders sharing power within the authoritarian structure. However, it will not meet the
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threshold for even a one party semi-democratic system similar to Russia. There is currently the
formation of two divided coalition, one centered on a push for democratic elections under a multi-party
system and the other around military apparatus that maintains authoritarian power. Fearing the rise of
more anti-Israeli sentiment, Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel will support the Egyptian military and
intelligence apparatus as a partial assurance or hedge against further dissent. Israel will consistently turn
to the Egyptian military much more so than any of the future elected leaders such as Presidential
candidates Amr Moussa or Mohamed El Baradei. Iran will also more supportive an authoritarian
structure under the Egyptian military. Khamenei will prefer the military and intelligence apparatus
overseeing Egypt for fear of rising Sunni extremist leaders that may arise from popular elections, posing
a threat to an already waning minority Shiite influence. In the final evolution of Egypt’s transitional
Democratic phase, the military will allow for semi-free elections but will still act as custodians of the
country and true center of power for Egypt in the short to medium term.
Strengths: Egypt will have Democratic reforms, allowing for election of national leaders. The military will
act as a safety net against rising anti-Israeli and anti-American sentiment. The military and intelligence
apparatus will act against extremism that may emerge in the democratic process.
Weakness: The shadow military government will undermine true attempts for democratic reform in the
short to medium time frame.
Opportunities: The United States can gain support from future Egyptian elected leaders if it acts as a
buffer between the Egyptian military and the democratic political candidates.
Threats: There may emerge even more violence and conflict between the future elected government of
Egypt and the military apparatus.
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Scenario: Future Form of Government if General Tantawi Resigns or is Removed

Outcome: At 76 years old, General Tantawi is an aging figure in Egypt’s military. Tantawi’s departure or
resignation is a realistic possibility because of this fact. If General Tantawi is removed or resigns as
Chairman of the Egypt’s military council, the intelligence apparatus and military will still remain
entrenched in Egypt’s governance. In order to signal strength and cohesion, the military council will
remain united. The legitimate political parties and democratic candidates pushing for a multi-party
system will continue to push for democratic reform. Perceiving Tantawi’s departure as a loss of strength
by the military, the Al Ghud Party and Presidential Candidate El Baradei will push for even stronger
democratic reform toward a more liberal democracy. In the final evolution, the military apparatus will
still remain as the dominant force governing Egypt. The shadow military regime will still persevere,
resulting into only limited or marginal gains for the democratic movement.
Strength: The Al Ghud Party and Presidential Candidate El Baradei will push for even stronger
democratic reform toward a more liberal democracy.
Weakness: The shadow military regime will still remain with very marginal gains for the democratic
movement.
Opportunity: There can be some concessions made for more democratic reform, but this will be
marginal.
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Threat: The bifurcation between those who prefer a military regime and those advocating democratic
reform will remain. This will continue to hinder Egypt’s quest for a true democratic society. The
perseverance of a shadow government may present serious security challenges similar to what the
United States is experiencing in Pakistan between the elected government and Pakistani ISI intelligence
agency.

Basecase: Extent of Support for the United States
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Outcome: The military will continue to be pro-American because its reliance on U.S. foreign aid and
military assistance. The Muslim Brotherhood along with the Freedom and Justice Party will continue
their position in the opposite direction by promoting anti-American sentiment as their political
narrative.
Strength: The political figures within the government will by in large remain pro-American because of
their reliance on the United States for foreign aid.
Weakness: The public media will remain anti-American in their commentary.
Opportunities: The United States can continue to gain pro-American partnerships within the future
democratically elected government in Egypt.

Scenario: Extent of Support for United States if General Tantawi Resigns or is
Removed

Outcome: If Tantawi is removed or resigns, it will have little or no effect on the extent of support for the
United States. This indicates that his presence in the Egyptian political landscape is not very significant.
In short, there are substitutes for his role.
Strength: Egypt’s outcome is not dependent on General Tantawi.
Weakness: Egypt does not become any more or less pro-American if he is removed.
Opportunities: N/A
Threat: N/A
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Extent of Economic Openness

Outcome: Egypt’s economy is driven primarily by tourism; however, it also has a substantial portion of
its GDP comprised of agriculture and transport sectors. Egypt will have a semi-open economy that is
regulated and controlled by the government. The economy will consist of a series of public-private
partnerships ensuring the government its share of profits.
Strength: Egypt will have a semi-open economy.
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Weakness: Because Egypt’s economy is driven by tourism, it will continue to face massive deficits in
spite of attempts to open to open the economy. The positive impact on the degree of economic
openness will be mitigated because of lack of perceived safety in the country.
Opportunity: The United States can leverage its foreign aid in compelling Egypt to make economic
reforms for an open economy.
Threat: Lack of safety and uncertainty over Egypt’s governance will hinder growth in the economy in the
future.

2. Complete Predictions on Iran
a. The Future of Iran: Governance and Power Structure
rd

th

Initial Data Collected: March 3 2011 Analysis Completed: March 11 2011

Background: There is more conflict taking place within the Iranian regime than anytime following the
death the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1988. This does not necessarily mean the Islamic Republic of Iran is
going to collapse or that the country’s leaders will follow the fate of Mubarak and Ben Ali in the shortterm. The tension observed in Iran can be distinguished in two forms: conflict between the government
and the citizenry and conflict within the government. In the first case, the various opposition groups
such as the student movement or minority factions whether violent or peaceful are perceived by the
Iranian government primarily as nuisances rather than existential threats. The latter, tension within the
government, is primarily a conflict over resources or power and not a debate over fundamental changes
necessary for improving the lives of the citizenry. Much of the fight over power and distribution of
wealth within the state apparatus is driven by the question of succession following the death of
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. It is reported that the Supreme Leader is very ill with his death is
in the near horizon. This certainly plays a part in the calculations of all the senior stakeholders in Iran’s
government. Thus there is competition taking place between the various power brokers in order to
secure their future in Iran upon the death of Khamenei.
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What is the potential of the student movement in causing change? The student movement has
very little power under the status quo system in Iran. I predict the students call for reform will not have
the intended effect for substantive change in the short-term. I also forecast that if the students continue
to target support for Mousavi and Karroubi, the consolidation of power within the fundamentalist camp
will be circumvented. In short, the student movement will not lead to reform but it will hurt the IRGC
and the fundamentalists by keeping them divided.

What are the changing power dynamics under Khamenei? There is a major push for a transfer of
power into the hands of the IRGC and security apparatus. I forecast the longer Khamenei remains, the
greater the reconciliation of power centered on the supreme leader. There is currently a divergence
between those who support a military regime versus some such as the Larijanis who wish to retain
power under the status quo. Khamenei appears to be the buffer between these two camps. I predict
that Rafsanjani, still a powerful figure who controls a vast financial empire, will continue to be isolated
and will eventually diverge even closer toward the position of reformists and bazaar merchants.

What is the Extent of Support for the Supreme Leader? As long as Khamenei lives he will continue
to garner support from the major power brokers in Iran. There continues to be a power sharing
arrangement between the fundamentalist clerics and the IRGC; however, it is still weighted in favor of
the status quo structure mandated by “Velayat-e-Faqih” (i.e. the Guardianship by divine authority). The
university students and reformist such as Khatami, Karroubi, and Mousavi remain opposed to the
hardliners, but their calls for change are severely dampened as long as Khamenei lives while retaining
support from the IRGC.

What is going to Happen when Khamenei Dies? Once Khamenei passes away there will be a power
struggle between those who support the status quo under the supreme leader’s “velayat-e-faqih” versus
a 3 to 5 leader structure with greater oversight from Qom and the Guardian Council. There will be either
a newly created compromise between “velayat-e-faqih” and the 3 leader structure or a significant
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splintering between clerics and select members of the IRGC. I predict that in the end, a similar structure
under the status quo will prevail because of Russia, China, and the majority of domestic hardliners overweighing dissenters such as Grand Ayatollah Khorasani and the Larijanis.

What Can the United States Do While Khamenei Remains? While Khamenei stays in power the
United States can take two alternative actions in the framework of this forecast. The first action is
continued support for the student movement which is guided in the direction of support for Mousavi
and Karroubi. This will not have the intended effect of bringing Democracy, domestic reform, or
rapprochement; however, it will dampen the Iranian regime from consolidating positions between the
IRGC and the fundamentalists. The second alternative would require the United States to make a grand
bargain.

What Will Happen if United States Makes a Grand Proposal? This second alternative for the
United States is a substantive proposal directed at Khamenei and Jafari in the form of a grand bargain
such as a security guarantee and lifting of sanctions. Under this scenario, I forecast that the Iranian
regime would further diffuse power through a multi institutional autocracy. This will result into a
massive splintering within the IRGC and within the fundamentalist camps. I show through the simulation
that such a splintering will further result into a serious power sharing crisis, a necessary but insufficient
condition for internal conflict.

Overview: I explore the current process of coalition building and negotiations between actors within
Iran and internationally. Data collection was completed on March 3rd 2011 and analysis was finished on
March 11th 2011. In addition to the predicted outcomes of the current positions, I also suggest other
courses of actions indicating alternative futures of what may happen if the internal players within Iran or
the U.S. change their positions. I evaluate two scenarios affecting power structure in Iran. One of the
most pressing issues in Iran is the issue of succession. There are reports that Ayatollah Khamenei is ill
with cancer; however, the extent of his illness is unknown. I provided a network analysis in determining
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the credible pressure causing various actors to move their positions while Khamenei lives. I also
conducted Monte Carlo analysis to determine those who are susceptible to changing their positions. The
two scenarios are as follows:

1. Power structure in Iran if Khamenei remains.
2. Power structure in Iran when Khamenei dies.
Current Stakeholder Dispositions: I have incorporated SME incite from academics within the United
States, input from journalists and most importantly the perspective from those who are supporters of
the regime, some who have recently returned from Iran. And although they too will naturally have
biases, the fusion of these views provides an analysis that is much closer to reality than any single
perspective. In conducting these interviews I measured the relative power of the various groups, the
power of the actors, their positions on the issue and the importance they placed on such issues within
the continuum.
Issues: 1. Governance While Khamenei Lives
2. Governance when Khamenei Dies
Problem: There is rising conflict within the state over resources and increasing calls for reform by the
citizenry. Although the citizenry is becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the state of affairs in Iran
ranging from high unemployment and inflation to worsening pollution in the cities, change within Iran
will most likely occur if there is a splintering within the government. Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi
Karroubi have created some rifts, but this remains marginal at best. The majority of power brokers in
Iran remain committed to the status quo, leaving little initiative in the government for the type of
reform necessary in bringing substantive change to the country.

Issue Continuum: The scale of preferences ranges from zero as a “Harsh Military Autocracy,” all the
way to 200 as a “Liberal Democracy.” The continuum displays the entire spectrum, but the credible
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debate centers around the interpretation of Velayat-e-Faqih, meaning “guardianship” or supreme
authority over the all elements of society. This is a question of who should rule Iran, particularly when
Khamenei passes.

Basecase Scenario: Power Structure under
Khamenei
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Outcome: There is a power struggle taking place between the IRGC and the hardliners. We predict
Rafsanjani’s powerbase will continue to wane. It will transfer into the direction of the IRGC and
fundamentalist clerics. Yet while Khamenei remains alive, there will be little change in the distribution of
power amongst the key players within Iran. However, China and Russia will begin shifting support for a
military regime under the IRGC but as long as Khamenei remains, they will return in support of him.
Power will continue to be distributed between the Supreme Leader and the IRGC. Mousavi and Karroubi
will remain marginalized. The university students and Bazaar will not be given significant consideration
either. Grand Ayatollah Sistani, the highest ranking cleric in Shia Islam, will lean towards a multiinstitutional autocracy. Rafsanjani will shift away from an autocratic position and will move closer to
alignment with the bazaar class, perhaps in support of his business interests because of his waning
authority under an autocratic structure.
Strengths: The United States and its allies will remain unified in their positions. The university students
and the bazaar will also remain fixed on democratic preferences.
Weakness: Power will remain in the hands of hardliners and the IRGC. It will continue to merge into a
consolidated position in which power is shared and centered on the supreme leader. China and Russia
will continue to back the status quo under Ayatollah Khamenei.
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Network Analysis: Moves in reaction to Pressure

Description: My network analysis indicates no pressure being exerted by the United States on changing
governance in Iran while Khamenei remains alive. Most of the pressure is exerted within the
fundamentalist or IRGC camps, indicating that change will most likely occur from internal pressures
among the hardliners. Although the foreign actors are making moves, almost all the moves are being
waged on other foreign actors. In this case, we can observe that Khamenei is exerting some type of
pressure in which Ali Larijani, Sadeq Larijani, and Hossein Taeb are accordingly reacting by moving
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towards the supreme leader’s position. Jundollah, the MEK, and PJAK seem to be exerting some type of
credible pressure throughout the various rounds on Russia and China. In the middle rounds, Taeb is
reacting to pressure exerted by him from Hassan Abbassi, Mojtaba Hashemi, and Ali Ramin.
Opportunities: Turkey is waging pressure on Karroubi and Mousavi, but this is limited. There is some
pressure being waged on regime hardliners by the reformists such as Khatami.
Threats: There is limited credible pressure being waged on the regime in regards to governance from
foreign actors. This means that the effectiveness in policy change by foreign actors may be untenable.

Alternative COA: Iranian Students Continue to Drive Mousavi and Karroubi

Outcome: I predict that if the Iranian students, i.e. the youth, continue to drive Mousavi and Karroubi,
the fundamentalist clerics and the IRGC will remain splintered within the hardliner camp. This does
mean the student movement will result in Democracy or even reform; however, the simulation indicates
that the students continued support for Mousavi and Karroubi will prevent the hardliners from
consolidated their positions. This is apparent if I compared this COA with the basecase showing a much
more unified position within the hardliners.
Strengths: A continued splintering within the hardliner camp prevents Iran from attaining it’s fully
realized strength.
Weakness: The student movement does not appear to lead to Democracy or substantive reform
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Opportunities: A splintering within Iran’s power apparatus would certainly provide more alternatives for
the United States than a fully unified hardliner regime.

Alternative COA: United States Makes a Proposal to Khamenei and Jafari

Outcome: Under this proposal authority will shift from the status quo to a power sharing structure,
termed “multi institutional autocracy.” Under this scenario power will be diffused between clerics of the
Expediency Council, the Guardian Council, Office of the President, the military and the Parliament. Iran
would still remain autocratic, but there would be a fundamental realignment within the government.
There would be significant resistance from hardliners such as Ahmadinejad, Mesbah Yazdi, G.H. Elham,
and key players linked to the IRGC. This alternative COA suggests that under such a proposal there
would be a splintering within the IRGC as Jafari moves to accommodate a power sharing structure while
other hardliner elements within the security apparatus remain fixed at the status quo. This simulation
also suggests a realignment taking place internationally as China and Russia move away from supporting
the regime’s new structure and takes a democratic stance.
Strengths: Iran re-aligns toward a more significant power sharing structure, becoming less autocratic.
Opportunities: A splintering takes place within the IRGC and hardliner camp.
Weakness: Iran still remains autocratic and a good portion of the power brokers remain committed to
either the status quo or a military regime structure.
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Scenario: Khamenei Dies

Outcome: Once Khamenei passes, I predict there will be a power struggle between the status quo under
the supreme leader’s “velayat-e-faqih” versus a 3 to 5 leader structure with greater oversight from Qom
and the Guardian Council. There will be either a new compromised system between “velayat-e-faqih”
and the 3 leader structure or a serious splintering between clerics and select members of the IRGC. The
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simulation suggests that in the end, a similar structure under the status quo will prevail as Russia, China,
and the majority of actors over-weigh Grand Ayatollah Khorasani and the Larijanis.
Strengths: The bazaar class, university students and key reformists remain committed to a democratic
alternative.
Weakness: Under this power struggle, the strongest actors will not consider a democratic alternative. It
will remain a struggle for authoritarian control.
Opportunities: A potential splintering between the hardliner camps can potentially weaken the regime’s
power.

Alternative COA if Khamenei Dies: United States Makes a Deal with Mesbah Yazdi and Mohsen
Rezaei

Outcome: I predict if the United States makes a substantive deal with the Iranian Regime, specifically
Mesbah Yazdi and Mohsen Rezaei, it will lead to a dramatic splintering within the hardliner camp. Such a
deal would have to be in the form of something credible and valuable such as a security guarantee. This
will result into a division within the IRGC and also divisions within the clerical ranks. It will ultimately
lead to power crisis between the hardliners. Yazdi and Rezaei will advocate for a multi institutional
autocracy where power is shared by the bureaucracy. The Larijanis and Khorasani will push for a 3 to 5
leader council. Elham, Naqdi and Taeb will lean toward the status quo supreme leader structure.
Ahmadinejad’s clique along with Jafari will push closer to a military regime.
Strength: Iran experiences a serious crisis which will significantly weaken their powerbase.
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Weakness: Iran will remain autocratic with no signs.

Monte Carlo Analysis

Description: We conducted Monte Carlo Analysis
to simulate derivations and uncertainty taking
place with the various powerbrokers in Iran. The
purpose is to determine those who are susceptible
to shocks and the degree to which player are
shifting positions. We set the maximum variations
at +- 40 points running 30 rounds, using a random
distribution to conduct the simulations. For
example, if Ali Khatami prefers a 1 party semidemocracy (100), the maximum he can fluctuate is
either to 140 or down to 60 based on the shocks
simulated by Monte Carlo analysis. My analysis
indicates there are many fluctuations taking place
while Khamenei lives.
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Khamenei Lives: Through my analysis I predict that while Khamenei lives there are significant shifts
taking place by multiple actors within Iran. These are anticipatory shifts are occurring with respect to the
question of governance and succession. In all 30 simulated rounds, there are significant shifts upward
and downward of at least 25 points and up to 40 points. This means that the question of governance
and succession is being debated dramatically while Khamenei lives.
Who Are most Susceptible While Khamenei Lives? Through Monte Carlo Analysis I have identified a
pattern that Ali Larijani, Sadeq Larijani, Ali Akbar Velayati, and Ahmad Tavakoli are most susceptible to
changing their positions in either direction. The simulation indicates that they are consistently prone to
shifting positions, making them more vulnerable to accepting change. All four of these players are
shifting preferences between a harsh military autocracy to a 3 – 5 Ruler structure. I conclude that they
are hedging their risk in anticipating the shifts in power taking place as Khamenei’s death draws near.
Khamenei Passes Away: There will be significantly less shifting of positions once Khamenei dies. If I
compare this with the highly volatile scenario while he lives, I can conclude that the moves and debate
over succession are being resolved while Khamenei lives instead of when he Khamenei dies.
Who are Most Susceptible When Khamenei Dies? Muhammad Ali Jafari is the most susceptible to
shifting his position once Khamenei passes. As head of IRGC, he will most likely be tenable to shifting in
order to prevent the military from splintering while Iran selects new leadership after Khamenei’s
passing. The second most susceptible is Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi. Current reports support this analysis
given his status as a front runner for the position of supreme leader or one of the leading clerics in the
alternative 3 to 5 leader structure.
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b. Update: Power Structure Change While Khamenei Remains
Data Updated and Analyzed: 27 June 2011

Updated Scenario: Ahmadinejad Loses up to 40% of Power while Larijani
Ascends

Outcome: As predicted by my initial forecast, reconsolidation of power around Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei continues. However, as Ahmadinejad has lost up to 40% of his power, Ali Larijani and Sadeq
Larijani have ascended in their influence. In reaction to his loss of power and on the brink of political
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oblivion, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will continue to attempt regaining favor by Supreme Leader
Khamenei. In spite of the reconsolidation of power around the Supreme Leader, the ascending coalition
will be short-lived. Rafsanjani will return from political obscurity now that his opponent Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad has lost significant influence. He will provide support for the Larijanis, bringing them closer
to parity with Khamenei’s camp under the Supreme Leader structure. In conclusion the competition for
governance will continue in a fractionalized debate among hardliners with the reconsolidation of power
under the Supreme Leader continuing to ebb and flow.

3. Complete Predictions on Libya
a. The Libyan Uprising: Stalemate Phase
nd

th

Initial Data Collected: March 22 2011 Initial Analysis Completed: March 28 2011

Background: Libya is a country where civil society and political organizations have remained absent for
more than thirty years. This was done intentionally by Muamar Gaddafi to prevent dissent by limiting
the capabilities of those within the regime as well as well broader societal forces.

Will there be a cessation of fighting in the near term? I predict that the conflict will continue with no
reconciliation or cessation between Muamar Gaddafi and opposition forces in the near term unless he
leaves the country by force.
When will the tide turn in favor of the opposition? The Gaddafi coalition will become highly unstable
when his power is degraded by 50%. He will still continue to fight but it will become increasingly
ineffective past this point.
What type of government will emerge with the new opposition? I predict a slightly authoritarian 1
party system emerging. The further Gaddafi’s forces are weakened, the greater the prospect for a
democratic movement. However, there will be a significant splintering in the debate for governance into
three camps: those who favor a liberal democracy, those who favor a multi-party non liberal system and
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those who prefer 1 party system (similar to China or Russia). There will be significant deadlock, but a 1
party system will still emerge as the winning coalition.
What will happen to Gaddafi as his power is degraded? Muamar Gaddafi is much more resilient that he
appears. He will remain committed to fighting even with 50% loss in strength.

What will be the effect of the No Fly Zone? The conflict will be prolonged and although an AmericanEuropean led No Fly Zone will favor the rebels in a more even fight, hostilities will continue with no near
term solution for a unified Libya.

How will the international community act as the conflict continues? The United States along with
France and Britain will remain committed to supporting anti-Gaddafi forces on a limited scale. The
further degradation of Gaddafi’s power will motivate the effort to continue supporting the rebels with
the prospect of near endgame. The BRIC countries will remain in support of Gaddafi, but as his power
wanes, they will enter the debate on issue of governance in support of a 1 party system.
What will happen if Gaddafi Leaves: If Muamar Gaddafi departs Libya, the newly formed government
will be highly factionalized. This will lead to prolonged deadlock on determining the form of
government, but the winning coalition will eventually resemble a slightly authoritarian 1 party system
similar to Russia or China. Russia and China will then be in support of this winning coalition as they seize
an effortless opportunity.

Overview: I explore the current process of coalition building and negotiations between actors within
Libya and internationally. Data collection was completed on March 22nd 2011 and analysis was finished
on March 28th 2011. I evaluated two issues where I gauged their power and extent of support for or
against Muamar Gaddafi along with the prospect for Democracy. I provided a network analysis in
determining the credible pressure causing various actors to move their positions while Gaddafi remains
in power. I also conducted Monte Carlo analysis to determine those who are susceptible to changing
their positions.
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Current Stakeholder Dispositions: I have incorporated SME incite from academics within the United
States and input from journalists reporting on the current crisis. In conducting these interviews I
measured the relative power of the various groups, the power of the actors, their positions on the issue
and the importance they placed on such issues within the continuum. I predicted the outcome of the
Libyan Crisis by evaluating two issues:
1. Extent of Support for Gaddafi
Issue Continuum 1: The scale of preferences ranges from zero as “Staunch Opposition to Gaddafi,” all
the way to 200 as a “Strong Support for Gaddafi.” The midpoint constitutes a neutral position.
2. Prospect for Democracy in Libya
Issue Continuum 2: The scale of preferences begins at zero as “Liberal Democracy.” This is similar to a
European Proportional Representation or American Presidential system. I defined 50 as a “multi-party
system” which is similar to European style but not as liberal. 100 is defined as “1 party system” similar to
Russia. And finally, 200 is defined as a “harsh autocratic” system under the status quo one ruler
authority.

Basecase: Extent of Support for Gaddafi
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Outcome: The U.S., France and Britain are united initially and pose a significant force with NATO in close
support. However the internal debate within the U.S. over commitment to the conflict will eventually
wane as President Obama and his advisors become divided on the extent of U.S. commitment.
Therefore, as this coalition along with NATO engages in a limited war effort, the American debate may
decrease their influence in shaping the outcome of the conflict. As the war prolongs Turkey, China,Egypt
and Iran will shift toward a more neutral position in order to hedge against the unknown outcome. The
simulation indicates that Shokri Ghanem (Chairman of Libyan Oil Corp) remains neutral to avoid any risk
to his own position while attempting to mitigate decrease in oil production. As Libya’s largest neighbor,
Egypt has been affected by the influx of refugees. I predict that Egyptian leadership will be divided on
issues concerning Gaddafi’s reign as General Tantawi leans toward support for Gaddafi while Prime
Minister Sharaf shifts toward a neutral position.
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Strengths: The opposition will continue to fight against Gaddafi in attempt to further secure the east.
The British, Americans, and French will not diverge significantly from their initial positions, indicating
their near term commitment to enforcing the No Fly Zone Resolution strongly in favor of anti-Gaddafi
forces. The Libyan Oil Corporation will continue to remain neutral, suggesting a halt in funding Gaddafi’s
interests through oil revenue as long as the conflict persists.
Weakness: Both sides will remain strongly opposed, suggesting prolonged fighting. As long as Gaddafi
remains in power, very few actors will shift their positions away from their initial stances. Furthermore,
China, Iran and Turkey will shift toward a neutral position, contributing little in the direction of the
opposition.
Opportunities: The American and European coalition can continue to support the opposition groups in
hope of more pro-Gaddafi forces defecting; however, the top figures such as Saif Gaddafi and Abu Bakr
Jabr will remain committed to Colonel Gaddafi.

Extent of Support for Gaddafi with 50% Loss in Capabilities
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Outcome: If Gaddafi forces get degraded down to 50% of strength as a result of the air campaign, the
U.S., France and U.K. will remain unified in hope of reaching an endgame to the conflict. The Libyan Oil
Corporation will still remain neutral. However, as the American and Europeans continue to weaken
Gaddafi, the BRIC countries will remain unified in support of Gaddafi. The top Gaddafi leadership will
stay committed, indicating their fate is tied to Gaddafi’s survival as the conflict continues to escalate.
Strength: As the American and European led effort continues to gain traction, success in degrading
Gaddafi’s power will keep them committed in hopes of a quicker endgame.
Weakness: As long as Gaddafi remains committed to fighting, the BRIC countries will still be in favor of
his regime. The Libyan Oil Corporation will remain neutral as long Gaddafi has some power in spite of his
50% loss in capabilities.
Opportunities: The U.S. can make a deal with Turkey to receive more support than currently expected.
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Extent of Support for Gaddafi with 60% Loss in Capabilities

Outcome: Even with 60% of his forces degraded, the political landscape in favor or against Gaddafi will
not change. This means that the American and European led effort will not coalesce any of the other
actors to change positions once the bombing campaign has started. Gaddafi is more resilient than
commonly expected.
Strength: The intensified coalition effort will not change the position of its allies in a negative direction
as the bombing escalates.
Weakness: Those opposed to Gaddafi will not coalesce.
Opportunities: As Gaddafi’s capabilities decrease, the coalition against him will continue to remain
unified.
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Basecase: Prospect of Democracy While Gaddafi Remains

Outcome: The Libyan opposition will be significantly divided on the type of government they desire
while Gaddafi remains in power. The transitional council representing the new Libyan government will
be divided into three camps: Mahmoud Jebril, Ibrahim Dabashi and Ali Awjali will prefer a more
liberalized western style Democracy, Mustafa Jalil and Omar Hariri will prefer a multi-party system that
is not liberal, and Abdul Raham Shalgam will lean toward a 1 party system. The various European and

124

American leaders will also be divided within their respective camps on the type of Democratic system
Libya should strive for.
Strength: The Libyan Oil Corporation will lean in support for a Democratic 1 party system, suggesting
favor for the opposition in terms of similar preferences on governance but not on individual
personalities.
Weakness: Russia, China, and pro-Gaddafi forces will remain fundamentally opposed to any reform. The
Libyan opposition will be significantly splintered.
Opportunities: India may break away from BRIC in terms of preferences on Democratic governance.

Prospect for Democracy when Gaddafi Loses 50% of his Capabilities

Outcome: There will be a significant splintering within the Libyan opposition in terms of governance. As
Gaddafi’s capabilities are degraded by 50%, the foreign actors will be divided between a 1 party
Democratic system (similar to Russia) and a liberal Democracy. More important, the opposition leaders
represented by the Libyan Transitional Council will be increasingly divided between a liberal democracy,
multi-party system and a one party system. I predict that as Gaddafi is weakened, China, Russia, India
and Brazil will enter in support of a 1 party system, ultimately taking a stake in the future of Libya’s
governance.
Strength: Libya will have a Democracy, but this will have a cost and the debate will not be resolved as
long Gaddafi remains.
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Weakness: Gaddafi is more resilient than expected. The newly formed Libyan opposition government
will be tied in a deadlock on the issue of governance.
Opportunities: The Libyan Oil Corporation will remain neutral when it comes to choosing between the
opposition debates on governance, but will prefer a democratic form of government instead of an
authoritarian system. This indicates that if Gaddafi’s forces are degraded, the Libyan Oil Corporation will
lean in favor of the winning coalition to continue business.

Prospect of Democracy if Gaddafi Leaves or Dies
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Outcome: If Gaddafi departs Libya, the newly formed opposition will become extremely factionalized
resulting in potential deadlock. The Libyan Oil Corporation will move in favor of a liberal Democracy, but
the winning coalition will be a slightly authoritarian structure nearing a 1 party Democracy similar to
Russia’s system. China and Russia will be part of this winning coalition along with India and Turkey.
Strength: Libya will be less authoritarian and nearing a Democratic system
Weakness: China and Russia will benefit and seize the opportunity without having participated in the
removal of Gaddafi.
Opportunity: The U.S. can make a deal with the Libyan Oil Corporation in support of a more liberal
Democracy.
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Monte Carlo Analysis
Description: We conducted Monte Carlo analysis to
simulate derivations and uncertainty taking place
with the various powerbrokers in the Libyan conflict.
The analysis allows us to find out how random
shocks can affect my predictions generated by the
Monte Carlo algorithm. The purpose is to determine
those who are susceptible to shocks and the degree
to which actors are shifting in power. We set the
maximum variations at +- 30 points running 30
rounds, using a random distribution to conduct the
simulations. For example, if Saif Gaddafi’s influence
is at 60, then it can fluctuate up to 90 and down to
30.
Outcome: My analysis indicates that the U.S. actors consisting of SECDEF Gates, Secretary of State
Clinton, and Admiral Mullen fluctuate the most in influence. This suggests that any prolonged U.S. ability
to influence the other stakeholders with its current anti-Gaddafi position is unstable and vulnerable to
decreasing. Saif Gaddafi also fluctuates significantly, indicating that his power is unstable under the
banner of his father’s support. In addition, Abu Bakr Jabr, the Defense Minister and long time Gaddafi
loyalist is equally susceptible to shocks. These two particular actors are the highest ranking Gaddafi
loyalists; therefore, the Monte Carlo analysis indicates a power structure that is much more susceptible
to shocks compared to anti-Gaddafi Libyan opposition.
Strengths: Muamar Gaddafi’s power structure is more susceptible to collapse or defection. The Monte
Carlo analysis is supported by the recent continued wave of defection in support of the opposition
against Gaddafi.
Weakness: The U.S. ability to influence its interests is also unstable.
Opportunities: The coalition can exploit the instability within the Gaddafi camp to further splinter and
isolate Muamar Gaddafi.
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Network Analysis: Moves in Reaction to Pressure
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Description Round 1: My analysis uncovers that in the initial round of conflict, the opposition
represented by the newly formed Libyan Transitional National Council are applying credible pressure to
Russia, China, India and Turkey in attempt to move theme from their positions. The head of the new
rebel council and spokesman, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, stated that any country who attempts to circumvent
support for the opposition would be denied Libyan oil along with business opportunities in the future.
This was a statement aimed at BRIC’s absent support on the No Fly Zone Resolution. Whatever the
comment, the network analysis indicates that pressure exerted on BRIC is beyond cheap talk. In the first
round of this conflict, it has caused them to react to such tactics.
Description Round 2: In the second round of the conflict, I can see that the United States, France and
Britain are imposing credible pressure on the Middle Eastern countries, perhaps in support of their
military action. The analysis indicates that these countries reacted to the pressure and ultimately were
driven in support of the coalition action. This is validated by the Arab League’s support for No Fly Zone
Resolution authorizing military action.
Description Round 3: Although in the 3rd round there are less actors moving in reaction to pressure, the
moves are telling. In this round I indicate pressure being exerted on China from Shokri Ghanem who is
the head of the Libyan Oil Company. This means that China is going to be affected by the Libyan crisis
most likely because of their energy concerns that are magnified by their rising economy and massive
population.
Description Final Round: In the final round of the conflict, Shokri Ghanem continues to pressure China
and also Turkey. This is consistent with report of Chinese interest in Libyan oil and Turkey’s desire to
purchase Libyan petroleum as well.
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b. Libyan Uprising Update: Shokri Ghanem Defects to Tunisia and Gaddafi Loses 40% of
Capabilities

Transition from Stalemate to Endgame

Data Updated and Analyzed: 18 May 2011

What will happen now that Ghanem has defected? After the defection of Shokri Ghanem along with
degradation of Gaddafi’s power by at least 40%, I predict that the initial stalemate is transitioning into a
phase where the opposition now has the upper hand. At this point, the Gaddafi government is beyond
the point of sustaining a stalemate and is susceptible to collapse.

How can the United States end this conflict decisively? If we can align Shokri Ghanem and the Libyan
Oil Corporation with Libyan Transitional Council, the coalition becomes much more united resulting into
an even higher likelihood of collapse by the Gaddafi regime, bringing the conflict closer to an end.

Situation Update: The head of Libyan Oil Corporation Shokri Ghanem has defected to Tunisia in
clear sign of opposition to Muamar Gaddafi. An official at the Libyan Transitional Council has asked
him to join the opposition. In addition, the continued bombing campaign led by the United States,
France, United Kingdom and NATO has degraded Gaddafi’s power by at least 40%.
Current Stakeholder Dispositions: I have incorporated SME incite from academics within the United
States and input from journalists reporting on the current crisis. In conducting these interviews I
measured the relative power of the various groups, the power of the actors, their positions on the issue
and the importance they placed on such issues within the continuum. I predicted the outcome of the
Libyan Crisis by evaluating two issues:
1. Extent of Support for Gaddafi
Issue Continuum 2: The scale of preferences ranges from zero as “Staunch Opposition to Gaddafi,” all
the way to 200 as a “Strong Support for Gaddafi.” The midpoint constitutes a neutral position.
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Shokri Ghanem Defects to Tunisia and Gaddafi Loses up to 40% of Power

Updated Outcome: After the defection of Shokri Ghanem along with degradation of Gaddafi’s power by
at least 40%, I predict that the initial stalemate is transitioning into a phase where the opposition now
has the upper hand. This is resulting from the support of NATO, France, the United States and the U.K. In
this phase I observe an effort that is more disjointed than the initial stalemate phase. However, supports
from allied forces along with the defection of Ghanem now provide the upper hand to the rebels. At this
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point, the Gaddafi government is beyond the point of sustaining a stalemate and is susceptible to
collapse.

Course of Action for the United States: Allies Align Ghanem with Opposition Forces

Outcome: If the United States and the Europeans can unite Shokri Ghanem and Libyan Oil Corporation
with the Libyan Transitional Council, the coalition in support of rebel forces will be aligned resulting into
overwhelming force over the Gaddafi regime. Although Russia and China will still support Gaddafi
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forces, the decreased power of Muamar Gaddafi relative to the opposition’s strengthened coalition will
make his authority highly unstable. Gaddafi’s ability to remain in Libya will be even more untenable and
closer to collapse.

c. Libyan Uprising Update: Post Gaddafi Libya
Data Updated: 27 August 2011 Analysis Updated: 5 September 2011

What type of government will take Shape in Libya? Post-Gaddafi Libya will transition to a limited
multiparty tribal system. The national government will have a selection process based on predetermined representation by tribal affiliation. This new government may have Democratic elements,
but it will not meet the threshold for a true Democracy requiring fair and free elections.

What elements within Libya will resist the new government’s effort for a limited multiparty
tribal system? The eastern tribes situated in Misrata will pose the greatest reluctance to more
democratic representation followed by the central tribes and the western tribes. In absence of a strong
central authority Libya runs the risk of increased tribal conflict. The apprehension by the Eastern tribes
centered on Misrata will pose the greatest threat to any form of consensus building necessary for a
limited multiparty tribal representative system. There will also be remnants of the Gaddafia tribe
continuing to pose the greatest resistance to new forms of governance in Libya.

Will there be conservative or extremist elements threatening the future of Libya? The newly
formed Libyan government will not be affected by extreme or conservative Islamic ideology. Quite the
contrary Libya will be fairly liberal compared to its neighbors in the Middle East and North Africa.
Although Islam is part of Libya’s identity, the future government will be driven more by tribal politics
rather than religious ideologies.

What will happen to Libya’s economy? Libya will transform into an open economy with few
structural barriers to commerce once it becomes stabilized and secure. However, an open economy will
present limited changes in structure given that Libya’s only significant export will continue to be oil.
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There will be a much greater desire for foreign direct investment because of the support for an open
economy. Resistance to this economic openness with the exception of the Gaddafia tribe will be
marginal at best. Libya’s potential for open trade, particularly as a significant petroleum exporter with
access to several ports, will be supported by the international community. This liberalization of the
economy will allow for a wider distribution of oil resources into the hands of more stakeholders
compared to the centralization of the Gaddafi regime.

What will be the role of the international community in shaping post-Gaddafi Libya? The
NATO coalition consisting of the United States and European allies will push for a multi-party
Democracy, but post-Gaddafi Libya will not reach the threshold for becoming a true democracy. The
coalition along with Arab neighbors such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Tunisia will give strength to the
transitional council. This will be an important step in countering the various tribal desires for more
authoritarian alternatives to the transitional council’s multi party tribal representation proposal.

Overview: I explore the current process of coalition building and negotiations between actors within
Libya and internationally. Data collection was completed on August 27th 2011 and analysis was
completed on September 5th 2011. Libya is a country where civil society and political organizations have
remained absent for more than forty years. This was done intentionally by Muamar Gaddafi to prevent
dissent. As a result, the various positions held by the transitional council and various defectors until
recently have remained unknown. Using subject matter expertise and media statements from various
actors within Libya and internationally, I have evaluated the future form of government in Libya, the
ideological bent of the new government, and extent of economic openness.

Current Stakeholder Dispositions: I have incorporated SME incite from academics within the United
States and input from journalists reporting on the current crisis. In conducting these interviews I
measured the relative power of the various groups, the power of the actors, their positions on the issue
and the importance they placed on such issues within the continuum.
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Issue Continuum: I developed three issue continuums in predicting the future of post-Gaddafi Libya:
(1) The future form of government in Libya (2) The ideological spectrum of the Libyan government and
(3) The Extent of Economic Openness.
1. The Future form of Government: The continuum for defining the future form of government in Libya
ranges from “0” as a liberal democracy to “200” as a harsh autocracy similar to the Gaddafi government.
At “20” I defined a multi party democracy similar to Europe or American Presidential system, but lacking
some liberal freedoms associated with systems. I set “50” as a limited multiparty system (by tribes). This
system would have some democratic elements but is still authoritarian because representatives will be
pre-determined by tribal rank and order. At “100” I defined the point on the spectrum as a tribal
electorate system, a strictly authoritarian form of government which is selected by tribal representation
with no democratic processes. At “160” I defined this point as a moderate autocratic government which
is hierarchical but less authoritarian than the Gaddafi government.
2. Ideological Spectrum of the Libyan Government: This continuum ranges from “0” as conservative to
“100” as liberal, with “50” defined as neutral. This spectrum is defined in the context of Islam in the
Middle East. Therefore, what may be defined as liberal in the West is not the same by definition in the
Middle East and North Africa.
3. The Extent of Economic Openness: This continuum ranges from “0” as a closed economy all the way to
“100” as an open competitive economy. An open competitive economy is defined as a system allowing
the free flow of goods within Libya and abroad with very limited tariffs or barriers to commerce.
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Future Form of Government in Libya

Outcome: Post-Gaddafi Libya will transition to a limited multiparty tribal system. The national
government will have a selection process based on pre-determined representation by tribal affiliation.
This new government may have Democratic elements, but it will not meet the threshold for a true
Democracy requiring fair and free elections. The future of Libya will have a less centralized power-base
compared to the Gaddafi regime. There will be more actors in the ruling coalition, but it will remain
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authoritarian. The distribution of power within Libya’s national political landscape will be determined by
tribal size and influence.
Furthermore, the Libyan transitional council’s overwhelming influence compared to the individual tribes
will create a pull toward a position calling for the limited multiparty tribal representation system. The
eastern tribes situated in Misrata will pose the greatest reluctance to more democratic representation
followed by the central tribes and the western tribes.
In spite of such reluctance by the various tribes in meeting the limited multiparty system, Libya’s
neighbors and regional allies will support the governance structure imposed by the transitional council.
The regional players that will eventually support a proposal by the transitional council will consist of
UAE, Saudi, Egypt, and Qatar. The Iranians followed by Russia, China and Algeria will push for a more
authoritarian system in the form of a tribal selectorate but will have limited effectiveness in achieving
this.
The NATO coalition consisting of the United States and European allies will push for a multi-party
Democracy. The Libyan youth which played a significant role in the war against Gaddafi will also push for
a democratic system. However, the tribes will resist this approach and weigh-in for a more authoritarian
system based on local tribal authority. The Libyan Transitional Council will attempt to reconcile these
differences by providing a tribal representation system with limited Democratic elements.
Strength: Libya will be less autocratic compared to the Gaddafi regime
Weakness: Although Libya will be less autocratic, it will not be a Democracy by most standard
definitions.
Opportunities: The United States and Western allies can influence the Libyan Transitional Council by
limited semi-democratic reform.
Threat: In absence of a strong central authority Libya runs the risk of increased tribal conflict. The
apprehension by the Eastern tribes centered on Misrata will pose the greatest threat to any form of
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consensus building required for a limited multiparty tribal representative system. There will also be
remnants of the Gaddafia tribe continuing to pose the greatest resistance to new forms of governance
in Libya.

Ideological Spectrum of Libyan Government

Outcome: The newly formed Libyan government will not be affected by extreme or conservative Islamic
ideology. Quite the contrary, Libya will be fairly liberal compared to its neighbors in the Middle East and
North Africa. The central and western tribes will initially prefer a more conservative ideology, but will
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eventually shift toward a liberal influence. Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Algeria will support a liberal
ideology by Middle Eastern standards.
Strength: Although Islam is part of Libya’s identity, the future government will be driven more by tribal
political than religious ideologies.
Weakness: The expatriates along with the Libyan youth will desire a more ideologically liberal
government but will not achieve their optimal preference based on overwhelming influence by
Transitional Council.
Threat: The Eastern tribes centered on Misrata will challenge the transitional council’s more liberal
ideology. The remnants of the Gaddafi regime will resist in attempt to counter any new dominant
ideology.

Economic Openness
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Outcome: Libya will transform into an open economy with few structural barriers to commerce once it
becomes stabilized and secure. However, an open economy will present limited changes in structure
given that Libya’s only significant export will continue to be oil. There will be a much greater desire for
foreign direct investment because of the support for an open economy. There will be almost no
resistance to this economic openness. Libya’s potential for open trade, particularly as a significant
petroleum exporter with access to several ports, will be supported by the international community. This
liberalization of the economy will allow for a wider distribution of oil resources into the hands of more
stakeholders compared to the centralization of the Gaddafi regime.
Strength: An open economy presents many opportunities for a successful post-Gaddafi Libya
Weakness: Security will remain an issue until open trade can be achieved.
Threat: Remnants of the Gaddafi regime will resist

4. Complete Predictions on Syria
a. The Syrian Uprising

th

th

Data Collected: May 13 2011 Analysis Completed: May 15 2011

Background: Throughout the course of Bashar Al-Assad’s rule and even preceding him with Hafez AlAssad, both father and son have created a system in which their role has been an integrative element of
stability necessary for the survival of his loyal domestic coalition. This is typical of most other stable
autocracies; however, Syria is particularly unique in the Middle East because of Bashar Al-Assad’s skillful
positioning such that he has support from Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel, all of whom are deeply
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opposed to each other yet support the Syria’s current ruler. This arrangement has made Bashar AlAssad’s resilient in the face of great rebuke from the United States and its European allies. My analysis
predicts that Assad will continue to prosper as he continues to perfect this unique relationship among
the various players in the region. This is typical of most other stable autocracies; however, Syria is
particularly unique in the Middle East because of Bashar Al-Assad’s skillful positioning such that he has
support from Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel, all of whom are deeply opposed to each other yet support
the Syria’s current ruler. This arrangement has made Bashar Al-Assad’s resilient in the face of great
rebuke from the United States and its European allies. My analysis predicts that Assad will continue to
prosper as he continues to perfect this unique relationship among the various players in the region.

To What Extent is Bashar Al-Assad affected by the Current Protests in Syria? The impact of the
protests will be marginal at best on the ruling authority of Bashar Al-Assad. He will still remain in power
with continued support from his coalition. However, his power will slightly wane within the coalition,
resulting into increased concessions to his supporters. In seeking to mitigate the potential for any loss of
authority, Assad will provide additional powers to his loyal coalition, thereby making his rule more
stable.

How will the limited concessions and diffusion of authority given to his coalition supporters
affect Bashar Al-Assad’s rule? The concession will strengthen consensus within his domestic
coalition, making his leadership more stable in the short-term. In effect Assad will augment any
potential loss of power by rewarding his loyal followers more than he would have prior to the protests.

Is there any prospect for democratic change or reform in Syria? There is no credible prospect for
democratic change in Syria. The status quo authoritarian structure in Syria will remain nearly intact as
Assad’s support from the Ba’ath Party, the Syrian media, and the military remain loyal to the status quo
structure.
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Will there be any attempt to make reforms under Assad’s rule? In spite of the prevailing status
quo structure in Syria, I predict that Vice Presidents Najah al-Attar and Farouk Al-Shara along with the
Prime Minister Adel Safar will continue to push for limited economic or political reform by slightly less
autocratic means. This attempt to make reforms will not prevail because the majority of power centers
within Assad’s camp will continue to advocate no change from the status quo autocratic structure.

To What Extent Does Syria’s Current Government Structure Depend on Bashar Al-Assad? Even
if Assad were to depart Syria, the current regime structure would still remain. There would be a push
from Prime Minister Safar, Vice President Attar and Vice President Shara to make some reforms toward
a slightly less autocratic structure such as more economic freedom. However, the coalition supporting
the status quo structure presently would continue to prevail as both the Iranians and the Saudis
continue backing the Ba’ath Party loyalists and the military leadership that existed under Assad.

To What Extent Could Bashar Al-Assad survive in Syria if he loses a significant amount of
power? If Bashar Al-Assad loses even 50% of his power, he will still have a strong enough coalition to
effectively rule Syria. In fact, my analysis indicates that the ruling coalition will be even stronger given
that he concedes a limited amount of power.

How effective are the opposition forces in Syria protesting against Assad’s rule? As Assad
continues to make limited concessions to his loyal supporters, the Muslim Brotherhood along with the
Kurdish opposition will be weakened in their resolve to oppose him. Any foreign support will be
ineffective.

Overview: I explore the current process of coalition building and negotiations between actors within
Syria and internationally. Data collection was completed on May 13 2011 and analysis was finished on
May 16th 2011. In addition I provided alternative scenario of what would occur if Bashar Al-Assad were
to depart Syria along with alternative courses of action for the United States. I also conducted Monte
Carlo analysis to determine the players most susceptible to changing their stances or positions. Finally, I
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conducted a network analysis of the various actors to determine the extent of leverage and pressure
imposed on one-another. I predicted the future of Syria by evaluating two issues:
1. Extent of Support for Bashar Al-Assad
Issue Continuum 1: The scale of preferences ranges from zero as “Strong Support Support for Assad,” all
the way to 100 as a “Staunch Opposition to Assad.” The midpoint constitutes a neutral position.
2. Regime Type Preference in Syria
Issue Continuum 2: The scale of preferences begins at zero as “Harsh Autocracy.” I then define the
“status quo” at 20 which is the
Assad government. 50 is defined as a “1 party system” similar to Russia. At 150 I defined “Democracy
Limited” as a two party government with limited individual liberties. And finally 100 is defined as
“Liberal Democracy,” a system similar to a European proportional representation or American
presidential system.

Stakeholder Dispositions: I have incorporated SME incite from academics within the United States
and input from journalists reporting on the current crisis. In conducting these interviews I measured the
relative power of the various groups, the power of the actors, their positions on the issue and the
importance they placed on such issues within the continuum.

Regime Type Outcome under Bashar Al-Assad
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Outcome: There is no credible prospect for democratic change in Syria. The status quo authoritarian
structure in Syria in will remain nearly intact as support from the Ba’ath Party, the Syrian media, and the
military remain intact. In spite of the prevailing status quo structure in Syria, I predict that Vice
Presidents Najah al-Attar and Farouk Al-Shara along with the Prime Minister Adel Safar will continue to
push for limited economic or political reform by slightly less autocratic means.
This attempt to make reforms will not prevail because the majority of power centers within Assad’s
camp will continue to advocate unwavering change from the status quo autocratic structure.
Furthermore the Muslim Brotherhood will realize that democratic reform is an untenable proposition
and will ultimately advocate change, no matter how ineffective, within the confines of an authoritarian
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spectrum. In the final round, none of the international advocates for democratic reform will keep true to
their positions with the exception of Egypt and the United States.
Turkey and the European will shift their initial position advocating multi-party democracy one
supporting a slightly less autocratic government than the current system in Syria. The United States will
also shift in their democratic direction as they move from supporting a multi-party system to anything
reflecting a one-party system similar to Russia or China. In spite of this current description of the
changing positions of the international actors, such players are almost irrelevant in the outcome for
regime type preference in Syria.
Strength: Syria will not become more autocratic than the status quo. Assad’s close advisors and
stakeholders such as the Vice Presidents and the Prime Minister will advocate some reform.
Weakness: Syria will remain autocratic
Threats: Turkey’s shifting support from democratic reform to slightly autocratic one may strengthen
Bashar Al-Assad’s coalition within Syria.

Scenario: Regime Type if Bashar Al-Assad Departs Syria

146

Outcome: If Bashar Al-Assad were to depart Syria, the current regime structure would still remain. There
would be a push from Prime Minister Safar, Vice President Attar and Vice President Shara to make some
reforms toward a slightly less autocratic structure such as more economic freedom. However, the
coalition supporting the status quo structure present would prevail as both Iranians and the Saudis
continue backing the Ba’ath Party loyalists and the military leadership that existed under Assad.
Strength: The status quo-structure under Bashar Al-Assad is stable even if he were to depart. The level
of authoritarian rule will not be worse than the current situation.
Weakness: The prospect for substantive reform or any notion of democratic change is unlikely
Opportunities: The United States can provide some type of support or offer toward the Prime Minister
and the Vice Presidents if it seeks a limited reform platform advocated by these leaders.
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Extent of Support for Assad

Outcome: After this current wave of protests in Syria, Bashar Al-Assad will still remain in power with
continued support from his coalition. However, his power will slightly wane within the coalition,
resulting into increased concessions to his supporters. In this process Bashar Al-Assad will negotiate the
extent of additional authority given to the Ba’ath Party along with his two Vice Presidents, the Prime
Minister and the military. This diffusion of authority within his camp will prevent his coalition from
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splintering or defecting. In fact this limited diffusion of power will strengthen consensus within the
domestic coalition, making his leadership more stable in the short-term. Saudi Arabia and Iran will
continue to support Bashar Al’Assad throughout this diffusion of power within his loyalist camps while
Israel and Russia will remain neutral toward his rule. In addition I also predict that the Muslim
Brotherhood along with the Kurdish resistance to Assad will be weakened in their resolve to oppose
him.
Strength: Assad will be slightly weakened, forcing him to share more power. The rise of further
extremism will remain low as long as Assad keeps his coalition intact.
Weakness: The political resolve of Assad’s coalition will be strengthened.
Opportunities: The United States can begin dealing with more key leaders within Syria than before.
Threats: Iran will continue to support Assad, requiring some quid pro- quo concession from Syria.

Scenario: Bashar Al-Assad Loses 30% of Power

Outcome: If Bashar Al’Assad loses up to 30% of his power, he will still garner enough support to remain
the leader of Syria. However, he will be less willing to provide concessions or diffuse authority to his
supporters if he loses power compared to the current situation in which his power is relatively intact.
The Saudis and the Iranians will continue to support his domestic coalition. Interestingly enough, the
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European Union will move in support of Assad perhaps fearing that a weak ruler in Syria is less desirable
than a strong one.
Strength: Assad’s leadership is stable suggesting mitigating the risk of a worse alternative or an
unknown outcome.
Weakness: Syria will continue to operate under Assad’s authoritarian rule, minimizing the chances for
any substantive reform.
Opportunity: None

Support for Bashar Al-Assad Loses 50% of Power

Outcome: If Bashar Al-Assad loses even 50% of his power, he will still have a strong enough coalition to
effectively rule Syria. In fact, my analysis indicates that the ruling coalition will be even stronger given
that he concedes a limited amount of power. Therefore, he has established a structure in which his role
is necessary amongst his domestic and international allies.
Strength: Assad’s leadership is stable suggesting mitigating the risk of a worse alternative or an
unknown outcome.
Weakness: Syria will continue to operate under Assad’s authoritarian rule, minimizing the chances for
any substantive reform.
Opportunity: None
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Monte Carlo Analysis
Description: We conducted Monte Carlo
analysis to simulate derivations and
uncertainty taking place with the various
powerbrokers in support or against Syrian
leader Bashar Al-Assad. The analysis allows us
to find out how random shocks can affect my
predictions generated by the Monte Carlo
algorithm. The purpose is to determine those
who are susceptible to shocks and the degree
to which actors are shifting in position. We
set the maximum variations at +- 30 points
running 30 rounds, using a random
distribution to conduct the simulations. For
example, if Ahmadinejad’s position is 30, then
it can fluctuate up to 60 and down to 0.
Outcome: My analysis indicates that none of the actors within Syria are susceptible to shocks that would
cause them to change their positions in supporting or deposing Assad. This further supports my initial
findings that the extent of support for Bashar Al-Assad is stable within Syria. I indicate that Israel, Iran
and United States are most susceptible in shifting their positions toward Assad.
Strengths: The level of uncertainty in Syrian political order is stable and predictable
Weakness: The ability to induce a decrease in support for Assad is most likely untenable
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Network Analysis: Moves in Reaction to Pressure in the Extent of Support for Bashar Al-Assad
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Round 1: In the initial I observe that Turkey is pressuring the Muslim Brotherhood. This is in
accordance with the fact that Turkey supports the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. In addition,
Turkey also pressures the Kurds in Syria but most likely in a negative manner because their
historical conflict with these people. Therefore, this analysis indicates that Turkey has a role in
shaping the direction of the opposition in Syria. I also observe that Iran’s Supreme Leader
Khamenei effectively applies pressure to Syrian Prime Minister Adel Safar. This is also expected
given Iran’s influence in cooperating with Syria based on their common interests in Lebanon
and the Palestinian issue.
Round 2: The same network dynamics are in play in this round except that I observe Supreme
Leader Khamenei of Iran exerting pressure on not just Syria Prime Minister but also Vice
Presidents Attar and Shara.
Round 3: Once again I observe Supreme Leader Khamenei applying pressure to Syria’s military
chief of staff General Dawud Raja. More interestingly I see Egypt exerting pressure on Syrian
media as well Bashar Al-Assad. This is also somewhat apparent due to the current revolution in
Egypt which played a role in catalyzing the protests in Syria.
Round 4: In the final round I observe the entire Syrian leadership exerting significant pressure
back onto Egypt. This may be the result of Bashar Al-Assad’s effective policy in shattering the
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opposition in Syria, a counter-revolution in support of the status quo and opposite to Egypt’s
success in removing their leader Hosni Mubarak.
b. Syrian Uprising Update
Data and Analysis Updated: 7/21/2011

Extent of Support for Assad al-Bashar
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Outcome: Core support for Bashar Al-Assad remains strong with no indication that he is
planning to leave Syria. The uprising is gaining support from the general population and a wave
of military defections is reported. These power shifts are not sufficient to threaten the current
regime.
Consistent with the initial forecast and simulations of April 2011” The impact of the protests
will be marginal at best on the ruling authority of Bashar Al-Assad. He will still remain in power
with continued support from his coalition. However, his power will slightly wane within the
coalition, resulting into increased concessions to his supporters.”
The update shows that as anticipated Assad is delegating some of his power to subordinates in
return for a unified effort against the opposition. The international community remains split.
The Iranians, Saudis and the Chinese will continue to support Assad. Russia will join Israel by
adopting a neutral stance. The United Stated did imposed weak sanctions to counter Assad’s
violent grip on the country. Turkey’s critical remarks lead to coordination with Europe, the US
and Egypt. These developments will not martially affect Assad’s position. Current international
pressure is insufficient to weaken Assad to any substantial degree. Specifically the regional
alliances Assad has established will serve his need to further stabilizing the internal situation.
The Syrian crisis is largely an internal affair. Domestic opposition is weak. The military defectors
along with the Kurds and the Muslim Brotherhood are the only organized opposition and there
is some indication of increased coordination among these factions (Figure 1, round 5). Yet,
compared to the Assad government these opposition groups are weak and will have only a
marginal effect in the short-term. This crisis can escalate only if major unexpected events
prompt large shifts in the military support for Bashar Al-Assad or substantial not organized
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populations rise unexpectedly. Therefore, violence is likely to continue because of the
entrenched antigovernment stand by the weak opposition, but over time revolutionary activity
will likely be ineffective and subside.
c. Syrian Uprising Update: Assad Loses 30% Power, Turkey Shifts Further Away, Iraq Enters and
Increases Concern
th

Data and Analysis Updated: August 13 2011
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Updated Outcome: Similar results and conclusions from my initial forecast in May 2011 and update in
July 2011 stand. Although there have been a wave of military defections along with isolation from the
international community, Bashar Al-Assad will continue to remain in power with strong support from
Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iraq has increased its salience on the issue and weighed in support of the Assad
regime. Although I initially observe a staunch opposition from the Kurds, Muslim Brotherhood, and the
military, the final evolution of events indicates that the opposition moves closer to a neutral position
while the Muslim Brotherhood remains opposed but with less intensity. In short, the international
community’s isolation of Assad will have little effect on him departing Syria unless enacted by external
force. Bashar Al-Assad will continue to remain in power with what appears to be an effective
pacification enacted by the government’s brutal onslaught of dissenters. As a result of the government
crackdown, the level of opposition will decrease by most dissenting groups.

d. Syria Forecast Update: Escalation into Civil War and Stalemate Phase
th

th

Data Updated: November 9 2011 Analysis Completed: November 20 2011

Basecase: Extent of Support for Bashar Al Assad
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Outcome: Syria is now engaged in a civil war. There are members of the Army who have begun to defect
into what is now called the Syrian Free Army. As a result Bashar al Assad has been weakened,
particularly with Arab League and Turkish support for the Syrian opposition (Syria National Council).
Although the Syrian opposition is not as capable as the Assad regime, its lack of strength has been
augmented by a supporting coalition consisting of the Arab League, the United States, Turkey, and the
European Union. The Assad regime still has support from China, Russia, and Iran; however, the coalition
opposing his rule will become stronger and more unified compared to the regime’s current coalition.
Although Bashar Al Assad has lost international support and is becoming more isolated, he still
maintains a strong domestic coalition with external support from Iran. Bashar Al Assad will continue to
fight and remain in power unless removed by external intervention such as a NATO military action
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similar to Libya’s removal of Gaddafi. Otherwise Bashar Al-Assad will continue to fight and remain in
power although the international coalition opposing is rule will become stronger.
Strength: Assad is weakened, resulting into a more even between the opposition and status quo regime.
The international community continues to turn against Bashar Al Assad
Weakness: Bashar Al Assad will continue to fight and remain in power unless removed by external
intervention such as a NATO military action similar to Libya’s removal of Gaddafi.
Opportunity: The international community brings the civil war to a closer end if there is a foreign
military intervention
Threat: There will be a stalemate in the civil war. Bashar Al Assad may end up providing a negotiated
settlement where he remains in power if not removed by external force.

Scenario: Sunni Business Community Moves in Support of the Opposition and Assad Loses
30% of Strength
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Outcome: If the majority of the business community in Syria takes sides with the Syrian opposition, the
Assad regime will continue to fight and maintain its domestic coalition. The civil war in Syria will
intensify. Bashar Al Assad will not relinquish power in this scenario. Under this scenario, the civil war will
transition from an escalation to a stalemate phase. The only way the conflict will end is if there is foreign
intervention led by Turkey, the United States, or NATO.
Strength: There will be a more even fight, providing more strength to the Syrian opposition.
Weakness: The civil war in Syria will intensify and transition into a stalemate phase.
Opportunity: The United States, Turkey, and the Arab League can strengthen their support from the
Syrian opposition and business community by guaranteeing business opportunities and concessions for
anyone opposing Bashar Al Assad.
Threat: If there is no foreign military intervention, the stalemate will continue.
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Future Form of Government in Syria

Outcome: Although the Arab League will initially push for democratic elections in Syria, they will
inevitably prefer a status quo system of governance. This indicates that that the Arab League opposes
Bashar Al Assad and will prefer to replace Assad with another ruler under a similar autocratic structure.
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The bifurcation between democratic and autocratic preferences is a further indication that Syria will
remain engaged in a civil war.
There will continue be a disagreement on governance between Bashar Al Assad and his brother Maher
Al Assad. Maher will seek a position closer to a harsh autocracy while Bashar will want to provide
concessions or limited reforms, believing that such reforms will strengthen his waning coalition. The
disagreement will be over type and extent of authority. There will be no debate within the Assad camp
over democratic reform.
Strength: There is a legitimate Democratic movement within the Syrian National Council.
Weakness: The bifurcation between democratic and autocratic preferences is a further indication that
Syria will remain engaged in a civil war.
Opportunities: Syria can have democratic elections if Assad is removed by external force.
Threat: Any potential change in personality will not necessarily result in a dramatic change in
governance unless the United States drives the Arab League and provides credible promises and
concession to the Syrian business community.

Best COA: U.S. Provides Credible Concession to Syrian Business Community, Arab League and
Russia

Outcome and Recommended Course of Action: Bashar Al-Assad’s regime is highly susceptible to
collapse if the United States can build a coalition with support from the Sunni business community,
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Russia and the Arab League. This is a two-step strategy. First, the United States should allow for the
situation in Syria to escalate further, thereby allowing for consolidation and unity among the Syrian
opposition, the Turks and the Arab League. Second, as the civil war reaches the stalemate phase (4th
round or evolution of the crisis) the United States can then provide credible concessions and guarantees
to the Sunni business community in Syria. If the United States can follow its credible commitment to the
Syrian business community with political or economic concessions to the Arab League and Russia, such a
coalition calling for democratic elections will be strong enough to successfully defeat the Bashar Al
Assad’s regime.
Strength: The defeat of Bashar Al Assad with support from the Arab League, the business community
and Russia will provide opportunity for democratic reform nearing a two party competitive election.
Iran’s influence will be substantially weakened in the Middle East, thereby losing its foothold in the Arab
world.
Weakness: The Assad regime will continue to resist and this cannot happen unless he is removed by
force.
Opportunity: Syria will have the opportunity of having elections and Iran will be weakened as well.
Threat: Democratic elections may present unforeseeable threat of having an equally anti-Israeli
sentiment.

5. Complete Predictions on Yemen
a. The Yemeni Uprising: The Future of President Ali Abdullah Saleh
nd

th

Data Collected: April 22 2011 Analysis Completed: April 29 2011

Can President Saleh remain in Yemen in the midst of defections? I predict Ali Abdullah Saleh can
remain in Yemen for the next 30 to 60 days. But his stay in the medium term is untenable because of
the possible wave of military defections. Although weakened, he still has the ability to negotiate his
departure because of the limited support from Saudi Arabia.
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Who will be in power when Saleh departs? The most likely person is General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar. This
forecast is based on his support from the opposition and high level of influence from the military. A
second as yet unidentified candidate from the military may emerge. The next likely candidate is Sheik
Sadeq Abdullah from the Islah Party based on his level of power and influence largely among nonmilitary sources.

How will President Saleh act as he continues to lose power? I predict that as Saleh loses control
(up to one-third of his current power), the opponents will become less staunchly opposed to him. This
suggests that he is in a position to create a series of credible deals with key opposition leaders where his
stay becomes less intolerable than the current situation. Based on such estimates I forecast that Saleh
will be allowed for a soft departure rather than a sudden exit.

Will the level of violence escalate in Yemen? The level of violence will not escalate significantly
further than the current levels I am observing. As Saleh continues to work out deals with the powerbrokers within Yemen, the intensity of opposition against him will decrease.

What can the United States do to mitigate violence? The United States can strike a cooperative
deal with the military defectors, reducing the risk for further violence. Working with the military
defectors dampens the strengthened extremist groups such as the Islah Party, Al Qaeda, and various
other extreme elements.

Overview: I explore the current process of coalition building and negotiations between actors within
Yemen and internationally. Data collection was completed on April 22nd 2011 and analysis was finished
on April 29th 2011. Yemen is a deeply divided country consisting of multiple tribal networks and
independent provincial leaders who have rarely operate with support or oversight by the central
government. This decentralization is in part due to the fact that prior to 1990 Yemen was divided into
South and North states. After unification, the country has continued to struggle to establish an effective
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government. Yemen is a poor country with limited resources and stressed by water scarcity that is
estimated to fall below anticipated requirements within the next 10 to 15 years.
Following September 11th, Yemen has been recognized as a hotbed for Sunni extremism and allegedly a
breeding ground for terrorist groups such as Al- Qaeda.
The potential departure of pro West Ali Abdullah Saleh poses policy questions for the United States that
are still unanswered.

Current Stakeholder Dispositions: I have incorporated SME incite from academics within the United
States and input from journalists reporting on the current crisis. In conducting these interviews I
measured the relative power of the various groups, the power of the actors, their positions on the issue
and the importance they placed on such issues within the continuum.
To assess the crisis in Yemen I posed the following concern:
Issue: Specify the extent of support or opposition for President Ali Abdullah Saleh
Issue Continuum: The scale ranges from
0: “Staunch Opposition to Saleh,”
50: Neutral
100 “Strong Support for Saleh.”

Basecase: Extent of Support for Ali Abdullah Saleh
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Outcome: Despite the most recent wave of ruling party and military defections, President Saleh is still
capable of remaining in power in the short term. The tide will turn in favor of the opposition as the
ruling party defectors along with the military defectors consolidate their positions with the Islah
Party.President Saleh will not depart easily unless a negotiated exit is carved out. Although he will face
more pressure, Saleh will still have enough support to remain in Yemen in the short term. In addition, I
predict that although the ruling party defectors along with members of the military have defected, their
opposition to Saleh is not adamant enough to initiate a full scale war to depose him.
At the outset the United States takes a slightly anti-Saleh stance but the American position shifts slightly
in favor of Saleh. This suggests that as Saleh’s power begins to wane relative to that of the opposition’s
consolidation, the United States takes a softer approach attempting to ease him out instead of a sudden
forced exit.
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Although the various tribes and political parties play a significant role, the most critical element
influencing Saleh’s exit will be the military defectors led by General Mohsen al Ahmar and Brigadier
General Mohammed Mohsen. The situation is very fluid and a large number of opportunities emerge to
categorize this transition depending on who among many is the first mover.
Strengths: The military defectors hold the most power in opposition to Saleh. A transition of
governmental power to this group suggests an alternative that is not as prone to the extremism that
would be propagated if tribal leaders or rebel groups came to power.
Opportunities: The United States can strike a cooperative deal with the military defectors, reducing the
risk accompanied by strengthened extremist elements within the tribal factions, the Islah Party, Al
Qaeda, and various other rebel groups.
Weakness: The Islah Party, though not as powerful as the military, still holds influence within Yemen’s
political landscape. It has many extremist elements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists.

Scenario: President Saleh Loses 30% of Power
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Outcome: As President Saleh continues to lose more power, the intensity of those opposing him
decreases, approaching closer to a neutral position instead of a staunch opposition. This means that
President Saleh will either be eased out based on a negotiated departure with the unlikely possibility of
remaining by cutting some type of a deal. Many of the opposing groups who have staunchly opposed
President Saleh will move toward a slightly opposing him, suggesting that he may be providing a credible
deal where he is handled in a less unfavorable manner than expected. At a 30% loss in strength
President Saleh’s position becomes highly unstable, but with Saudi Arabia still supporting him he has the
capability to remain in Yemen in the short-term (i.e. only 30 to 60 days).
Strength: The military and ruling party defectors will still hold sway and influence the outcome. This is a
relatively favorable alternative if Saleh departs because the military is the least extreme of the opposing
factions within Yemen.
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Weakness: Extremist elements of the Islah Party will increase their influence by aligning with the
military defectors.
Opportunities: The United States is hedging in the middle in its policy toward Saleh. Although the United
States appears to be divided on the extent of support for Saleh, it can still strike a cooperative deal with
the military defectors, reducing the risk accompanied with strengthening extremist elements within the
Yemen.

Scenario: United States Takes and Saudi Arabia Take Neutral Position
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Outcome: If the United States and Saudi Arabia initially take a neutral position, the situation will
inevitably lead to a more responsible eased exit for President Saleh. In spite of an initially neutral
position, the leading opposition elements along with the U.S., Saudi, European, Chinese and Russian
actors will also shift in support of an eased exit. This will assure the departure of Saleh in a more
responsible and less violent manner.
Strength: Saleh’s exit is less staunch and more responsible
Weakness: Aligning slightly to the left of neutral may provide some opportunity for Saleh to remain
longer if he is adamant about staying.
Opportunities: The U.S. can establish cooperative relationship with the military defectors and certain
non-extremist elements within the opposing factions.
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Network Analysis:
Moves in Reaction Pressure
The network analysis
illustrates all the actors
being moved in reaction
to pressure according to
the various rounds of
negotiations.

171

Description: I initially observe that the military defectors led by General al Ahmar, General Alliewa and
General Mohsen are pressuring the ruling party defectors to move in their direction in opposition to
President Saleh. This indicates that they are shaping the direction of the opposition action against Saleh.
While the military is pressuring the ruling party, Ali Mohammad Mujawar (2nd in command to Saleh) is
pressuring King Abdullah and Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia to support their position. This is perhaps an
attempt to gain a soft exit that is less harmful than a sudden departure. In every round of the
negotiations, General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar is the key driver with the ability to pressure numerous key
players such as the ruling party, the Europeans, the Americans, and especially the Saudis.

6. Complete Predictions on Saudi Arabia
a. Saudi Arabia Governance and Power Structure
th

th

Data Collected: October 26 2011 Analysis Completed: October 27 2011

Background:
How stable is Saudi Arabia’s government in the midst of the Arab uprising? Saudi Arabia’s government
structure is stable and not prone to change in the short to medium time horizon. The status quo
governance structure in Saudi Arabia will remain unchanged with little or no reform. Even if the single
ruler structure under the House of Saud is weakened by 50%, there will be little or no change to the
power structure. A challenge to Saudi rule will marginally strengthen the coalition in support of the royal
family.
What will be the United States role in the future of Saudi Arabia? The United States along with the
other great powers support the single ruler structure under the Saudi Royal Family and are not expected
to change their position. They will not take any measures that could shake the foundational structure of
Saudi Arabia. However, the analysis also indicates that the United States and the great powers will only
support the Saudi Royal Family so long as it remains stable.
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Are there any prospects for substantial reforms toward Democracy in Saudi Arabia? There is no
prospect for democratic reform.There are few foreseeable alternatives other than the Saudi regime.
This limits options for the United States as much as it tries to hedge with any other tribe or faction.
There is no prospect for democratic reform.
What is the degree of economic openness in Saudi Arabia? Saudi Arabia has a relatively open economy,
indicating that the structural problems associated with its petroleum based economy are not rooted in
open or closed trade. The analysis indicates that the nearly all the governments having substantial
influence on the Saudi economy will continue to seek an on-going open economy that can transport
petroleum freely.
Is the Saudi economic system stable in regards to internal factors? Internally the Saudi economy is
stable in the short to medium term. The positions on the degree of economic openness with Saudi
Arabia will be consolidated, making it more stable under the status quo. This mitigates the risk for
continued petroleum exports to the rest of the world, a vital interest to the United States and the other
great power.

Overview: I explore the current process of coalition building and negotiations between actors within
Saudi Arabia and the international community. Data was collected on October 26th 2011 and analysis
was completed on October 27th 2011.

Current Stakeholder Dispositions: I have incorporated SME incite from academics within the United
States and input from journalists reporting on the current crisis. In conducting these interviews I
measured the relative power of the various groups, the power of the actors, their positions on the issue
and the importance they placed on such issues within the continuum.
Issue Continuum on Power Structure and Governance: This continuum ranges from “0” defined as a
liberal democracy all the way to “100” defined as the 1 ruler status quo structure under Saudi King
Abdullah. At “75” I identified the next option which is a single tribe autocracy other than the Saudi Royal
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Family. At “50” I defined a multi-tribal autocracy, an authoritarian system where two or more tribes
share power. At “25” I defined the governance form as a single party system, similar to China or Russia’s
government.
Issue Continuum on the Degree of Economic Openness: This was a simple but effective continuum. At
“0” I defined the economy as completely closed and at “100” I defined the economy as completely open.

Basecase: Power Structure and Governance
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Outcome: Saudi Arabia’s government structure is stable and not prone to change in the short to
medium time horizon. The United States along with the other great powers support the single ruler
structure under the Saudi Royal Family and are not expected to change their position. They will not take
any measures that could shake the foundational structure of Saudi Arabia. However, the analysis also
indicates that the United States and the great powers will only support the Saudi Royal Family so long as
it remains stable. This can be discerned by the evolution of the various rounds depicted above indicating
that the United States and the great powers have positioned themselves slightly between a single tribe
autocratic structure and status quo under Saud, suggesting that they are prepared to hedge their
support toward any other tribe that could possibly shake the status quo power structure. This means
that the United States, China, Russia, India, and the European Union will support the House of Saud so
long as they maintain order. The onset of any internal struggle will result in the great powers taking
sides with whoever will win. Although Iran, Oman, Qatar, and Yemen prefer a multi-tribal autocratic
structure, the support for such governance structure is insignificant. The support for any democratic
system is also marginal at best. In short, the status quo governance structure in Saudi Arabia will remain
with little reform or change.
Strength: The Saudi government is stable in the short and medium term.
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Weakness: There are few foreseeable alternatives other than the Saudi regime. This limits options for
the United States as much as it tries to hedge with any other tribe or faction. There is no prospect for
democratic reform.
Opportunities: There are little or no opportunities. The United States has trades it’s other options for
stability under the status quo.
Power Structure Scenario: Challenge to Saudi King and House of Saud (loss of power by up to 50%)
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Outcome: A challenge to the leadership in Saudi Arabia will not pose a threat to the governance
structure of the country. Any challenge will most likely derive from an internal power struggle within the
Saudi royal family. Therefore, a change in personality which can occur from the death of King Abdullah
who is very old will not necessitate change in governance. The simulation indicates that even if the
single ruler structure under the House of Saud is weakened by 50%, there will be little or no change to
the power structure. A challenge to Saudi rule will marginally strengthen the coalition in support of the
royal family. This will occur when Turkey moves closer in support of the status quo if they view a
weakening of the royal family’s power. The United States along with the great powers will not change
their position even with a dramatic waning of influence unless the Saudi Royal family nears inevitable
collapse. This simulation further indicates the stability of the Saudi regime.
Extent of Economic Openness
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Outcome: Saudi Arabia has a relatively open economy, indicating that the structural problems
associated with its petroleum based economy are not rooted in open or closed trade. Other factors such
as shortage of skilled labor, lack of education, and cultural issues may capture the challenges faced by
Saudi Arabia much more effectively (not captured in this analysis). The analysis indicates that the nearly
all the governments having substantial influence on the Saudi economy will continue to seek an ongoing open economy that can transport petroleum freely. These governments will collective restrict the
prospect of excessive or innovative economic liberalization in order to strengthen adherence to the
status quo economic structure.
Strength: The positions on the degree of economic openness with Saudi Arabia will be consolidated,
making it more stable under the status quo. This mitigates the risk for continued petroleum exports to
the rest of the world, a vital interest to the United States and the other great power.
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Weakness: Although the current economic system in Saudi Arabia is stable, there is little prospect for
opening it up even more.
Opportunities: N/A
Threats: The Shiite in Saudi Arabia and Iran will seek to hinder to the degree of economic openness.
This is threat is marginal at best.
Economic Scenario: Challenge to Saudi King and House of Saud (loss of power by up to 50%)
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Outcome: If the authority of the Saudi Royal family is challenged, the degree of economic openness will
not change. This is a further indication of internal stability of the Saudi regime.

7. Complete Predictions on Bahrain
a. Forecast on Future Stability of Bahrain
th

th

Data Collected: November 7 2011 Analysis Completed: November 9 2011

Is the Kingdom of Bahrain stable following the uprising in 2011? Bahrain’s rule under the Al Khalifa
Family is stable. Having turned to rely on Saudi Arabia and the United States as their security guarantors,
the Al Khalifa Family will continue their hold on power in Bahrain.
How will the opposition elements react as a result of the violent crackdown? Shiite led elements such
as Al Haq and Al Wifaq will continue to be marginalized in spite of their initial support from Iran. The
opposition element most likely to continue adamantly working against the Al Khalifa Family will be Al
Haq. In the final evolution of this uprising the Waad Opposition Party, Al Wifaq, and even Iran will
reduce their anti-ruling family activities and eventually accept Al Khalifa family as the legitimate
authority in Bahrain.
What will the Al- Khalifa Family do in response to the uprising? Opposition elements will be further
pacified either by force or limited concessions. Having already conceded as supplicants of Saudi Arabi,
the Al Khalifa Family will make a series of deals or concessions that will align the opposition parties and
external influences from Egypt and Iran with the domestic business community.
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What will happen if the Al-Khalifa is substantially weakened? If the Al Khalifa family concedes some of
its authority in order to share it with the other people within their already strong coalition, they will gain
more stability and support. Therefore, their limited loss of influence will be augmented by a rising
coalition in support of Al Khalifa rule. Saudi Arabia will remain adamantly in favor of the Al Khalifa
Family.
What will Iran do in reaction to the Shiite led uprising in Bahrain? Iran will decrease their opposition
activities against the Al Khalifa family after realizing that a successful uprising is untenable. This suggests
that they will accept some sort of deal or concession in return for ceasing anti-ruling authority
operations.

Overview: We explore the current process of coalition building and negotiations between actors within
Bahrain and internationally. Data collection was completed on November 7th 2011 and analysis was
completed on November 9th 2011. Using subject matter expertise and media statements from various
actors within Bahrain and internationally, we have evaluated the future stability of Bahrain and the
extent of support for the Al Khalifa Royal Family.
Background: Bahrain is a small island situated in the Persian Gulf between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
and Islamic Republic of Iran. Throughout history it has served as a strategically significant island
providing port access and a transit point for travel and trade. Although the country is a relatively
wealthy country due to the discovery of oil in 20th century, the Kingdom of Bahrain remains strategically
important for the same historical reasons: an island that provides access to Persian Gulf shipping lanes.
For example, the United States 5th Fleet uses Bahrain as its major port and staging area for Naval
operations in the Persian Gulf. The 2011 uprising against the Al Khalifa Family presented a major
dilemma for the United States and its Arab allies on how to respond to the crisis. Realizing the rising
Iranian influence of a Shiite led majority in Bahrain, the United States and its Arab allies under the Gulf
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Cooperation Council (GCC) effectively provided support to the Sunni minority Al Khalifa Royal Family to
quell the uprising.
However, this is not an unusual occurrence in the history of Bahrain. The Al Khalifa Family has ruled the
Kingdom of Bahrain for over 200 years because of its willingness to concede to whichever power that
could guarantee its security and stability. They have switched alliances repeatedly ranging from
declaration of loyalty to Nasseredin Shah of Iran from British rule in 1860 all the way to the recent 2011
supplication to Saudi Arabia.

Issue Continuum: We developed an issue continuum in predicting the future stability of Bahrain by
analyzing the extent of support for the Al Khalifa rule. At “0” we defined the position as staunch
opposition to Al Khalifa rule, “50” as neutral and “100” as strong support for the royal family.
Extent of Support for Al Khalifa Family
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Outcome: Bahrain’s rule under the Al Khalifa Family is stable. Having turned to rely on Saudi Arabia and
the United States as their security guarantors, the Al Khalifa Family will continue their hold on power in
Bahrain. Shiite led elements such as Al Haq and Al Wifaq will continue to be marginalized in spite of their
initial support from Iran. Gulf Cooperation Council members (GCC) such as Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, and
Saudi Arabia will maintain strong support for Bahrain’s ruling family in order to counter Iranian led Shiite
influence. The opposition element most likely to continue adamantly working against the Al Khalifa
Family will be Al Haq. In the final evolution of this uprising the Waad Opposition Party, Al Wifaq, and
even Iran will reduce their anti-ruling family activities and eventually accept Al Khalifa family as the
legitimate authority in Bahrain. This suggests that the Al Khalifa will make a series of deals or
concessions that will align the opposition parties and external influences from Egypt and Iran with the
domestic business community.
Strength: Bahrain remains stable. Opposition elements will be pacified either by force or limited
concessions
Weakness: Shiite opposition elements remain mainly through the Al Haq Party
Opportunity: The Al Khalifa Family can make a strong coalition in favor of any opposing elements
Threat: There will continue to be marginalized Shiite opposition elements within Bahrain.
Scenario: Al Khalifa Family Loses 30% of Power and Provides Limited Concessions to Opposition Parties
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Outcome: If the Al Khalifa Family loses up to 30% of its influence, it will further augment this loss by
providing concessions first to its supporters in the business community in addition to the opposition
parties (most likely in the form of subsidy payments). It will also make reforms in which some authority
is given to the opposing parties. In this scenario the Al Khalifa Family will relinquish some of its power in
return for greater support and stability. The coalition in support of the Al Khalifa Family will gain
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overwhelming support, ultimately trading some of their authority in return for stability. Iran will also
decrease their opposition activities against the Al Khalifa family. In short, if the Al Khalifa family
concedes some of its authority in order to share it with the other people within their already strong
coalition, they will gain more stability and support. Therefore, their limited loss of influence will be
augmented by a rising coalition in support of Al Khalifa rule. Saudi Arabia will remain adamantly in favor
of the Al Khalifa Family.
Strength: Even the Al Khalifa family loses up to 30% of its power, it will remain stable. It will augment its
loss of power by provided concession in order to gain a stronger coalition in support of their rule.
Weakness: The Al Khalifa Family will relinquish some authority in return for stability
Threat: N/A

Collected Data and Stakeholder Inputs for ABM
Inputs on Egypt collected on 2/3/2011 (Governance)
STAKEHOLDER
Omar Suleiman --Chief of Intel
Mohamed El-Baradei
Ayman Nour -- Al Ghud Party
Muslim Brotherhood
Ahmed Shafiq Prime Minister
Liberal Party (WAFD)
Amr Moussa (former head of Arab League)
General Tantawi -- Army Chief
Gamal Mubarak
Egyptian Media
Hosni Mubarek --President
Obama
Biden V.P.
Clinton -- Sec State
Netanyahu
Khamenei
Ahmadinejad
Medvedev
China
European Union
NATO

GROUP
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Israel
Iran
Iran
Russia
China
EU
NATO
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Positions INFLUENCE GROUP IMPORTANCE
20
65
100
95
85
35
100
95
70
15
100
95
25
40
100
95
50
10
100
95
80
68
100
95
75
10
100
95
20
100
100
95
20
2
100
95
85
25
100
95
25
10
100
95
95
100
20
85
95
75
20
85
90
80
20
85
50
100
10
95
65
100
5
80
65
60
5
80
35
100
3
70
30
100
3
75
90
100
4
76
90
100
3
80
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Hamas
PLO
Turkey

Hamas
PLO
Turkey

35
35
60

100
100
100

5
4
3

Inputs on Egypt Collected on 11/7/2011 (Governance)
STAKEHOLDER
Mohamed El-Baradei
Ayman Nour -- Al Ghud Party
Muslim Brotherhood
Freedom and Justice Party
Ahmed Shafiq
Liberal Party (WAFD)
Egyptian secular
Amr Moussa
General Tantawi -- Army Chief
Military Council
Remaining Mubarak
Copits
Ali Salmy -vice PM
Esam Sharaf – PM
Presidential Candidates
Judges
Radical Muslims
Private Media
Public Media
Egypt Youth
Intellectuals
Obama
Biden V.P.
Clinton -- Sec State
CENTCOM
Netanyahu
Khamenei
Ahmadinejad
Russia
China
European Union
NATO
Hamas
PLO

GROUPGROUP POSITION INFLUENCE INFLUENCE IMPORTANCE
Egypt
95
10
100
98
Egypt
90
5
100
95
Egypt
75
28
100
95
Egypt
78
10
100
90
Egypt
65
3
100
70
Egypt
85
15
100
92
Egypt
85
18
100
90
Egypt
75
10
100
80
Egypt
20
50
100
90
Egypt
40
100
100
95
Egypt
15
30
100
70
Egypt
75
20
100
80
Egypt
40
3
100
70
Egypt
75
10
100
90
Egypt
70
20
100
95
Egypt
70
5
100
80
Egypt
40
5
100
75
Egypt
90
30
100
90
Egypt
25
15
100
50
Egypt
95
25
100
95
Egypt
80
10
100
90
U.S.
80
100
40
75
U.S.
60
60
40
60
U.S.
70
80
40
70
U.S.
50
30
40
60
Israel
40
100
10
85
Iran
30
100
20
60
Iran
30
60
20
55
Russia
50
100
5
50
China
40
100
7
65
Eu
75
100
25
70
Nato
70
100
15
60
Hamas
60
100
7
80
Plo
55
100
5
60

186

95
95
95
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Turkey
Saudi
Sudan
Libya

Turkey
Saudi
Sudan
Libya

75
30
50
60

100
100
100
100

20
5
10
10

70
85
50
80

Inputs on Iran Collected on 3/3/2011 (Governance)
STAKEHOLDER

GROUPS

Khamenei
Rafsanjani
Ahmadinejad
Moj. Khamenei
Jafari
Taeb
Yazdi
Naqdi
Ali Larijani
Tavakoli
Velayati
Sadeq Larijani
G.H. Elham
M. Ali-Ramin
Moj.Hashemi
Hassan Abassi
Mohsen Rezaei
Karroubi
Mousavi
Ali Khatami
Khorasani
Iranian Media
Bazaar Class
University Students
Jundollah
MEK
PJAK
Royalists
Obama
Clinton
CENTCOM
CIA
Biden

Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Jundollah
MEK
PJAK
Royalists
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

POSTION

INFLUENCE

25
75
20
25
15
5
25
10
40
40
45
40
35
20
20
20
15
115
115
95
50
25
110
175
150
150
150
125
190
190
190
190
190

100
50
75
20
75
65
40
45
72
25
15
70
60
10
10
10
30
10
27
29
48
25
40
30
100
100
100
100
100
80
50
50
75
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GROUP-INFLUENCE

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
2
5
2
2
20
20
20
20
20

IMPORTANCE

95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
80
80
80
80
80
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Congress
AIPAC
Sistani
Israel
Egypt
Russia
China
EU
Saudi
Turkey

U.S.
U.S.
Sistani
Israel
Egypt
Russia
China
EU
Saudi
Turkey

190
190
75
190
145
25
25
185
75
130

70
60
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

20
20
12
7
3
10
11
10
5
10

80
90
75
90
85
70
70
70
90
90

Inputs on Iran Collected on 6/27/2011 (Governance)
STAKEHOLDER

GROUP

Khamenei
Rafsanjani
Ahmadinejad
Moj. Khamenei
Jafari
Taeb
Yazdi
Naqdi
Ali Larijani
Tavakoli
Velayati
Sadeq Larijani
G.H. Elham
M. Ali-Ramin
Moj.Hashemi
Hassan Abassi
Mohsen Rezaei
Karroubi
Mousavi
Ali Khatami
Khorasani
Iranian Media
Bazaar Class
University Students

Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Iran
Jundolla
h
Mek
Pjak
Royalists

Jundollah
MEK
PJAK
Royalists

POSITION

INFLUENCE

GROUP-INFLUENCE

IMPORTANCE

25
75
20
25
15
5
25
10
40
40
45
40
35
20
20
20
15
115
115
95
50
25
110
175

100
50
75
20
75
65
40
45
72
25
15
70
60
10
10
10
30
10
27
29
48
25
40
30

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95

150
150
150
125

100
100
100
100

2
5
2
2

95
95
95
95

188

Bagherpour 189
Obama
Clinton
CENTCOM
CIA
Biden
Congress
AIPAC
Sistani
Israel
Egypt
Russia
China
EU
Saudi
Turkey

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Sistani
Israel
Egypt
Russia
China
Eu
Saudi
Turkey

190
190
190
190
190
190
190
75
190
145
25
25
185
75
130

100
80
50
50
75
70
60
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

20
20
20
20
20
20
20
12
7
3
10
11
10
5
10

80
80
80
80
80
80
90
75
90
85
70
70
70
90
90

Inputs on Libya Collected on 3/22/2011 (Governance)
STAKEHOLDER

GROUPS

POSTION

INFLUENCE

Muamar Gaddafi
Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi
Abu-Bakr Yunis Jabr
Mustafa Abdul Jalil
Omar El-Hariri
Abdul Fatah Younis
Suleiman Mahmoud
Khalifa Belqasim Haftar
Mohammed Hawil
Abdelhafiz Ghoka
Abdul Raham Shalgam
Ali Al Awjali
Ibrahim Omar Al
Dabashi
Mahmoud Jebril
Ali Tarhouni
Ali al-Essawi

Gaddafi Libya
Gaddafi Libya
Gaddafi Libya
Opposition
Opposition
Opposition
Opposition
Opposition
Opposition
Opposition
Opposition
Opposition

100
100
100
1
1
5
1
1
1
1
1
1

100
20
45
100
90
100
75
30
40
80
10
10

100
100
100
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80

99
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95

Opposition
Opposition
Opposition
Opposition
Libyan Oil
Corp.
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States

1
1
1
1

10
65
15
10

80
80
80
80

95
95
95
95

50
10
10
10
10
10

100
100
60
75
55
70

65
50
50
50
50
50

85
75
75
90
90
85

Shokri Ghanem
Obama
Biden
Clinton
General Ham
Gates

189

GROUP-INFLUENCE

IMPORTANCE
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Mullen
Sarkozy
Fillon
Juppe
Cameron
Hague
NATO
Erdogan
Gul
Hu Jintao
Wen Jiabao
India
Mevedev
Putin
Tantawi
Essam Sharaf
Israel
Kuwait
Khamenei
Ahmadinejad
Syria
UAE
Brazil
Saudi

United States
France
France
France
UK
UK
NATO
Turkey
Turkey
China
China
India
Russia
Russia
Egypt
Egypt
Israel
Kuwait
Iran
Iran
Syria
UAE
Brazil
Saudi

10
10
10
10
10
10
25
45
45
75
75
75
75
75
60
60
5
5
25
25
75
15
75
65

55
100
70
65
100
100
100
100
50
100
65
100
100
80
100
50
100
100
100
75
100
100
100
100

50
35
35
35
25
25
15
10
10
35
35
10
30
30
20
20
2
1
10
10
1
1
2
1

85
95
90
90
75
75
75
70
75
60
60
65
65
65
90
90
80
80
85
85
90
75
75
90

Inputs on Libya Collected on 5/18/2011 (Governance)

STAKEHOLDER
Muamar Gaddafi
Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi
Abu-Bakr Yunis Jabr
Mustafa Abdul Jalil
Omar El-Hariri
Abdul Fatah Younis
Suleiman Mahmoud
Khalifa Belqasim Haftar
Mohammed Hawil
Abdelhafiz Ghoka
Abdul Raham Shalgam
Ali Al Awjali
Ibrahim Omar Al
Dabashi

GROUP
Gaddafi Libya
Gaddafi Libya
Gaddafi Libya
Opposition
Opposition
Opposition
Opposition
Opposition
Opposition
Opposition
Opposition
Opposition
Opposition

POSITION INFLUENCE
200
100
180
20
200
45
50
100
50
90
100
100
100
75
100
30
100
40
75
80
50
10
30
10
30

190

10

GROUPINFLUENCE
50
50
50
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
80

IMPORTANCE
99
95
95
90
90
90
85
85
90
75
74
95
95
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Mahmoud Jebril
Ali Tarhouni
Ali al-Essawi
Shokri Ghanem
Obama
Biden
Clinton
General Ham
Gates
Mullen
Sarkozy
Fillon
Juppe
Cameron
Hague
NATO
Erdogan
Gul
Hu Jintao
Wen Jiabao
India
Mevedev
Putin
Tantawi
Essam Sharaf
Israel
Kuwait
Khamenei
Ahmadinejad
Syria
UAE
Brazil
Saudi

Opposition
Opposition
Opposition
Libyan Oil
Corp.
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States
France
France
France
Uk
Uk
Nato
Turkey
Turkey
China
China
India
Russia
Russia
Egypt
Egypt
Israel
Kuwait
Iran
Iran
Syria
Uae
Brazil
Saudi

20
50
50

65
15
10

80
80
80

95
95
95

75
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
50
50
160
160
75
160
160
100
100
1
150
120
120
150
150
75
175

100
100
60
75
55
70
55
100
70
65
100
100
100
100
50
100
65
100
100
80
100
50
100
100
100
75
100
100
100
100

65
50
50
50
50
50
50
35
35
35
25
25
15
10
10
35
35
10
30
30
20
20
2
1
10
10
1
1
2
1

70
75
75
90
90
85
85
95
90
90
75
75
75
70
75
60
60
65
65
65
90
90
80
80
85
85
90
75
75
90

Inputs on Libya Collected on 8/27/2011 (Governance)
STAKEHOLDER

GROUP

Mustafa Abdul Jalil
Omar El-Hariri
Abdul Fatah Younis

Opposition
Opposition
Opposition

POSITION

INFLUENCE

1
1
5

100
90
100

191

GROUP-INFLUENCE

80
80
80

IMPORTANCE

95
95
95
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Suleiman Mahmoud
Khalifa Belqasim Haftar
Mohammed Hawil
Abdelhafiz Ghoka
Abdul Raham Shalgam
Ali Al Awjali
Ibrahim Omar Al
Dabashi
Mahmoud Jebril
Ali Tarhouni
Ali al-Essawi
Shokri Ghanem
Obama
Biden
Clinton
General Ham
Gates
Mullen
Sarkozy
Fillon
Juppe
Cameron
Hague
NATO
Erdogan
Gul
Hu Jintao
Wen Jiabao
India
Mevedev
Putin
Tantawi
Essam Sharaf
Israel
Kuwait
Khamenei
Ahmadinejad
Syria
UAE
Brazil
Saudi

Opposition
Opposition
Opposition
Opposition
Opposition
Opposition

1
1
1
1
1
1

75
30
40
80
10
10

80
80
80
80
80
80

95
95
95
95
95
95

Opposition
Opposition
Opposition
Opposition
Libyan Oil
Corp.
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States
France
France
France
Uk
Uk
Nato
Turkey
Turkey
China
China
India
Russia
Russia
Egypt
Egypt
Israel
Kuwait
Iran
Iran
Syria
Uae
Brazil
Saudi

1
1
1
1

10
65
15
10

80
80
80
80

95
95
95
95

50
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
25
45
45
75
75
75
75
75
60
60
5
5
25
25
75
15
75
65

100
100
60
75
55
70
55
100
70
65
100
100
100
100
50
100
65
100
100
80
100
50
100
100
100
75
100
100
100
100

65
50
50
50
50
50
50
35
35
35
25
25
15
10
10
35
35
10
30
30
20
20
2
1
10
10
1
1
2
1

95
75
75
90
90
85
85
95
90
90
75
75
75
70
75
60
60
65
65
65
90
90
80
80
85
85
90
75
75
90
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Inputs on Syria Collected on 5/13/2011 (Governance)
STAKEHOLDER

GROUP

POSITIONS

INFLUENCE

GROUP-INFLUENCE

Farouk Al-Shara VP
Najah al-Attar VP
Muslim Brotherhood
Adel Safar PM
Lt. Gen. Ali Habib Mahmoud Defense
Minstry
Chief of Staff General Dawud Rajha
Syria Media
Bashar Al-Asad --President
Obama
Biden V.P.
Clinton -- Sec State
CENTCOM
Netanyahu
Khamenei
Ahmadinejad
Medvedev
China
European Union
NATO
Turkey
Egypt
Saudia

Syria
Syria
Syria
Syria

30
30
25
30

30
25
40
30

100
100
60
100

60
45
95
75

Syria
Syria
Syria
Syria
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
US.
Israel
Iran
Iran
Russia
China
EU
NATO
Turkey
Egypt
Saudia

20
20
20
35
95
95
90
95
50
65
65
35
30
90
90
60
50
10

45
40
30
85
60
50
50
20
10
60
60
50
50
60
60
60
50
30

100
100
100
100
20
20
20
20
1
35
40
30
30
20
20
40
40
5

50
50
40
50
85
85
85
85
50
40
30
60
50
80
80
95
95
20

Inputs on Syria Collected on 7/21/2011 (Governance)
STAKEHOLDER

Farouk Al-Shara
VP
Najah al-Attar VP
Muslim
Brotherhood
Adel Safar PM
Lt. Gen. Ali Habib
Mahmoud
Defense Minstry
Chief of Staff
General Dawud
Rajha
Syria Media
Ba_ath Party

GROUP

POSITION

INFLUENCE

GROUP-INFLUENCE

IMPORTANCE

Syria
Syria

25
25

20
15

100
100

95
95

Syria
Syria

70
20

15
25

100
100

95
95

Syria

15

30

100

95

Syria
Syria
Syria

10
20
20

25
20
50

100
100
100

95
95
95

193

IMPORTANCE
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Kurds
Bashar Al-Asad –
President
Obama
Biden V.P.
Clinton -- Sec
State
Donilon
Mullen
CENTCOM
Netanyahu
Khamenei
Ahmadinejad
Russia
China
European Union
Turkey
Egypt
Saudi
Arab League
Business Suni
UN

Syria

70

10

100

90

Syria
United
States
United
States
United
States
United
States
United
States
United
States
Israel
Iran
Iran
Russia
China
Eu
Turkey
Egypt
Saudi
Arab
League
Syria
UN

40

100

100

90

95

100

15

80

95

40

15

80

90

50

15

80

90

25

15

80

90

25

15

80

40
20
15
10
25
20
80
70
60
20

20
100
100
50
100
100
100
100
100
100

15
4
45
45
35
35
20
20
20
5

80
85
75
75
60
50
70
80
60
50

65
30
80

100
25
100

30
100
30

85
65
85

Inputs on Syria Collected on 8/13/2011 (Governance)
STAKEHOLDER

GROUP

POSITION

Farouk Al-Shara VP
Najah al-Attar VP
Muslim Brotherhood
Adel Safar PM
Lt. Gen. Ali Habib
Mahmoud Defense
Minstry
Chief of Staff General
Dawud Rajha
Syria Media
Ba_ath Party
Kurds

Syria
Syria
Syria
Syria

25
25
70
20

20
15
15
25

100
100
100
100

95
95
95
95

Syria

15

30

100

95

Syria
Syria
Syria
Syria

10
20
20
70

25
20
50
10

100
100
100
100

95
95
95
90

194

INFLUENCE

GROUP-INFLUENCE

IMPORTANCE
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Bashar Al-Asad --President
Obama
Biden V.P.
Clinton -- Sec State
Donilon
Mullen
CENTCOM
Netanyahu
Khamenei
Ahmadinejad
Russia
China
European Union
Turkey
Egypt
Saudi
Arab League
Business Suni
UN

Syria
United
States
United
States
United
States
United
States
United
States
United
States
Israel
Iran
Iran
Russia
China
Eu
Turkey
Egypt
Saudi
Arab League
Syria
UN

40

100

100

90

95

100

15

80

95

40

15

80

90

50

15

80

90

25

15

80

90

25

15

80

40
20
15
10
25
20
80
70
60
20
65
30
80

20
100
100
50
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
25
100

15
4
45
45
35
35
20
20
20
5
30
100
30

80
85
75
75
60
50
70
80
60
50
85
65
85

Inputs on Syria Collected on 11/9/2011 (Governance)
STAKEHOLDER

GROUP

Farouk Al-Shara VP
Najah al-Attar VP
Muslim Brotherhood
Adel Safar PM
Lt. Gen. Ali Habib Mahmoud
Defense Minstry
Chief of Staff General Dawud
Rajha
Syria Media
Ba_ath Party
Kurds
Bashar Al-Asad --President
Obama
Biden V.P.

POSITION

INFLUENCE

Syria
Syria
Syria
Syria

30
30
65
30

30
25
35
30

100
100
100
100

95
95
95
95

Syria

20

45

100

95

Syria
Syria
Syria
Syria
Syria
United
States
United

20
20
20
85
20

40
30
50
10
100

100
100
100
100
100

95
95
95
90
90

95
95

100
40

20
20

80
80

195
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IMPORTANCE
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Clinton -- Sec State
Donilon
Mullen
CENTCOM
Netanyahu
Khamenei
Ahmadinejad
Medvedev
China
European Union
Turkey
Egypt
Saudi

States
United
States
United
States
United
States
United
States
Israel
Iran
Iran
Russia
China
Eu
Turkey
Egypt
Saudi

90

60

20

80

90

65

20

80

90

50

20

80

95
25
20
20
35
30
90
70
80

20
100
100
50
100
100
100
100
100
100

20
4
35
35
35
25
20
40
20

80
85
75
75
60
50
80
80
80

20

5

90

Inputs on Yemen Collected on 4/22/2011 (Support for Saleh)

STAKEHOLDER of YEMEN

GROUP

President Ali Abdullah Saleh
Yahia Mohamed Abdallah Saleh
Ahmed Ali Saleh
Ali Mohasen Al Ahmar
Amar Mohamed Abdallah Saleh
Yahya al-Raie
Ali Mohammed Mujawar
Hassan Zaid
Shiite Houthi
Southern Protests
Yemeni Clerics
Hamed Al Ahmer
Sadek Abdallh Al Ahmar
Abdulaziz Jubari
Yemen Army
Yemeni Youth
Yemen Media
Obama

Yemen
Yemen
Yemen
Yemen
Yemen
Yemen
Yemen
Yemen
Yemen
Yemen
Yemen
Yemen
Yemen
Yemen
Yemen
Yemen
Yemen
U.S.

POSITIONS

98
80
75
40
85
35
50
15
20
5
90
30
35
30
95
10
40
25

196

INFLUENCE

90
85
77
30
85
60
30
20
15
10
80
50
50
30
80
20
30
50

GROUP-INFLUENCE

100
90
85
40
80
40
35
30
20
10
90
40
55
15
95
25
50
100

IMPORTANCE

50
50
50
80
50
50
50
70
70
65
65
60
60
90
50
90
55
100
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Biden V.P.
Clinton -- Sec State
CENTCOM
Netanyahu
Khamenei
Ahmadinejad
Medvedev
China
European Union
NATO
Turkey
Saudi Arabia
Egypt
Head of Arab League

U.S.
U.S.
US.
Israel
Iran
Iran
Russia
China
EU
NATO
Turkey
Saudi
Egypt
Arab
League

20
23
20
2
15
15
10
20
20
20
20
40
30

45
40
35
1
20
20
20
20
30
30
10
65
40

85
90
50
100
100
95
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

100
100
90
50
50
50
50
50
90
80
90
50
88

10

20

100

85

Inputs on Bahrain Collected on 11/7/2011 (Support for Al Khalifa Family)
STAKEHOLDER

GROUP

POSITION

INFLUENCE

GROUP-INFLUENCE

IMPORTANCE

Al Khalifa Family
Al Wifaq Shiite Opposition
Al Haq Shiite Opposition
Waad Opposition Party
Shura Council
South Asian Workers
Bahrain Business Community

Bahrain
Bahrain
Bahrain
Bahrain
Bahrain
Bahrain
Bahrain
Saudi
Arabia
Us
Qatar
Egypt
Iran
Turkey
Kuwait
Uae
Iraq
Eu
China
Russia

100
10
1
10
60
20
80

100
20
20
15
85
3
60

100
100
100
100
100
100
100

95
90
90
90
95
65
90

100
80
80
75
1
80
95
90
45
75
60
60

80
70
10
50
15
10
10
10
3
10
5
3

80
70
10
50
15
10
10
10
3
10
5
3

95
85
80
80
90
70
85
85
60
70
60
60

Saudi Arabia
US
Qatar
Egypt
Iran
Turkey
Kuwait
UAE
Iraq
EU
China
Russia
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Inputs on Saudi Collected on 10/26/2011 (Governance)
STAKEHOLDER

GROUP

POSITION

INFLUENCE

GROUP-INFLUENCE

IMPORTANCE

King Abdullah al-Saud
House of Saud
The Shura
Saudi Intellectuals
Saudi Youth
Saudi Women
Shiite
Business Community

Saudi
Saudi
Saudi
Saudi
Saudi
Saudi
Saudi
Saudi
United
States
United
States
United
States
United
States
United
States
Eu
China
India
Russia
Iran
Turkey
Egypt
Israel
Yemen
Oman
Uae
Bahrain
Qatar
Kuwait

100
100
90
50
15
15
15
90

100
20
25
10
15
4
7
30

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

95
95
85
80
85
90
92
95

80

100

45

95

80

50

45

95

80

60

45

95

80

60

45

95

80
80
80
80
75
50
80
15
100
50
50
80
100
50
100

75
7
5
10
3
8
12
15
1
4
2
3
2
2
3

45
7
5
10
3
8
12
15
1
4
2
3
2
2
3

95
95
95
95
95
85
80
70
95
90
90
90
95
70
95

President Obama
Secretary Clinton
SECDEF Podesta
Tom Donilon
US Oil Companies
EU
China
India
Russia
Iran
Turkey
Egypt
Israel
Yemen
Oman
UAE
Bahrain
Qatar
Kuwait
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